This post was also authored by Andrew Hoover.
In Cybersecurity Architecture, Part 1: Cyber Resilience and Critical Service, we talked about the importance of identifying and prioritizing critical or high-value services and the assets and data that support them. In this post, we'll introduce our approach for reviewing the security of the architecture of information systems that deliver or support these services. We'll also describe our review's first areas of focus: System Boundary and Boundary Protection.
The purpose of this two-part blog series is to discuss five challenges that often plague insider threat programs and more specifically the analysts that are working in insider threat hubs. I am in a unique position to discuss this area because I have many years of experience working directly with operational insider threat programs of varying maturity levels. Thus I have a front-row vantage point to understand the challenges that analysts face on a daily basis. In this blog post, I will discuss some of the key challenges and associated recommendations (e.g., quick wins) facing many organizations.
The National Institute for Science and Technology (NIST) recently released version 1.1 of its Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). Organizations around the world--including the federal civilian government, by mandate--use the CSF to guide key cybersecurity activities. However, the framework's 108 subcategories can feel daunting. This blog post describes the Software Engineering Institute's recent efforts to group the 108 subcategories into 15 clusters of related activities, making the CSF more approachable for typical organizations. The post also gives example scenarios of how organizations might use the CSF Activity Clusters to facilitate more effective cybersecurity decision making.
In this blog series, I review topics related to deploying a text analytics capability for insider threat mitigation. In this segment, I continue the conversation by disambiguating terminology related to text analysis, summarizing methodological approaches for developing text analytics tools, and justifying how this capability can supplement an existing capability to monitor insider threat risk. In my next post, Acquiring or Deploying a Text Analytics Solution, I will discuss how organizations can think through the process of procuring or developing a custom in-house text analytics solution.
In this blog series I cover topics related to deploying a text analytics capability for insider threat mitigation. A text analytics capability is a means of measuring the risk employees may pose to an organization by monitoring the sentiment and emotion expressed in their communications.
According to the Verizon 2018 Data Breach Investigations Report, email was an attack vector in 96% of incidents and breaches that involved social actions (manipulation of people as a method of compromise). The report also says an average of 4% of people will fall for any given phish, and the more phishing emails they have clicked, the more likely they are to click again. The mantra of "more user training" may be helping with the phishing problem, but it isn't solving it. In this blog post, I will cover four technical methods for improving an organization's phishing defense. These methods are vendor- and tool-agnostic, don't require a large security team, and are universally applicable for small and large organizations alike.
Insider threat programs can better implement controls and detect malicious insiders when they communicate indicators of insider threat consistently and in a commonly accepted language. The Insider Threat Indicator Ontology is intended to serve as a standardized expression of potential indicators of malicious insider activity.
Editor's note: This blog post first appeared on the FAIR Institute Blog.
Organizations with a mix of cutting-edge technologies and legacy systems need adaptable, agile frameworks that provide executives with a real-time view of cyber risks. They also need tools and processes to ensure that everyone from executives to practitioners practice sound, consistent risk management.
Mitigating insider threats is a multifaceted challenge that involves the collection and analysis of data to identify threat posed by many different employee types (such as full-time, part-time, or contractors) with authorized access to assets such as people, information, technology, and facilities. The landscape of software and tools designed to aid in this process is almost as wide and varied as the problem itself, which leaves organizations with the challenge of understanding not only the complexities of insider threats, but also the wide array of tools and techniques that can assist with threat mitigation. This post explores some of the recommended tool features and functionality available through use of a combination of tools, as well as a proposed process to implement and operate controls at an organization.
In our cyber resilience assessments at the CERT Division of the SEI, we often find that organizations struggle with several fundamentals of cybersecurity management. Specifically, organizations have trouble identifying what critical assets need to be protected and then implementing specific cyber architecture controls, such as network segmentation and boundary protection, to protect them. This post will be the first in a series focusing on common weaknesses in organizational cybersecurity architecture. This initial post focuses on the importance of identifying an organization's critical assets and data so it can design a cybersecurity architecture that incorporates controls to protect those systems.
The CERT Division of the SEI has evaluated the cyber resilience of hundreds of organizations. We've seen that many organizations may not have formally established a controls management program. In this blog post, we will describe the basic controls management life cycle and provide a method for establishing effective controls for a new "green field" system or identifying gaps in an existing "brown field" system.
The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a directive that concerns the processing of personal data by private organizations operating in the European Union, whether as employers or as service providers. While many organizations have focused their GDPR readiness efforts on managing data subjects' personal information on customers, employees are also considered data subjects. This post will focus on an organization's obligations to its EU employees (inclusive of contractors and trusted business partners, regardless of a formal contract) under GDPR.
This blog post outlines best practices for establishing an appropriate level of control to mitigate the risks involved in working with outside entities that support your organization's mission. In today's business landscape, organizations often rely on suppliers such as technology vendors, suppliers of raw materials, shared public infrastructure, and other public services. These outside entities are all examples of the supply chain, which is a type of trusted business partner (TBP). However, these outside entities can pose significant security risks.
Insiders have been known to collude with others, both with coworkers (i.e., other insiders) and outsiders. In our previous post on insider collusion and its impact, we explored 395 insider incidents of collusion and found that insiders working with outsider-accomplices had greater financial impact to their organization than those working with other insiders. When an insider works alone, or when an insider works with others within their organization, User Activity Monitoring (UAM) / User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) tools have the ability to identify one or multiple insiders as engaging in anomalous or suspicious activity. When insiders are working together, further analysis can correlate that suspicious activity and provide insight into where data may have moved. But what insight do organizations have when an insider reaches out to others to commit a malicious act? In this post, we explore a subset of these insider-outsider collusion incidents that involve an insider's significant other (i.e., current or former partners or spouses).
