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


## **DevOps Security:**

Ignore It As Much As You Would Ignore Regular Security



**DevOps security?** 



### What is "DevOps security"?

"DevOps security" isn't a thing. We're talking about minding your security in the context of the cultural and technological shift toward DevOps.

### Poll: At what point do you consider security?

- A) At the very beginning
- B) Sometime in the middle
- C) Toward the end
- D) Not at all

### Is DevOps, itself, a security problem?

- **Automation**
- False sense of security, about security
- Security as a fourth arm to DevOps
- Docker
- Using DevOps principles for security analysis
- Security and everyone but you

#### **Automation**

- Increased attack surface with added third-party tools and services, each with additional scripts and configuration
- Straightforward to automate a manual process, but easy to leave behind all the paranoia you had when you wrote that manual process
- Not everything needs to be, or should be, automated
- Tip: draw perimeters around things you trust and let that guide where human interaction and verification is needed

### False sense of security

(security about security)

- DevOps makes everything better, so relax
- Application code is stronger, but infrastructure just blew up
- Continuous integration sabotage

### How to Security, DevOps-like

- Do have a security team, with domain expertise
- Don't merge the security role with development, operations, or QA roles
- Do include the security team and collaborate with them from Day 1
- Do generate security tests with every change
- https://www.ruggedsoftware.org
- http://gauntlt.org

Poll: Does your organization have a dedicated security role?

#### Docker as an attack vector?

#### **Containers**

- Could have access to the root of the host file system
- Kernel namespaces help isolate containers

#### The Docker daemon

- The daemon must run as root
- Multi-tenant systems share the daemon
- Control over the daemon is control over all containers

### The Docker registry

- Anyone can post an image
- No checking is done to enforce the security of images

### Poll: Do you use Docker?

### **Docker Wrangling**

- Use certificates for registry access
- Be mindful of what services run as what users and with what permissions
- Don't assume images downloaded from the registry are safe to use without close inspection first
- Be mindful of how third-party hosts operate with Docker and other containerizing or virtualization technologies – your code may not be where you think it is

### How to Security Analysis, DevOps-like

- Are there security signals in your feedback loop?
- We want to quantify security analysis results, but there is a particular difficulty in quantifying security
- Cannot always get actionable results from automated security tests
- Cannot always respond in an automated way to security issues


### **Security and everyone else**

Interaction with customers to identify their goals is necessary to determine what is important to them in terms of x.

- Let x be security
  - Your security focus can break the thing they need to work
  - What they need to work can break without security
  - Build value for them based on this relationship between what they need and the security you can provide



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