

# Semantic Forensics (SemaFor)

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DARPA I2O

Deepfakes Day 2022

8/30/2022





# Image & video manipulation technology evolution

## Image Synthesis



**2014** Goodfellow et al.



**2015** Radford et al.




**2016** Liu and Tuzel



**2017** Karras et al.



**2018** Karras et al.



**2019** Karras et al.

## Video Manipulation




**2016** Thies et al.



**2017** Deepfakes




Source Subject



Target Subject 2

**2018** Chan et al.



..stock price closed at one hundred ~~ninety one~~ point ~~four~~ eighty two point two five dollars


**2019** Fried et al.



# Image & video manipulations we've already seen

Manual manipulation

## MH17 Downing (2014)



Photoshop

Source: Bellingcat

## Catalan Independence (2017)



Photoshop

Source: El Pais

## Chinese government social media (2020)



Photoshop

Source: Twitter

<https://twitter.com/zlj517/status/1333214766806888448>

Automated manipulation


## Jordan Peele's Obama (2018)



Deepfake

Source: YouTube

## Katie Jones – LinkedIn (2019)



GAN

Source: CNET


## Nixon Moon Speech (2020)



Multiple

Source: moondisaster.org

## Pro-Chinese Inauthentic Network (2020)



GAN

Source: Graphika



# Future threats from falsified multi-modal media

## Targeted Personal Attacks

Peele 2017




AI Multimedia Algorithms



Highly realistic video

## Generated Events at Scale

AI Multimedia Algorithms



Believable fake events

## Ransomfake concept: Identity Attacks as a service (IAaaS)

Bricman 2019

AI Multimedia Algorithms



Forged Evidence



Identity Attacks

Examples of possible fakes:

- Substance abuse
- Foreign contacts
- Compromising events
- Social media postings
- Financial inconsistencies
- Forging identity

### Undermines key individuals and organizations



## Objective

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Create rich semantic algorithms that automatically detect, attribute, and characterize falsified multi-modal media to defend against large-scale, automated disinformation attacks



# Synthetic Media Detection, Attribution, and Characterization Capabilities

	Desired Capability	Today	SemaFor
Detection	Automatically detect semantic generation/manipulation errors	Limited	Yes
	Detect manipulations across multiple modalities and assets	Limited	Yes
	Robust to many manipulation algorithms	Fragile	Highly robust
	Increased adversary effort needed to fool detection algorithms	Some	Significant
Attribution	Automatically confirm source or author	Limited	Yes
	Automatically identify unique source fingerprints	No	Yes
	Explain authorship inconsistencies	No	Yes
Characterization	Automatically characterize manipulation intent or impact	No	Yes
	Provide evidence and explanation for manipulation intent	No	Yes
	Correctly prioritize generated/manipulated media for review	No	Yes

## Text (Notional)

*NewsWire: April 1, 2019, Bob Smith*  
On a rainy spring day, a vast, violent group gathered in front of the US Capitol to protest recent cuts in Social Security.

## Video




## Audio (Notional)



"We'd like to welcome you here on this beautiful spring day. Thank you all for coming out [cheering]..."

## Image



## Text (Notional)

*NewsWire: April 1, 2019, Bob Smith*  
On a rainy spring day, a vast, violent group gathered in front of the US Capitol to **protest** recent cuts in Social Security.


## Audio (Notional)




"We'd like to welcome you here on this beautiful spring day. Thank you all for coming out [cheering]..."

Conclusion: Media components consistent across modalities.

## Image



## Video





## Text (Notional)

*NewsWire: April 1, 2019, Bob Smith*  
On a rainy spring day, a vast, **violent group** gathered in front of the US Capitol to protest recent cuts in Social Security.


## Audio (Notional)




"We'd like to welcome you here on this beautiful spring day. Thank you all for coming out [cheering]..."

Conclusion: Media components not consistent across modalities.

