

# Protect What Matters™

## Secluded Semiconductors, Inc. Case Study

Software Engineering Institute Zero Trust Industry Day

Gartner

Cool  
Vendor  
2017

CISO  
CHOICE  
AWARDS

2020  
FINALIST  
NETWORK  
SECURITY




Marty Fabry  
May 14, 2024

# Agenda

- Review of the Secluded Semiconductors environment
- Our approach to Zero Trust
- Proposed deployment architecture for Secluded Semiconductors
- Review of the challenge and specific questions
- Additional thoughts and considerations


# Scenario - Secluded Semiconductors, Inc.

CONUS



Satellite Links

SECLUDED ISLAND




## **We combine**


- Network zone-based segmentation (Virtual Chambers)
- Micro-segmentation inside and across chambers
- Access control (ZTNA, both remote and on-prem)
- Overlay application network

**into an integrated, coherent solution**  
for IT, OT, and Cloud

# Zentera CoIP® Platform: NIST SP800-207 ZTA With Simple, Identity-Based Policies




**NIST SP 800-207  
Zero Trust Architecture**





# Zentera Zero Trust Solution for Secluded Semiconductors

CONUS




- zCenter/ZNS**  
PDP and Datapath
- zLink**  
PEP
- MSG**  
PEP
- User Launcher**  
PEP
- Virtual Chamber**  
NIST SP800-207  
Implicit Trust Zone
- Access Policy**

SECLUDED ISLAND



## Challenge



**A hurricane passes by the island that knocks out the satellite communications and could reduce the power grid capabilities for up to three days.**

**How would your zero trust approach support continued operations for the manufacturing facility?**

# Questions

1. What mitigations would reduce the resulting security/resilience risks and threats associated with the island infrastructure?
  - For the ZT system, the PDP is deployed with HA – island and CONUS ZT systems continue to operate autonomously until connectivity is restored
    - Chambers continue to protect data and assets against unauthorized access, for example malicious insiders who may seek to take advantage of the event
  - Virtual chambers can be configured to fail open, allowing administrators to prioritize availability/safety if the factory network infrastructure is unstable
  - Dependencies on CONUS resources and applications should be identified and a suitable local backup should be configured to minimize the need to fail-open



# Questions


## 2. What concerns do legacy systems create, and how would the legacy systems be addressed to support the zero trust strategy?

- Legacy systems:
  - May not be patchable, and may have many vulnerabilities as a result
  - May not support modern authentication methods, including multi-factor
  - May be deployed with network topologies that cannot be easily changed (e.g. to add segmentation)
- Zentera uses the following strategies to protect legacy systems
  - Micro-segmentation to isolate legacy systems, with ZT identity-based access control
  - Encrypted LAN/WAN overlay to hide vulnerable traffic
  - Agent-based PEP for Win XP+, RHEL 5+, etc
  - Agentless PEP (MSG) for all other types of legacy systems

# Questions

3. What challenges arise with OT and IIoT systems when considering a zero trust implementation? How do you resolve those challenges?
- OT and IIoT systems often are closed, and do not support agent-based deployments
  - The Zentera MSG enables a “Zero Trust DMZ” deployed in front of OT/IIoT workloads or subnets containing them


# MSG: Micro-Segmentation, Access Control, with Zero Trust Enforcement



- Creates an inline segmentation boundary (“Zero Trust DMZ”) enforcing new implicit trust zones for groups of devices
- Layer 2 non-disruptive insertion (no change to existing IP switch and routing architecture), with hardware bypass for fail-open
- Inline Zero Trust access policy enforcement
- Terminates ZTNA user access sessions in ZT DMZ
- Various form factors and LAN modules for different applications

# Questions

4. In a highly connected system like a smart city, how do you handle threats and vulnerabilities with a zero trust implementation without impacting overall functionality?
- Wherever possible, migrate users to ZT authentication, especially for sensitive or privileged services, and make web / data services private
  - In a highly connected system, it may not be feasible to identify every single client (e.g. public-facing web service)
    - In such cases, we recommend deploying standard application protections (e.g. FW, WAF) and protect each tier with its own NIST SP800-207 trust zone



Zero Trust enforces proper flow of tiered communications, and enables quarantining of servers that violate policy

# Questions

## 5. How does zero trust help address the accessibility and availability required of a manufacturing environment?

- Zero Trust can:
  - help to reduce the urgency of patching, or provide a compensating control for unpatchable (EOL) systems
  - provide simple, least-privilege access to remote users, improving user experience while reducing the attack surface of the manufacturing environment
  - be configured to fail-open, enabling administrators to make conscious choices about how and when to degrade security effectiveness
  - reduce the urgency of cyber incident response due to compartmentalization provided by segmentation

# Questions

6. What factors must be considered when managing disasters with a zero trust implementation?
  - Failover behavior triggered by denied, degraded, intermittent, or limited (DDIL) communications on ZT orchestration and dependencies
  - Implicit trust zone behavior for an asset: fail-closed (prioritize Confidentiality) or fail-closed (prioritize Availability)?
  - Enhanced logging and history during a disaster are crucial for forensics and post-mortem analysis

# Questions

7. In the event of a loss of connectivity with cloud services, how do you manage identity and access management (IAM)?
- Our Zero Trust solutions can support configuration of multiple IAM/identity providers to help avoid single points of failure
  - Access rights are documented by Zero Trust policies and maintained in a replicated database

# Final Considerations for Secluded Semiconductors

- The importance of integration
  - For the Zero Trust program to succeed, it cannot just be about maturity in each pillar; action must be orchestrated across *all* pillars; even “best of breed” tools may be exceedingly difficult to orchestrate if not designed for this!
- Focus on adopting Zero Trust from the inside out
  - Zero Trust is about protecting assets and data – not about creating “secure infrastructure”
  - Make the problem and journey tractable by protecting a few applications, learning how to operate, and then scale
- Overlay networks can be very useful!
  - Eliminating dependence on physical IPs can help with resiliency by allowing you to quickly use alternate connectivity
  - Service insertion of other tools as necessary – eg DLP scanning, threat analysis, etc.



# Q&A

# Thank You!

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