

# QUIC FIXES FOR NETWORK SECURITY MONITORING

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# QUESTIONS

- Who uses QUIC and why?
- How and why does QUIC inhibit security monitoring?
- Can we extract metadata and fingerprints from QUIC?
- What should security teams do with QUIC?

<https://github.com/cisco/mercury/> open source and [Network Protocol Fingerprinting](#)

# QUIC

## OVERVIEW

- Google proprietary from 2012 (gQUIC)
- IETF draft (2015) and RFC 9000 (2021)
- Replaces TCP, runs over UDP 443
- Incorporates/replaces TLS

## STATUS

- Supported by Google, Apple, Microsoft, Cloudflare, ...
- Used on over half of sessions in Chrome/Google ecosystem
- UDP/443 blocked by many enterprises

# PLUSES AND MINUSES

## BENEFITS

- Lower latency than TLS/TCP
- Multiplexing without head of line blocking
- 'Anti-ossification'

## DEMERITS

- Challenges network visibility through encryption, fragmentation, and randomization
- Challenges traditional network and operating system access control



# ANTI-OSSIFICATION

- Problem: operating systems and 'middleboxes' inhibit protocol evolution
  - TCP Fast Open - slow to get in Linux kernel, blocked by firewalls
  - SCTP non-adoption
- Solution:
  - Encrypt all messages
  - 'Greasing' and randomization of messages
- RFC 8558: *The IAB urges protocol designers to design for confidential operation by default. We strongly encourage developers to include encryption in their implementations and to make them encrypted by default.*
- RFC 9170: *[Grease] reserves values for extensions that have no semantic value attached.*

# QUIC ANTI-VISIBILITY FEATURES

- *Every* packet is encrypted (except version negotiation)
- Padding to maximum packet length
- TLS client hellos needlessly fragmented\*
- TLS extensions and QUIC transport parameters randomly shuffled\*

\* *Not part of standard; observed with Chrome and other clients*

## INITIAL PACKET ENCRYPTION

- *Every* packet is encrypted
- Initial packets encrypted with fixed, well-known key
- Keys are *not* registered with IANA



# INITIAL SALTS

```
quic_initial_salt = {
    {4207849473, salt_enum:D22}, // faceb001
    {4207849474, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // faceb002
    {4207849486, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // faceb00e
    {4207849488, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // faceb010
    {4207849489, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // faceb011
    {4207849490, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // faceb012
    {4207849491, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // faceb013
    {4278190102, salt_enum:D22}, // draft-22
    {4278190103, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // draft-23
    {4278190104, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // draft-24
    {4278190105, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // draft-25
    {4278190106, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // draft-26
    {4278190107, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // draft-27
    {4278190108, salt_enum:D23_D28}, // draft-28
    {4278190109, salt_enum:D29_D32}, // draft-29
    {4278190110, salt_enum:D29_D32}, // draft-30
    {4278190111, salt_enum:D29_D32}, // draft-31
    {4278190112, salt_enum:D29_D32}, // draft-32
    {4278190113, salt_enum:D33_V1}, // draft-33
    {4278190114, salt_enum:D33_V1}, // draft-34
    {1, salt_enum:D33_V1}, // version-1
};
```

```
std::array<salt, 4> salts{
    salt{{0x7f,0xbc,0xdb,0x0e,0x7c,0x66,0xbb,0xe9, 0x19,0x3a,
          0x96,0xcd,0x21,0x51,0x9e,0xbd,0x7a,0x02,0x64,0x4a}, "d22"},
    salt{{0xc3,0xee,0xf7,0x12,0xc7,0x2e,0xbb,0x5a,0x11,0xa7,
          0xd2,0x43,0x2b,0xb4,0x63,0x65,0xbe,0xf9,0xf5,0x02}, "d23_d28"},
    salt{{0xaf,0xbf,0xec,0x28,0x99,0x93,0xd2,0x4c,0x9e,0x97,
          0x86,0xf1,0x9c,0x61,0x11,0xe0,0x43,0x90,0xa8,0x99}, "d29_d32"},
    salt{{0x38,0x76,0x2c,0xf7,0xf5,0x59,0x34,0xb3,0x4d,0x17,
          0x9a,0xe6,0xa4,0xc8,0x0c,0xad,0xcc,0xbb,0x7f,0x0a}, "d33_v1"}
};
```

# QUIC PACKET FORMATS

```
Initial Packet {  
  Header Form (1) = 1,  
  Fixed Bit (1) = 1,  
  Long Packet Type (2) = 0,  
  Reserved Bits (2),  
  Packet Number Length (2),  
  Version (32),  
  Destination Connection ID Length (8),  
  Destination Connection ID (0..160),  
  Source Connection ID Length (8),  
  Source Connection ID (0..160),  
  Token Length (i),  
  Token (..),  
  Length (i),  
  Packet Number (8..32),  
  Packet Payload (8..), # Encrypted sequence of frames  
}
```

```
Version Negotiation Packet {  
  Header Form (1) = 1,  
  Unused (7),  
  Version (32) = 0,  
  Destination Connection ID Length (8),  
  Destination Connection ID (0..2040),  
  Source Connection ID Length (8),  
  Source Connection ID (0..2040),  
  Supported Version (32) ...,  
}
```



# QUIC METADATA

Field	Location	Notes
Server Name	TLS Client Hello	Optional
Application Layer Protocol	TLS Client Hello	
Google User Agent	TLS Client Hello	Optional
Error Messages	Connection Close	