## Image



## Video



"violent group"

## Text (Notional)

*NewsWire: April 1, 2019, Bob Smith*

On a rainy spring day, a vast, violent group gathered in front of the US Capitol to protest recent cuts in Social Security.

### Video




### Audio (Notional)



"We'd like to welcome you here on this beautiful spring day. Thank you all for coming out [cheering]..."

### Image



## Attribution: Incorrect

- Bob Smith is a tech reporter, doesn't report on social events
- Vocabulary indicates different author
- NewsWire has a different style for use of images in news article


## Characterization: Malicious

- Large number of inconsistencies across media
  - Environment – "rainy spring day"
  - Behavior – "violent group"
  - Location – "US Capitol"
  - Topic – "Social Security"
- Use of unsupported term "violent"
- Failed sourcing to high credibility organization ("*NewsWire*")







# SemaFor System


**Multimedia:**  
 Text,   
 Audio,   
 Images,   
 Video,   
 Source metadata




## Multimodal Representations




## TA1: Detection, Attribution, Characterization




## TA2: Explanation & Integration



## TA3: Evaluation





## TA4: Challenge Curation





# SemaFor evaluation mapped to notional adversarial landscape





## USG Disinfo Community

Topic A    Topic B    Narrative A

### Data Collection




### Labeled Mis/Disinformation


	Misattributed imagery.
	???

Development of first-of-kind dataset of actual context manipulations, including human annotations of in-the-wild manipulations.

Collaborate with USG disinformation and misinformation community to identify topics and campaigns of interest.



Threat Landscape: A multi-dimensional representation to quantify and categorize the “who, what, why, where and how” of threats using manipulated media.



### AUC on 10s video clips & 5 falsifications


	Audio Dubbing	Wav2Lip	Impersonator	FaceSwap	in-the-wild
Obama	1.00	1.00	0.95	0.90	0.98
Trump	0.99	0.99	0.89	0.92	0.98
Biden	0.89	0.93	0.98	0.73	0.95
Harris	0.89	0.92	0.82	0.93	-
O' Brien	0.92	0.88	0.90	0.84	-
Oliver	0.95	0.92	0.86	0.87	-
Avg	0.94	0.94	0.90	0.87	0.97

### Future integration & deployment

The screenshot shows a video analysis interface. The main video displays Barack Obama at a podium. The 'Analytic Output' panel shows 'Integrity: 16%' and 'Remarks: Very likely manipulated'. The 'Video Information' panel shows 'Duration: 00:48:56', 'Video Name: obama-imposter.mp4', and 'Number of Frames: 1437'. A 'Fake-Level Score' graph is visible at the bottom, showing a score over time with a threshold of 0.5 and a domain of [0.41, 0.65].

- Biometric-based (person-specific) forensic approach learns a semantic model of an individual's movement & speech
- Can detect both deepfakes and cheapfakes (such as audio dubbing or impersonator)
- Generalizes to falsification methods unseen during training

## Detect misinformation from a cluster of topically related documents



## Detection Accuracy (%)

Document-level	Detection Accuracy (%)		
	IED	TL17	Crisis
HDSF	78.42	80.62	82.14
GROVER-median	79.06	79.40	86.84
GROVER-mega	82.90	90.00	87.13
<b>Ours</b>	<b>86.76</b>	<b>90.21</b>	<b>93.89</b>

Event	IED		TL17		Crisis	
	F1	AUC	F1	AUC	F1	AUC
Random	16.31	50.44	19.44	49.65	21.70	50.41
LR	31.26	77.87	29.14	68.19	31.67	68.17
<b>Ours</b>	<b>44.86</b>	<b>88.46</b>	<b>41.56</b>	<b>82.59</b>	<b>48.48</b>	<b>85.60</b>
w/o cross-doc	<b>45.00</b>	<b>88.54</b>	<b>41.66</b>	82.28	47.78	85.17

### Real news

...She noted that at least 1% of people who catch coronavirus die of it. "Another 10-20% are hospitalized. Another 30% or more have long lasting symptoms. The vaccine is far safer, with only minor temporary side effects," Ranney said on Twitter. ...In both Pfizer and Moderna's vaccine trials, no worrying side-effects were seen. ...