In this blog post, I will discuss substance abuse as a potential precursor to increased insider threat and share statistics from the CERT National Insider Threat Center's (NITC) Insider Incident Corpus on incidents that involved some type of substance use or abuse by the insider. In relation to insider threats, I will discuss the prevalence of substance abuse and discuss some of its impacts on organizations. Finally, I will outline some technical means of detecting employee substance abuse and share some best practices from the CERT Common Sense Guide for Mitigating Insider Threats.
This post is also authored by Matt Trevors.
The 2003 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule requires health care organizations to safeguard electronic protected health information (ePHI). We have recently mapped the practice questions in the Cyber Resilience Review (CRR) to the Security Rule requirements. This post describes the mapping and how organizations can use the CRR alongside the HIPAA Security Rule.
Many organizations allow limited personal use of organizational equipment. To move personal data to or from the organization's devices and network, employees typically use email, removable media, or cloud storage--the same channels a malicious insider would use for data exfiltration. This post explores a new way, based on cross-domain solutions, for employees to safely transfer personal data between an organization's network and their own systems.
After 30 years, cyber command centers, educators, and Internet threat intelligence organizations have yet to embrace a standardized, encompassing, and intuitive way to represent the entities and activities of the Internet. Such a representation would make the Internet more understandable and allow shared situational awareness of Internet events and activities--the much-sought-after "Cyber Common Operational Picture." This post describes Atlas: a working demonstration application for visualizing the Internet.
Since 1988's Morris Worm, which infected 10% of the estimated 60,000 computers connected to the internet, cybersecurity has grown into an industry expected to exceed $1 trillion in global spending between 2017 and 2021. Cybercrime will cost the global business market an estimated average of $6 trillion annually through the same time frame! So how do we spend just enough money on cybersecurity to be resilient and achieve our business objectives despite disruptive events like cyber-attacks?
By Matt Mackie
When the Internet was still ARPANET, hostnames were converted to numerical addresses using a hosts.txt file stored locally on each computer. This system evolved into today's hierarchical domain name system (DNS). Namecoin is a new--and old--alternative to DNS: it relies on a locally stored file, like the hosts.txt file, but the file is a blockchain, similar to that used in Bitcoin financial transactions. This cryptoDNS offers anonymity, security, and resistance to censorship--features that make it attractive to privacy advocates and criminals alike.
Developing security metrics within an organization is an ongoing challenge. Organizations want to know "Am I secure enough?" While this is the common question, it lacks context. Organizations vary in size, mission, risk appetites, and budget for security. There is no "one size fits all" for security metrics.
Increasingly, organizations, including the federal government and industry, are recognizing the need to counter insider threats and are doing it through specially focused teams. The CERT Division National Insider Threat Center (NITC) offers an Insider Threat Program Manager certificate to help organizations build such teams and supports programs that are flexible, based on best practices, and tailored to the unique circumstances of individual organizations.
The transition from on-premises information systems to cloud services represents a significant, and sometimes uncomfortable, new way of working for organizations. Establishing meaningful Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and monitoring the security performance of cloud service providers are two significant challenges. This post proposes that a process- and data-driven approach would alleviate these concerns and produce high-quality SLAs that reduce risk and increase transparency.
Each year brings new cybersecurity threats, breaches, and previously unknown vulnerabilities in established systems. Even with unprecedented vulnerabilities such as Spectre and Meltdown, the approach to dealing with the risks they pose is the same as ever: sound risk management with systematic processes to assess and respond to risks. This post offers seven considerations for cyber risk management.
The CERT National Insider Threat Center (NITC) has been researching insider threats since 2001. In this blog post, we provide an overview of the CERT Insider Threat Vulnerability Assessment methodology, the CERT Insider Threat Vulnerability Assessor (ITVA) Training course, and the CERT Insider Threat Vulnerability Assessor Certificate program.
There are many reasons for an organization to perform a penetration test of its information systems: to meet compliance standards, test a security team's capabilities, or determine the effectiveness of controls, to name a few. A badly scoped or poorly executed penetration test might do nothing more than validate known vulnerabilities, easily identified by software, or reiterate the efficacy of social engineering. However, with some preparation and engagement on the part of the consumer, a penetration test can provide real value to an organization's overall cybersecurity posture. Read on to learn how.
Each year, the CERT Division of the SEI collaborates with CSO Magazine to develop a U.S. State of Cybercrime report1. These reports are based on surveys of more than 500 organizations across the country, ranging in size from fewer than 500 employees to more than 10,000. Each organization self-reports on information security issues that have impacted them in the past calendar year. The 2017 report covers activity that occurred in 2016. In this blog post, we share some of the findings from the upcoming report as they relate to insider threats.
The National Insider Threat Center (NITC) at the CERT Division of the SEI is developing an Insider Threat Program Evaluator (ITPE) Training course based on the methods and techniques the NITC currently uses to conduct Insider Threat Program Evaluations. This three-day, instructor-led, classroom-based, certificate training program presents strategies for measuring and evaluating an operational insider threat program within an organization. The first course will be offered in March 2018.