



# Striking the Balance:

## Measuring and Managing the Complexity of Cyber Environments

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# Value Proposition in Understanding Complexity

**Organizations must strive to make risk-based decisions to optimize their security stack.**

- This is not as easy as it sounds.

Threat actor tactics and techniques continually shift as much as the technology is evolving.

- Security stacks are diverse and complex.

**The complexity of the system may inhibit or enhance performance.**

- **Measurement would enable better decisions.**



# Use Case Example – Why Measure Complexity?

**Imagine having a speedometer for your cybersecurity control stack.**

- Provides indication of activity of your system.
- Could be thought of as a proxy for risk.
  - High speed = high risk
  - Low speed = high risk



**Changes to assets and controls could impact the index.**

- Think about physical, administrative, and technical controls.
- Dynamic environments that have many devices coming and going.

# Can Complexity of Cyber Be Measured?

**Complexity** — Cambridge Dictionary defines as the state of having many parts and being difficult to understand

- This research focuses upon complexity of cybersecurity that inhibits strategic objectives at the organizational level.

## **HYPOTHESIS:**

- System complexity is measured on a spectrum that ranges from overly simplistic to burdensome with a middle range of optimal performance.
  - For example, a system may have so much complexity that the performance is hindered, and organizational objectives are impacted negatively.
  - Alternatively, the system complexity may be minimal and allow threat actors to navigate and exploit the system in a shorter time period resulting in greater negative impact.
  - The optimal range of complexity strikes a balance between the ends of this spectrum where the system operates efficiently, yet threat actors have trouble navigating it once within its boundaries.



# Decomposing Cybersecurity Complexity

The cybersecurity stack of any organization has many diverse elements.

These elements may be contributing in part or in tandem to create a complex ecosystem.

An optimal balance is necessary to deliver value to the organization.



# Additional Elements to Consider

Other elements may be considered in this model.


However, these elements may be “cross-cutting”.

**Cross cutting considerations include:**

- **Supply Chain**
- **Resource Constraints**



# Quantifying System Interfaces



Complexity may be related to the number of interconnections in a system.

- Technical or even administrative

**May be quantified for the index using [Metcalf's Law](#)**

- Communication Channels =  $N^2$
- Where  $N$  = number of nodes in the system
- Weighting of nodes may be considered based upon critical nature

Technically speaking, net flow may provide measure.

- Sensor selection and placement critical
- May only consider internal flow

# Quantifying Organizational Capability



## Organizational Capability

Complexity may be related to the ability of the organization to manage and utilize its assets effectively.

- Represented by workforce skills and capabilities
- Process efficiencies may also be considered here

This complexity factor may be measured by analyzing the structure of the organization and needs as they relate to the security stack.

- National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE)  
The National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework  
Version 1.0
- [Structuring the Chief Information Security Officer Organization](#)

**Scores may be determined by organizational needs.**

# Quantifying Technical Debt



## Technical Debt

Complexity may also depend upon technical debt.

- Size and potential errors in the code base
- Architectural inadequacies
- Legacy infrastructure


Some research shows that the following may be considered for quantification:

- Heuristics related to [errors per lines of code](#)
- Historic [customer support costs](#) may provide some additional insights

# Index Will Come from an Integration of Parts

The three elements will each yield a quantitative measure.

- **Additional research needed** to determine the validity of the math.
- **Data sets or model systems must be identified** or built to validate the complexity index model.
- Other elements may be identified as the model evolves.
- **Weighting factors** may be a significant consideration as understanding evolves.



Complexity Index

$$S_i = \sum_{j=1}^n S_{ij}W_j$$

- $S_i$  = Complexity Index for "i" elements
- $S_{ij}$  = the score of the  $i$ th element on the  $j$ th criterion
- $W_j$  = the weight of the  $j$ th criterion

# Contact Information

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