**Claim:** COVID vaccine is safer than COVID





### Fake news

As many as 45,000 people may have died from the mRNA shots being given to halt COVID, according to prominent physician Dr. Peter McCullough. And teenagers — especially boys — are more at risk from being hospitalized from the vaccine than they are for COVID, he said. The culprit is myocarditis, inflammation of the heart. ...


**Claim:** COVID vaccine is more dangerous than COVID

Unique single-document to cross-document event coreference resolution and reasoning






- News organizations have highly curated pipelines for media production that leave signatures in the media
- Analytic verifies whether images originate from a purported (news) source or not, by comparing each image's compression settings to known image compression patterns of the source
- Strong performance in SemaFor Eval 2: Attribution Verification (News Articles) Organization Swaps
- Novel forensic analysis of image file compression with low computational cost



```
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x=3D'adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk=3D'Adobe XMP Core
↳ 5.6-c145 79=
.163499, 2018/08/13-16:40:22 ">
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf=3D'http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>
<rdf:Description rdf:about=3D"
xmp:CreateDate=3D'2019-11-19T22:47:45+01:00"
xmp:ModifyDate=3D'2019-11-19T22:47:45+01:00"
xmp:MetadataDate=3D'2019-11-19T22:47:45+01:00"
xmp:CreatorTool=3D'Adobe Premiere Pro CC 2019.0 (Windows)"
dc:format=3D"H.264">
<creatorAtom:windowsAtom
creatorAtom:extension=3D".prproj"
creatorAtom:invocationFlags=3D"/I"
creatorAtom:uncProjectPath=3D"\\?\\C:\\Users\\pengpeng\\Documents\\Ado
↳ be\\Pre=
miere Pro\\13.0\\premcut.prproj"/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
```

```
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x=3D'adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk=3D'Image::ExifTool
↳ 11.37'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf=3D'http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>
<rdf:Description rdf:about=3D'"
xmlns:exif=3D'http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/'>
<exif:DateTimeOriginal>1986-11-05T12:00:00</exif:DateTimeOriginal>
</rdf:Description>
<rdf:Description rdf:about=3D'"
xmlns:xmp=3D'http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'>
<xmp:CreateDate>1986-11-05T12:00:00</xmp:CreateDate>
<xmp:ModifyDate>1986-11-05T12:00:00</xmp:ModifyDate>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
```



- Analytics use metadata in the video files to determine if a video is manipulated
- Difficult to hide manipulation traces in metadata
- Method is significantly faster than pixel-based manipulation detection techniques




# GAN detector defends against high-resource actors


Purdue, Kitware, SRI, NVIDIA

**Challenge:** can detectors identify images from a novel GAN created by a high-resource actor, even without any data from it?

Pro-Chinese Inauthentic Network (2020)




GAN Source: Graphika  
Large-scale sock puppet accounts



Alias-Free Generative Adversarial Networks (StyleGAN3)

Official PyTorch implementation of the NeurIPS 2021 paper




Alias-Free Generative Adversarial Networks  
Tero Karras, Miika Aittala, Samuli Laine, Erik Härkönen, Janne Hellsten, Jaakko Lehtinen, Timo Aila  
<https://mlabs.github.io/stylegan3>

Training over semantic categories, augmentation, & many GANs




**No training data from StyleGAN3!**



**Highly accurate detection**


Distribution A: Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.



