


"Looking Ma, No Malware"

Unsupervised Learning Methods to Understand Certain DDoS Attacks

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FloCon 2020



Classifying Malicious Actors: classic problem

In intelligence analysis, we are frequently motivated to understand the actors and malware behind malicious behaviors. This can lead to better detection and threat analysis. We look to:

- Understand the landscape of the attacks
- Look for ways to identify similar malware
- Identify similarities across attacks and malware
- Detect or assign a label to malware
- Reverse engineer
- Assign attribution



Classifying Malicious Actors: Data Science

- Understand the landscape of the attacks
 - Statistical analysis of metadata around attacks
- Look for ways to identify similar malware
 - Exploratory data analysis and feature engineering
- Identify similarities across attacks and malware
 - Clustering
- Detect or assign a label to malware
 - Classification (binary and multi-class)
- Reverse Engineer
- Creating toolboxes to use against different problem sets



Sharing the Toolbox

- Frequently we don't have any labeled data (no malware)
- But we might have a lot of observations...
- Unsupervised learning techniques can help us understand
 - Actors
 - Actor Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures

This talk shares some of our tools in the context of

DNS-Based DDoS Attacks




Random Subdomain* DDoS Attacks

- Use "random" subdomains to overload authoritative name servers
 - Resource exhaustion attack
- Attacks against authoritative name servers; domain doesn't matter really

Goal: Identify and label attacks

We <u>postulate</u> that there are N uniquely identifiable software systems being used in these attacks.



Queries look like:

random_prefix.attack_domain

or

random_prefix.fixed_label.attack_domain



^{*} also referred to as Slow Drip or Water Torture DDos attacks

Sample Attack Queries from Various Domains

0k3.hfax.com. 5

t6q.hfax.com. 2

questioned.bjbgp.bjbgp.hfax.com. 2

cxj.bjbgp.hfax.com. 2

lzd.bjbgp.hfax.com. 2

fao.bjbgp.hfax.com. 2

9gi.hfax.com. 1

171j.bjbgp.hfax.com. 1

2ock.bjbgp.hfax.com. 1

krv.bjbgp.bjbgp.bjbgp.hfax.com. 1

us85.91y.com. 10

a34t.bjbgp.91y.com. 7

7c82.91y.com. 3

cp7.bjbgp.91y.com. 2

01uq.bjbgp.91y.com. 2

uh5t.bjbgp.91y.com. 2

dwu9.91y.com. 2

g1we.91y.com. 1

Queries USED TO look like:

random_prefix.attack_domain

or

random_prefix.fixed_label.attack_domain

qiv.wan.douyu.com. 3

worst.bjbgp.g.wan.douyu.com. 3

2xqy.passport.douyu.com. 3

i92.skeeball-arcade.scopely.com. 1

china.scopely.com. 1

books.scopely.com. 1

deal.yahtzee-with-buddies.scopely.com. 1

songs.tech.scopely.com. 1

gw2.wheel-of-fortune.scopely.com. 1

ab4.scopely.com. 1

 Prefix isn't random; can contain dictionary words.

 Fixed label is no longer fixed. Can vary.



The problem

- take ~800M records like the ones on previous slide
- put them into buckets of attacks generated the same way
- where an attack is (date, domain)

The solution

 use machine learning: "unsupervised learning" technique can cluster, or group, attacks that have similar "features"



Slow Drip Feature Engineering

- Problem is really hard -- we only have small observables, no malware
- Approaches we can take include:
 - Landscape statistics, e.g., popularity and co-occurrence of attacked domains, timing, etc.
 - Qname statistics, e.g., how long, how diverse, number of labels, etc.
 - Similarity statistics, e.g, overlaps in attacks and prefixes
 - Time series analysis
 - 0

"good" clustering requires many features.




Character Distributions as a Feature


One natural feature to analyze is the characters of the random prefix.

- Common approaches measure digit ratios, entropy, etc.
- Here we consider unigram character distributions instead
 - Unigram means a single character; distribution means normalized counts
 - We count characters over all <u>unique</u> prefixes in the attack
 - We consider:
 - first character
 - all prefix characters




Comparing Three Attacks





Distance for Character Distributions

- Compute a distance measure between two distributions
 - There are several ways to use this
 - We use Jensen-Shannon Distance
- Calculate the distribution for every attack
- Calculate the pairwise distance for each attack





Attack Clusters From Unigram Distributions

domain Labels (second level) by Frequency in Cluster#0

dollarshaveclub
pixiv temi unibet-tools
pixiv realself moneylion
realself player
Shave autoscout24
99designs giffgaff rev
trivago tindersplitmedialabs

domain Labels (second level) by Frequency in Cluster#2

```
paydiant buyatoyota steampowered toyota sc-corp ibm paypal-tpa sample of toyota sc-corp ibm snapchat watmarcus paypal-tpa paypal-tpa paypal-corp claritymoney ubnte marcus paypal-corp shapped icq sc-corp sha
```

These clusters cross many dates. Notice that we've picked up domains that are similar to each other solely by the single character distribution. This further supports that the attacks are related to each other.

What's the goal?

We can't compute pairwise distances for every attack over time, so what's the point?

We hope to find a small number of **reference distributions** which we can use a measuring sticks for attacks.

 This means we really don't care about clustering everything -different than 'typical' clustering goals

Intuitively, this is creating a set of items to compare an unseen attack against, e.g., "oh, yeah, that attack is like airbnb on 7/31/18 attack".



Reference Attacks


- Using data from June August 2018, found 8 reference attacks
 - Used DBSCAN clustering and took the center attack
- We can now compare new attacks to these as one feature
- Found these distributions to still be consistent in 2019.

Combine this character feature with others



Feature: Query Type










Feature: DNS Enumeration Dictionary

 A substantial number of the attacks use a dictionary for generating their random subdomain strings.


Overlap with DNS Enumeration Dictionary





Clustering the Attacks

- 20 Features in Total
 - Percentage of qtypes
 - Dictionary overlap
 - Character distributions
 - Time series
 - Percentage of unique labels in attack
 - Mean prefix lengths
 - etc.
- Used HDB-SCAN to cluster attacks in 20 dimensions
- Use UMAP to project
 20-dimensional space into
 2-d plane
 - -1 indicates an outlier





The Interesting Thing...

- Activity from 2014-2018 very high volume, one actor
 - Last seen May 2018
 - Mostly disrupted the middle Internet, not the targets
- Current activity is lower volume, harder to detect
 - Unclear what the motivations are
 - Totally different TTP than before
 - Not effective DDoS
 - Change in 2019
 - Weird mix of 'target' domains



Want more details?

Paper to be published in ACM Digital Threat: Research and Practice Preprint available on Arxiv.org (outdated)

Data sample provided by Farsight Security.

- Contains a sample of queries from multiple attacks 2018 & 2019
- For personal research use; not to be disseminated or published without consent of Farsight Security
- bit.ly/flocon20





