Posted on by Insider Threatin
Sabotage of IT systems by employees (the so-called "inside threat") is a serious problem facing many companies today. Not only can data or computing systems be damaged, but outward-facing systems can be compromised to such an extent that customers cannot access an organization's resources or products. Previous blog postings on the topic of insider threat have discussed mitigation patterns, controls that help identify insiders at risk of committing cyber crime, and the protection of next-generation DoD enterprise systems against insider threats through the capture, validation, and application of enterprise architectural patterns. This blog post describes our latest research in determining the indicators that insiders might demonstrate prior to attacks.
The immediate and lasting impacts of IT sabotage by insiders can be catastrophic. In one case analyzed by researchers at the CERT Insider Threat Center, a disgruntled employee sabotaged IT systems hosting a child abuse hotline, preventing access to the organization's website. Another similar case resulted in severe limitations of 911 emergency services in four major cities. In another instance, a company went out of business because an insider deleted all research data and stole all backups.
Since 2001, researchers at the CERT Insider Threat Center have documented malicious insider activity by examining publicly available information such as media reports and court transcripts. We have also conducted interviews with the United States Secret Service, victims' organizations, and convicted felons. The goals of our research have been to answer the following questions:
Previous research has been conducted on enabling and measuring early detection of insider threats, but several of the studies lacked access to the large collection of real-world cases our team has collected over the past 11 years.
As part of our research, we focused on the timeline of events in cases of IT sabotage. Specifically, we looked at the following:
Our analysis was based on more than 50 cases of insider IT sabotage (other types of insider threat behavior include fraud and theft of intellectual property). From the selected cases, we created a chronology of events for each incident. The number of events per insider incident ranged from 5 to more than 40, with an average of 15.
We began by trying to identify specific events in each case that represented key points of the incident. These key points are described as follows:
After we determined which events corresponded to each key point, we analyzed each case to determine whether the events or behaviors prior to each event indicated a predisposition for sabotage. For this project, we considered predispositions to be characteristics of the individual that can contribute to the risk of behaviors leading to malicious activity. For example, one issue we examined is whether an employee--prior to the point of clear disgruntlement--demonstrated a serious mental health disorder, an addiction to drugs or alcohol, or a history of rule conflicts.
Although we are still conducting analysis, two patterns have emerged:
One of the challenges we face in our work is measuring early detection with respect to the moment of attack. Specifically, we have found the following factors particularly troublesome:
Another difficulty we have experienced is a scarcity of detailed data. While we have several hundred cases to choose from, our sources for these cases are sometimes limited to court documents, media reports, etc., which generally do not contain detailed technical or behavioral descriptions of the insiders' actions prior to attack.
To help maintain integrity of our results and evaluation methodologies, we are collaborating with Roy Maxion from CMU's School of Computer Science, who is well known for his research in research methodologies and data quality issues.
One important factor to note is that our data is somewhat biased, as we only consider malicious insiders who have been convicted of a crime related to their insider activity, and we are limited in the scope of data sources used. The number of insiders who are not detected, or detected but not reported, is probably much greater than the number of insiders convicted. Moreover, our results are not generalizable to the entire scope of IT sabotage. They do, however, provide some of the best evidence available for researchers and practitioners to develop novel controls for preventing and detecting some types of sabotage - including the types of high-impact crimes that result in prosecution and conviction of the insider.
Impact of our Work and Future Plans
Through this research, we plan to equip organizations, companies, and even government agencies with improved insider threat detection capabilities. We believe that our work will be of particular relevance to programs in multiple sectors of industry and finance throughout the United States.
We also hope that our findings will establish a foundation for future research. Specifically, we are interested in leveraging our findings to develop controls, such as technical and non-technical methods of preventing and detecting insider threat.
CERT Insider Threat Blog
Chronological Examination of Insider Threat Sabotage: Preliminary Observations presented at the International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats
The "Big Picture" of Insider IT Sabotage Across U.S. Critical Infrastructures, Technical Report, May 2008
Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis