


Ranjit S. Mann, PE GMD DevSecOps Lead



## Missile Defense Evolving Threat Environment



SRBM: Short Range Ballistic Missile (300-1000 km :: 621 mi)
MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missile (1000-3000 km :: 1864 mi)
IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (3000-5500 km :: 3418 mi)
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (5500+ km :: 3418+ mi)

Subsonic: < Mach 1 (< 770 mph)

Supersonic: Mach 1-5 (770-3,800 mph)

Hypersonic: Mach 5-10 (3,800-7,700 mph)

High Hypersonic: Mach 10-25 (7,700-19,200 mph)

Adversaries are fielding diverse and expansive ranges of modern offensive missile systems

- Developing new missiles & improving existing systems
  - Precision strike
  - Penetration aids (e.g. decoys, jamming devices)
- Capable of maneuvering in midcourse or terminal phase
  - Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV)
  - Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)
  - Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)
  - Long Range Cruise Missiles (Defense of Homeland)
- Integrating ballistic, cruise missiles and UAVs



North Korea Hwasong-15 ICBM



China



Emad-1 MRBM with MaRV



Russia Kinzhal MRBM ALBM



## Missile Defense Agency Mission

To develop and deploy a layered Missile Defense System to defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends from missile attacks in all phases of flight
























Missile Defense Capability
Globally Deployed



## Missile Defense Agency Foundations

In Support of Strategy to Defend the Nation





## Today's Layered Active Missile Defense System

C2BMC Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications
NMCC USSTRATCOM USNORTHCOM USINDOPACOM USEUCOM USCENTCOM USSPACECOM



Sensors



Satellite Surveillance BMDS OPIR Architecture



Warning Radars



Forward-Based Radars



Aegis BMD SPY Radars




Discriminating Radars



## **DoD Enterprise Development Security** Operations (DevSecOps) Initiative


#### **DevSecOps implementation value to MDA:**

- ✓ Enhances Communication and Collaboration
- ✓ Continuous Integration / Continuous Delivery
- √ Rapid delivery of software capability to warfighter
  - Deploy software within days instead of months or years saving cost and schedule
- ✓ Implement cybersecurity earlier in software development life cycle (SDLC)
- ✓ Transparency into SDLC activities
- ✓ Reduces accreditation (Authority to Operate (ATO)) timeline from months to weeks or days by continuous **ATO**
- ✓ Increases software application portability
- ✓ Implements agile practices and principles in SDLC
- ✓ Hardware virtualization for early software and hardware integration (Find and Fix SW Bugs early)
- ✓ Enables automation to reduce the human error in SDLC



#### **DevSecOps Software Lifecycle**

Source: DoD Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design (Sept 12, 2019)



### Application DevSecOps Processes Source: DoD Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design (Sept 12, 2019)

Create, deploy, and operate software in a secure, flexible and interoperable manner via automated software tools, services and standards saving cost and schedule while achieving performance



### **DoD Leadership Thoughts On Software**

"What keeps me up at night is not North Korea, but that the U.S. has lost it's ability to go fast."

- Gen Hyten as STRATCOM Commander at AFA in 2017

https://www.csis.org/events/conversation-general-john-hyten-vice-chairman-joint-chiefs-staff

"... the thread that runs through all of our programs and all that we do is software and I believe that we need to catch up with the private sector ..." USD(A&S), HON Ellen Lord

Lets Talk Agile AAF Pathway with Sean Brady - Defense Acquisition University (dau.edu)



If confirmed to be the next USD(A&S), what is the first thing *you* would do to improve how DoD acquires software?



## DoD DevSecOps Policy/Guidance



#### **DoD Instruction 5000.87**

#### OPERATION OF THE SOFTWARE ACQUISITION PATHWAY

Originating Component: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

Effective: October 2, 2020

**Releasability:** Cleared for public release. Available on the Directives Division Website

at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.

