IPv6 deployment is on the rise. Google reported that as of July 14 2018, 23.94 percent of users accessed its site via IPv6, up 6.16 percent from that same date in 2017. Drafted in 1998 and an Internet Standard as of July 2017, Internet Protocol 6 (IPv6) is intended to replace IPv4 in assigning devices on the internet a unique identity. Plans for IPv6 got underway after it was realized that IPv4's cap of 4.3 billion addresses would not be sufficient to cover the number of devices accessing the internet. This blog post is the first in a series aimed at encouraging IPv6 adoption, whether at the enterprise-wide level, the organizational level, or the individual, home-user level.
When considering best practices in egress filtering, it is important to remember that egress filtering is not focused on protecting your network, but rather on protecting other organizations' networks. For example, the May 2017 Wannacry Ransomware attack is believed to have exploited an exposed vulnerability in the server message block (SMB) protocol and was rapidly spread via communications over port 445. Egress and ingress filtering of port 445 would have helped limit the spread of Wannacry. In this post--a companion piece to Best Practices for Network Border Protection, which highlighted best practices for filtering inbound traffic--I explore best practices and considerations for egress filtering.
This post is co-authored by Thomas Scanlon.
When a private key in a public-key infrastructure (PKI) environment is lost or stolen, compromised end-entity certificates can be used to impersonate a principal (a singular and identifiable logical or physical entity, person, machine, server, or device) that is associated with it. An end-entity certificate is one that does not have certification authority to authorize other certificates. Consequently, the scope of a compromise or loss of an end-entity private key is limited to only those certificates whose keys were lost.
Since it is the certificate that provides the identity used for authorization, authentication of a compromised certificate can lead to critical consequences, such as loss of proprietary data or exposure of sensitive information. Compromised certificates can be used as client-authentication certificates in SSL to authenticate principals associated with the certificate (e.g., a principal mapped in Active Directory, LDAP, or another database) or they may be accepted as is, depending on the service. This blog post describes strategies for how to recover and minimize consequences from the loss or compromise of an end-entity private key.
As detailed in last week's post, SEI researchers recently identified a collection of vulnerabilities and risks faced by organizations moving data and applications to the cloud. In this blog post, we outline best practices that organizations should use to address the vulnerabilities and risks in moving applications and data to cloud services.
These practices are geared toward small and medium-sized organizations; however, all organizations, independent of size, can use these practices to improve the security of their cloud usage. It is important to note that these best practices are not complete and should be complemented with practices provided by cloud service providers, general best cybersecurity practices, regulatory compliance requirements, and practices defined by cloud trade associations, such as the Cloud Security Alliance.
As we stressed in our previous post, organizations must perform due diligence before moving data or applications to the cloud. Cloud service providers (CSPs) use a shared responsibility model for security. The CSP accepts responsibility for some aspects of security. Other aspects of security are shared between the CSP and the consumer or remain the sole responsibility of the consumer.
This post details four important practices, and specific actions, that organizations can use to feel secure in the cloud.
Organizations continue to develop new applications in or migrate existing applications to cloud-based services. The federal government recently made cloud-adoption a central tenet of its IT modernization strategy. An organization that adopts cloud technologies and/or chooses cloud service providers (CSP)s and services or applications without becoming fully informed of the risks involved exposes itself to a myriad of commercial, financial, technical, legal, and compliance risks. In this blog post, we outline 12 risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that organizations face when moving application or data to the cloud.
Each year since the blog's inception, we present the 10 most-visited posts of the year in descending order ending with the most popular post. In this blog post, we present the 10 most popular posts published between January 1, 2017 and December 31, 2017.
Insider threat continues to be a problem with approximately 50 percent of organizations experiencing at least one malicious insider incident per year, according to the 2017 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey. Although the attack methods vary depending on the industry, the primary types of attacks identified by researchers at the CERT Insider Threat Center--theft of intellectual property, sabotage, fraud, and espionage--continue to hold true. In our work with public and private industry, we continue to see that insider threats are influenced by a combination of technical, behavioral, and organizational issues. To address these threats, we have published the fifth edition of the Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, which highlights policies, procedures, and technologies to mitigate insider threats in all areas of the organization. In this blog post, excerpted from the latest edition of the guide, I highlight five best practices that are important first steps for an organization interested in establishing a program to implement to protect and detect insider threats.
This blog post is coauthored by Jose Morales and Angela Horneman.
On May 12, 2017, in the course of a day, the WannaCry ransomware attack infected nearly a quarter million computers. WannaCry is the latest in a growing number of ransomware attacks where, instead of stealing data, cyber criminals hold data hostage and demand a ransom payment. WannaCry was perhaps the largest ransomware attack to date, taking over a wide swath of global computers from FedEx in the United States to the systems that power Britain's healthcare system to systems across Asia, according to the New York Times. In this post, we spell out several best practices for prevention and response to a ransomware attack.
When it comes to network traffic, it's important to establish a filtering process that identifies and blocks potential cyberattacks, such as worms spreading ransomware and intruders exploiting vulnerabilities, while permitting the flow of legitimate traffic. In this post, the latest in a series on best practices for network security, I explore best practices for network border protection at the Internet router and firewall.
The network time protocol (NTP) synchronizes the time of a computer client or server to another server or within a few milliseconds of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). NTP servers, long considered a foundational service of the Internet, have more recently been used to amplify large-scale Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. While 2016 did not see a noticeable uptick in the frequency of DDoS attacks, the last 12 months have witnessed some of the largest DDoS attacks, according to Akamai's State of the Internet/Security report. One issue that attackers have exploited is abusable NTP servers. In 2014, there were over seven million abusable NTP servers. As a result of software upgrades, repaired configuration files, or the simple fact that ISPs and IXPs have decided to block NTP traffic, the number of abusable servers dropped by almost 99 percent in a matter months, according to a January 2015 article in ACM Queue. But there is still work to be done. It only takes 5,000 abusable NTP servers to generate a DDoS attack in the range of 50-400 Gbps. In this blog post, I explore the challenges of NTP and prescribe some best practices for securing accurate time with this protocol.
The Domain Name System (DNS) is an essential component of the Internet, a virtual phone book of names and numbers, but we rarely think about it until something goes wrong. As evidenced by the recent distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against Internet performance management company Dyn, which temporarily wiped out access to websites including Amazon, Paypal, Reddit, and the New York Times for millions of users down the Eastern Seaboard and Europe, DNS serves as the foundation for the security and operation of internal and external network applications. DNS also serves as the backbone for other services critical to organizations including email, external web access, file sharing and voice over IP (VoIP). There are steps, however, that network administrators can take to ensure the security and resilience of their DNS infrastructure and avoid security pitfalls. In this blog post, I outline six best practices to design a secure, reliable infrastructure and present an example of a resilient organizational DNS.
Late last month, Internet users across the eastern seaboard of the United States had trouble accessing popular websites, such as Reddit, Netflix, and the New York Times. As reported in Wired Magazine, the disruption was the result of multiple distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against a single organization: Dyn, a New Hampshire-based Internet infrastructure company.
DDoS attacks can be extremely disruptive, and they are on the rise. The Verisign Distributed Denial of Service Trends Report states that DDoS attack activity increased 85 percent in each of the last two years with 32 percent of those attacks in the fourth quarter of 2015 targeting IT services, cloud computing, and software-as-a-service companies. In this blog post, I provide an overview of DDoS attacks and best practices for mitigating and responding to them based on cumulative experience in this field.