

# Improving Cyber Resiliency Through Microsegmentation Policy Optimization

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
**MITRE**

SOLVING PROBLEMS  
FOR A SAFER WORLD

# Introduction

- Optimal microsegmentation access policy rules  $\langle \textit{source IP}, \textit{destination IP}, \textit{source port}, \textit{destination port}, \textit{protocol} \rangle$  enforced via AWS Group Policy
- Optimization objective function that balances cyberattack risks against accessibility to critical network resources
- Genetic algorithm finds policy rules that optimize the objective function
- MITRE *Adaptive Resiliency Experimentation System* (ARES)
  - Off-the-shelf security tools and AI/ML components for optimizing cyber resilience
  - Includes microsegmentation, authentication, policy generalization, redundancy, deception, zero-trust architecture
- Reference: Steven Noel, Vipin Swarup, Karin Johnsgard, “Optimizing Network Microsegmentation Policy for Cyber Resilience,” *Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation*, Special Issue on Impact Analysis for Cyber Defense Optimization, 2021.

# Overview of Approach




- Host and network sensors forward data to repository
- Data elements correlated across the sensor types


- Network data mapped to model for threat and mission
  - Adversary reachability via multi-step exploitation
  - Mission criticality for access to network resources

- Policy rules that provide optimal network resiliency
- Optimization objectives: maximize adversary effort and mission availability


# Optimization Framework



$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 01110 \\ 00100 \\ 00001 \\ 00100 \\ 00000 \end{bmatrix} \quad P = \begin{bmatrix} 01110 \\ 00100 \\ 0000\mathbf{0} \\ 00100 \\ 00000 \end{bmatrix}$$



# Optimization Objective Function




Graph Adjacency Matrix And Powers

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 01110 \\ 00100 \\ 00001 \\ 00100 \\ 00000 \end{bmatrix}$$


$$A^2 = \begin{bmatrix} 01110 \\ 00100 \\ 00001 \\ 00100 \\ 00000 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} 01110 \\ 00100 \\ 00001 \\ 00100 \\ 00000 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 00201 \\ 00001 \\ 00000 \\ 00001 \\ 00000 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$A^3 = A \times A^2 = \begin{bmatrix} 01110 \\ 00100 \\ 00001 \\ 00100 \\ 00000 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} 00201 \\ 00001 \\ 00000 \\ 00001 \\ 00000 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 00002 \\ 00000 \\ 00000 \\ 00000 \\ 00000 \end{bmatrix}$$



Objective O3.1


O3.1.1 ( $k$  Shortest Attack Paths Blocked)



Objective O3.2


Mapping Dominance Relations To Numerical Ranges

# Illustrative Example









# Scoring Candidate Solutions

Policy (With Host-to-Host Impact)					Total Mission Impact	Blocked Shortest Paths			Blocked Edges
$p_{3,1}$ (10)	$p_{3,2}$	$p_{4,1}$ (5)	$p_{4,2}$	$p_{4,3}$ (10)		Length 1	Length 2	Length 3	
0	0	0	0	0	25	1	2	1	5
0	0	0	0	1	15	1	2	1	4
0	0	0	1	0	25	0	2	1	4
0	0	0	1	1	15	0	2	1	3
0	0	1	0	0	20	1	1	1	4
0	0	1	0	1	10	1	1	1	3
0	0	1	1	0	20	0	1	1	3
0	0	1	1	1	10	0	1	1	2
0	1	0	0	0	25	1	2	1	4
0	1	0	0	1	15	1	1	1	3
0	1	0	1	0	25	0	2	1	3
0	1	0	1	1	15	0	1	1	4
0	1	1	0	0	20	1	1	1	3
0	1	1	0	1	10	1	0	1	2
0	1	1	1	0	20	0	1	1	2
0	1	1	1	1	10	0	0	1	1
1	0	0	0	0	15	1	2	1	4
1	0	0	0	1	5	1	2	0	3
1	0	0	1	0	15	0	2	1	3
1	0	0	1	1	5	0	2	0	2
1	0	1	0	0	10	1	1	1	3
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	2
1	0	1	1	0	10	0	1	1	2
1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
1	1	0	0	0	15	1	2	1	3
1	1	0	0	1	5	1	1	0	2
1	1	0	1	0	15	0	2	1	2
1	1	0	1	1	5	0	1	0	3
1	1	1	0	0	10	1	1	1	2
1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
1	1	1	1	0	10	0	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0



# Pareto Optimal Solutions

Policy (With Host-to-Host Impact)					Total Mission Impact	Blocked Shortest Paths			Blocked Edges
$p_{3,1}$ (10)	$p_{3,2}$	$p_{4,1}$ (5)	$p_{4,2}$	$p_{4,3}$ (10)		Length 1	Length 2	Length 3	
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	2
1	0	0	0	1	5	1	2	0	3
1	1	0	0	0	15	1	2	1	3




**Legend**  
 Mission  
 Attack




# Baseline Policy For Testbed Network


Observed Network Flows



Threat Scenario




# Optimizing Policy Over a Threat Scenario




Threat Scenario


## Genetic Algorithm Evolution




# Optimal Solutions For Different Mission vs Threat Tradeoff




Mission Accessibility: 100%




75%




62.5%



50%




25%





0%

# Full Range of Tradeoff between Mission and Threat



# Scalability



Synthesized based on data distributions from testbed network (74 hosts)

# Summary

- Optimization of microsegmentation policy for a network, with tunable tradeoffs between security and mission
  - Maximize adversary effort in exploitation steps (block shorter paths)
  - Maximize accessibility to critical network resources
- Genetic algorithm to find optimal policy
  - Candidate solutions as individuals in evolving population
  - Fitness function for security/mission tradeoff
- Baseline for MITRE Adaptive Resiliency Experimentation System (ARES), which jointly optimizes microsegmentation, authentication, policy generalization, redundancy, deception, and zero-trust architecture for adaptive intelligent cyber resiliency

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