# EXAMPLE METADATA: QUIC INITIAL PACKET

```
{
  "tls": {
    "client": {
      "version": "0303",
      "random": "2a4dd793e7b2450ab86c22d6ed919599b7044f9119fa01ee34b088bf76860e99",
      "session_id": "",
      "cipher_suites": "130113021303",
      "compression_methods": "00",
      "server_name": "www.instagram.com",
      "quic_transport_parameters": "00390084040480f0000080004752040000000105048060000001048000753071292a4368726f6d6...",
      "google_user_agent": "Chrome/99.0.4844.74 Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7",
      "application_layer_protocol_negotiation": [
        "h3"
      ]
    }
  },
  "quic": {
    "connection_info": "11001100",
    "version": "00000001",
    "dcid": "a54e31098418c193",
    "scid": "",
    "token": "",
    "data": "5e585ea4694c66b20967dede634bdd9052b1be26cd461e47486d1179cb0ec08379e20ade289dfbadf2948a5f6d7157c1098613...",
    "salt_string": "d33_v1"
  }
}
```

# EXAMPLE METADATA: QUIC INITIAL PACKET

```
{
  "tls": {
    "client": {
      "version": "0303",
      "random": "0ae2cac4b506c0d8ee963f9f0b7cf728cac5d6a6d579fb28eb6c127026f0c01d",
      "cipher_suites": "130113031302",
      "compression_methods": "00",
      "server_name": "i.ytimg.com",
      "quic_transport_parameters": "0039005380ff73db0c00000019a3a0a9a0000001c0000000ff02de1a0243e80c006ab200040481..."
      "application_layer_protocol_negotiation": [
        "h3"
      ]
    }
  },
  "quic": {
    "connection_info": "11000011",
    "version": "00000001",
    "salt_string": "d33_v1",
  },
  "src_ip": "10.26.160.131",
  "dst_ip": "142.251.16.119",
  "protocol": 17,
  "src_port": 57211,
  "dst_port": 443,
}
```

# EXAMPLE METADATA: CONNECTION CLOSE MESSAGE

```
{
  "quic": {
    "connection_info": "11001101",
    "version": "00000001",
    "connection_close": {
      "error_code": 0,
      "frame_type": 0,
      "reason_phrase": "25:No recent network activity after 4016800us. Timeout:4snum_undecryptable_packets: 0 {}"
    },
    "salt_string": "d33_v1",
  },
  "src_ip": "64.100.12.5",
  "dst_ip": "172.253.122.94",
  "protocol": 17,
  "src_port": 22751,
  "dst_port": 443,
}
```

# APPLICATIONS USING QUIC



Chromium Web Browsers



Firefox Web Browsers



Apple Networking



Syncthing File Synchronization



IPFS File Synchronization



Deimos Command and Control Framework



Merlin Command and Control Framework



Psiphon Censorship Circumvention Tool



Malware



# APPLICATION LAYER PROTOCOL NEGOTIATION (ALPN)

Observed ALPN Values	Notes
["h3"]	HTTP3
["h3-29"]	HTTP3 Variant
["h3-alias-01"]	HTTP3 Variant
["h3","h3-29"]	HTTP3 Variants
["h2","http/1.1","quic"]	HTTP Variants
["http/1.1","h2","h3"]	HTTP Variants
["h3-fb-05"]	Proprietary HTTP3
["bep/1.0"]	Block Exchange Protocol (Syncthing)
["doq"]	DNS over QUIC
["smb"]	Server Message Block 2 (Microsoft)

*TLS ALPN: list of protocols advertised by client, in descending order of preference, named by IANA-registered, opaque, non-empty byte strings.*

# QUIC FINGERPRINTS

- Initial Message fingerprint requires key derivation, decryption, and defragmentation
- Fingerprint extends the TLS fingerprint definition
- TLS extensions and QUIC transport parameters are shuffled into random order by some clients
- Extensions are normalized by lexicographic sorting

Reference: <https://github.com/cisco/mercury/blob/main/doc/npf.md>

# QUIC FINGERPRINTS

```
quic/  
(ff00001d)  
(0303)  
(0a0a130113021303)  
[ (0000)  
  (000500050100000000)  
  (000a000c000a0a0a001d001700180019)  
  (000d0018001604030804040105030203080508050501080606010201)  
  (0010000800060568332d3239)  
  (0012)  
  (001b0003020001)  
  (002b0005040a0a0304)  
  (002d00020101)  
  (0033)  
  (0a0a)  
  (0a0a)  
  ( ffa5)  
    [ (04)  
      (05)  
      (06)  
    ]  
  )  
]
```

# RANDOMIZED EXTENSIONS ARE NOT GOOD

- Complexity in security-critical code
- Untrusted code can use subliminal channel
  - Permutation of  $n$  elements can leak  $\lg_2(n!)$  bits
  - Leak secret keys
  - User-tracking information
- Better idea: clients use lexicographic canonical ordering

<https://hnull.org/2022/12/01/sorting-out-randomized-tls-fingerprints/>

# CONCLUSIONS

- QUIC improves on TCP, and its adoption will grow
- 'Anti-ossification' features complicate visibility, but don't prevent it
  - Application Layer Protocol, Server Name, User Agent, Cipher Suites, ...
  - Fingerprints
- Less appropriate for security-critical environments
  - Data Centers, Industrial Settings, IoT, Defense, Regulated Industries, ...

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**THANK YOU**

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