On May 18, 2016, the DOD published Change 2 to DoD 5220.22-M, "National Industrial Security Operating Manual (NISPOM)," which requires contractors to establish and maintain an insider threat program to detect, deter, and mitigate insider threats. The intent of this blog post is to describe the summary of changes required by Change 2 and the impact it will have on contracting organizations.
Collusion among malicious insiders can produce a larger attack surface in terms of access to organizational assets. In theory, multiple actors could perform reconnaissance from within the "need-to-know" aspect of their job responsibilities to commit fraud or theft of intellectual property. Consequently, these malicious actors could then evade detection, presenting a real threat to an organization. In this blog post, I explore the concept of collusion among malicious insiders.
Effective cross-department collaboration usually requires a common standard language for communication. Until recently, the insider threat community has suffered from a lack of standardization when expressing potential insider threat risk indicators. The CERT Division's research into insider threat detection, prevention, and mitigation methods steered the design process for a newly proposed ontology for communicating insider threat indicators. Such an ontology allows organizations to share threat detection intelligence. In this post, I briefly describe our recently released report, An Insider Threat Indicator Ontology.