**NVIDIA delayed releasing the GAN software & published the detectors alongside StyleGAN3**



# Detecting & localizing synthetic audio



Example of humans + synth voices + background

**Shawn:** Has everyone had a chance to review the data?  
**Synth 1:** It's quite disturbing. And fascinating!  
**Dave:** It doesn't mean the vaccine isn't safe—  
**Synth 2:** Are you really sure about that?  
**Dave:** As sure as I am of anything.  
**Synth 3:** Well, well, I'm not convinced—  
**Shawn:** Nothing will convince you!  
**Dave:** OK, we all have to calm down.  
**Synth 2:** You want me to calm down? *Of course* I'm already calm!  
**Shawn:** This can't be allowed to go public. If it does...  
**Synth 1:** [Chuckle-whispers] Our scheme will be found out.  
**Dave:** There's still time to deal with the fallout.  
**Synth 2:** There's not much time left, though!  
**Shawn:** Have you spoken to our friends overseas?  
**Dave:** They're as worried as we are.  
**Synth 1:** They have the most to lose. Quite possibly even more.



**All the Feels: NVIDIA Shares Expressive Speech Synthesis Research at Interspeech**  
 Developers and creators can access state-of-the-art conversational AI models for expressive speech synthesis to generate voices for characters, virtual assistants and personalized avatars.  
August 31, 2021 by ISHA SALLIAN  
<https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2021/08/31/conversational-ai-research-speech-synthesis-interspeech/>  
<https://openreview.net/pdf?id=0NQwnnWAORi>

## Hackathon results (SRI)

Subset	Task 1	Task 2
	DETECT % EER	LOCALIZE % EER
ALL	26.4	33.3
GRP1	14.1	24.0
GRP2	14.1	21.5
GRP3	18.8	38.0
GRP4	4.7	5.1
GRP5	10.9	12.2
GRP6	53.1	86.9
GRP7	26.6	27.0
GRP8	21.9	39.1
GRP9	21.9	32.6
GRP10	26.6	38.1
GRP11	12.5	28.5
GRP12	23.4	26.5
GRP13	20.3	41.5
GRP14	57.8	89.7
GRP15	10.9	30.9
GRP16	20.3	39.8

Different audio categories


## Media asset

## Algorithm results

Source: Twitter  
Source URL: file:///D:/Image\_And\_Text\_Inconsistency/Social%20Media/Small%20Semantic%20Gap/SmallSemantic-Malicious/MilitaryVehicles-19/add-text-add-image.md  
The Chinese tanks and troops are parading in front of the Kremlin, Moscow, declaring China's full control of Russia.

caption:  
The Chinese tanks and troops are parading in front of the Kremlin, Moscow, declaring China's full control of Russia.

Analytic Name	version	Detection	Attribution	Characterization
kitware-ua-ub-article-consistency-detector-0-2-5	0.2.5	3.00		
kitware-ub-decontextualization-analysis-0-0-2	0.0.2	2.38		
kitware-ub-decontextualization-analysis-0-0-2	0.0.2	2.38		
kitware-ub-decontextualization-analysis-0-0-3	0.0.3	2.38		
kitware-ub-decontextualization-analysis-0-2-1	0.2.1	2.38		
kitware-cu-img-cap-inconsistency-0-2-5	0.2.5	2.12		
sri-ub-image-text-0-2-5	0.2.5	1.00		
sri-ub-image-text-0-2-6	0.2.6	1.00		
sri-ub-image-text-newsentites-0-2-25	0.2.25	0.73		
kitware-ua-ub-article-consistency-detector-0-2-7	0.2.7	0.69		
sri-image-text-entity-detection-0-2-10	0.2.10	0.87		
tonic-berkeley-sm-bdimg-clipf-0-0-11	0.0.11	0.42	0.00	0.00
tonic-berkeley-sm-bdimg-clipf-0-0-10	0.0.10	0.40	0.00	0.00
tonic-berkeley-sm-bdimg-mismatch-x-0-0-2	0.0.2	0.00	0.00	0.63
tonic-ua-text-characterization-0-0-7	0.0.7	0.00	0.00	0.63
tonic-berkeley-sm-bdimg-mismatch-x-0-0-3	0.0.3	0.00	0.00	-1.02
newsentites-0-2-28	0.2.28	-0.05		





[www.darpa.mil](http://www.darpa.mil)