**Incorporates and Cancels:** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

Memorandum, "Software Acquisition Pathway Interim Policy and

Procedures," January 3, 2020

**Approved by:** Ellen M. Lord, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Sustainment

**Purpose:** In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5135.02, this issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the establishment of software acquisition pathways to provide for the efficient and effective acquisition, development, integration, and timely delivery of secure software in accordance with the requirements of Section 800 of Public Law 116-92.

#### 1.2 Policy

Section (f) Programs will require government and contractor software teams to use modern iterative software development methodologies (e.g., agile or lean), modern tools and techniques (e.g., development, security, and operations (DevSecOps)), and humancentered design processes to iteratively deliver software to meet the users' priority needs.


Policy does not mandate DevSecOps but it is very difficult to meet policy without implementing DevSecOps



### **DevSecOps Overview**

**DevSecOps** aims to ensure quick release cycles and promotes a collaborative, integrated communication platform ... to include development, operational, compliance, tester, business analyst, project managers and end users who are sharing same business goals to maintain world class reliability, operation, and security.

Source: https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=517144



DevSecOps
Digital
Engineering




Figure 8: DevSecOps Ecosystem

Source: DoD Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design (Sept 12, 2019)



## **DevSecOps Reference Design Pillars**

The hardest part.



#### **ORGANIZATION**

- Culture shift & buy-in
- Communication & collaboration
- Security/QA throughout
- Learn from success/ failure
- Feedback and userdriven change

#### **PROCESS**

- Collaborative design
- Test-driven development
- Common and automatable tasks
- Continuous adaptation and improvement
- Continuous ATO

#### **TECHNOLOGY**

- Tool adoption
- Automation and orchestration
- Cloud and containerization
- Infrastructure as Code
- Security as Code

#### **GOVERNANCE**


- Built-in governance control
- Uniform policy enforcement
- Data-driven validation
- Enhanced visibility
- Inherited certifications and authorizations

"DevSecOps is the preferred software practice for DoD to deliver at speed of relevance" - DoD CIO, USD(A&S)

DoD Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design v1.0 Public Release.pdf (defense.gov)



# SW DevSecOps Ecosystem Under Construction To Support GMD Programs - Vision




DevSecOps Task	Vendor Env.	Gov. Env.	DevSecOps Task	Vendor Env.	Gov. Env.
Plan	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	Deliver	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Develop	$\checkmark$	Deferred	Deploy	NA	$\checkmark$
Build	✓	$\checkmark$	Operate	NA	$\checkmark$
Test	$\checkmark$	✓	Monitor	NA	✓
Release	✓	$\checkmark$			

**DevSecOps Software Functions Government & Industry Environment** 



## SW DevSecOps Ecosystem Under Construction To Support GMD Programs - Vision



DevSecOps Task	Vendor Env.	Gov. Env.	DevSecOps Task	Vendor Env.	Gov. Env.
Plan	Move to Gov. Env.	$\checkmark$	Deliver	Move to Gov. Env.	$\checkmark$
Develop	Move to Gov. Env.	✓	Deploy	NA	$\checkmark$
Build	Move to Gov. Env.	✓	Operate	NA	$\checkmark$
Test	Move to Gov. Env.	✓	Monitor	NA	✓
Release	Move to Gov. Env.	✓			

**DevSecOps Software Functions in Government Environment** 



## Continuous ATO (cATO)




https://repo1.dso.mil/dsawg-devsecops/continuous-ato-guidance/team6\_documentation/-/tree/master/results/pdf <a href="https://repo1.dso.mil/dsawg-devsecops/continuous-ato-guidance/team6\_documentation/-/tree/master/results/pdf">https://repo1.dso.mil/dsawg-devsecops/continuous-ato-guidance/team6\_documentation/-/tree/master/results/pdf</a>

cATO authorizes the platform, process, and the team that produces the product under a continuous monitoring process that maintains the residual risk within the risk tolerance of the Authorizing Official (AO)

**Engagement with AO on regular basis is important** 



## Defense Innovation Board (DIB) Study Software is Never Done



**DevSecOps Is a Multifunction Team Journey Not a Destination!** 

