
Applied Machine Learning in Software Security

Eliezer Kanal

Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213





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
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DM-0004563





Tom Mitchell, former CMU Machine Learning department chair:

The field of Machine Learning asks the question, "How can we build computer systems that automatically improve with experience, and what are the fundamental laws that govern all learning processes?"

Machine Learning seeks to automate data analysis and inference.

If your problem can be stated as either of the following:



...you would likely benefit from machine learning.




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Sample Techniques:

Regression





Clustering image: Weston.pace, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:K_Means_Example_Step_4.svg



Feature Engineering:

Using existing data to create more informative data

Data	Types
Image	Static Video
Time series	Financial data Event counts
Structured text	Web forms Structured data (JSON, XML) Source code
Free text	News Tweets Email
many	more






Examples:

 I would like to use <u>incident ticket</u> data to predict <u>customer needs</u>.

 I would like to use <u>publicly available code</u> to predict <u>what code I will write</u>.

 I would like to use <u>bug report</u> data to guess the location of <u>undetected bugs in my code</u>.





- accepted answers
- with more than 50 points
- on posts tagged "javascript"

Then I processed it by walking the ASTs of those snippets and creating a "completion" fragment for each node, pairing a trace of the left-hand context with the code snippet for the right-hand side.

To complete at run time, it uses the same logic to find the left-hand trace at the current cursor position, and tries to match that up against the database of completion fragments. Available completions are sorted by a proprietary blend of post score, left-hand context similarity, and nearby identifiers.



ecurity

Examples:

 I would like to use <u>incident ticket</u> data to predict <u>customer needs</u>.

 I would like to use <u>publicly available code</u> to predict <u>what code I will write</u>.

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
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


Many alerts left unaudited!





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Lasso Logistic Regression

CART

Random Forest

Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost)

Some of the	features used
Analysis tools used	Tokens in func/method
Significant LOC	Alerts in func/method
Complexity	Alerts in file
Coupling	Methods in file
Cohesion	SLOC in file
SEI coding rule	Avg Tokens
Function/method length	Avg SLOC
SLOC in func/method	Depth in code repository
# parameters in func/meth.	Cyclomatic complexity (func/meth)



Significant improvement!


- 91% Classifier accuracy overall
- Specific rule accuracy at right
- 10x developer time saved!

Random		Random
For eRa le ID	XGBoost	Forest
INT31-C	97%	
EXP01-J	74%	
OBJ03-J	83%	
FIO04-J*	80%	
EXP33-C*	83%	
EXP34-C*	72%	
DCL36-C*	100%	
ERR08-J*	100%	
IDS00-J*	96%	
ERR01-J*	100%	
ERR09-J*	88%	


* Small quantity of data




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







Signal Flow graph highlights behavior relating different malware families Program instruction analysis shows similarity and diversion of behavior






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
Simplify visualization of extremely complex data through the use of dimensionality reduction and associated visualization techniques





Chernoff face experiment





- <u>Ground Truth</u>: SVM trained with expert ground truth labels.
- <u>Turkers Avg</u>: Classifier trained with layperson labels.

Performance surprisingly similar!



Robert Ferguson, Dennis Goldenson, James McCurley, Robert W. S Early Lifecycle Cost Estimation (QUELCE)". Dec 2011. http://resou




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Table 2 Cost Overruns in DoD Acquisitions

Funding Shortfalls at the Start of Development for Five Major Weapon System Programs Program






Level of funding established in the FYDP in the year the program was initiated Level of funding the program needed to be fully funded in the initial FYDP Funding required beyond the initial FYDP to complete development

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

General Accounting Office. *Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes*. Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, July 2008, GAO-08-619.








Effects Causes	Scope Responsibility	Scope Definition	Mission / CONOPS	Capability Definition	Funding Schedule	Prog Mgt Structure	Manning at program office	Systems Design	Standards/Certifications	Acquisition Management	Program Mgt - Contractor Relations	Project Social / Dev Env	Supply Chain Vulnerabilities	Information sharing	PO Process Performance	Sustainment Issues	Contract Award	Contractor Performance	Production Quantity	Data Ownership	Change in Strategic Vision	Advocacy Change	Industry Company Assessment	Cost Estimate	Test & Evaluation	Closing Technical Gaps (CBA)	Building Technical Capability & Capacity	Functional Measures	Functional Solution Criteria (measure)	Interdependency	Interoperability	Size	Project Challenge Product Challenge	Total
Scope Responsibility		2		<u> </u>		1	1			1	1	1			1																\rightarrow	\rightarrow	+	8
Scope Definition	3					1	1																									\rightarrow	+	5
Mission / CONOPS	0	3		3																												\rightarrow	+	6
Capability Definition					0	0	0	3	2	2	1	1	2	2	_	1	0	0	2	0											_	\rightarrow	+	16
Funding Schedule		<u> </u>		<u> </u>			1			1					2			1								<u> </u>						\rightarrow	_	5
Prog Mgt Structure							2					1		1																	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	-	6
Manning at program office						2								1	_																_	\rightarrow	-	5
Systems Design	1												1	1		1				1			2	2	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	23
Standards/Certifications													1			1	1	1					1		3		1		1		_	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	10
Acquisition Management											2	3	1	1	2		2	2		1			1	1				1	1	1				1 20
Program Mgt - Contractor Relations												2		1	1	1		2							1		1	1	1	1	1			2 15
Project Social / Dev Env										1	1			1	2		2	2		1					1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1 19
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities					1			1	1	1								1	2															7
Information sharing								1							1	1		1		1						1	1							7
PO Process Performance																		2																2 4
Sustainment Issues																																		0
Contract Award																																		0
Contractor Performance																																		2 2
Production Quantity																																		2 2
Data Ownership																																		2 2
Change in Strategic Vision				3	2									2		2	2		3			3	2	3	2		3			2		-		29
Advocacy Change	1	2				1	1			1																								6
Industry Company Assessment																																		0
Cost Estimate																															-	+	+	0
Test & Evaluation																															-	+	+	ŏ
Closing Technical Gaps (CBA)	1							3	1	1	2	2	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1		2	2	2	1	1	+	+	37
Building Technical Capability & Capacity	CBA	1				1				1	2	2	2	3		2	2	1	1	2	0	1	2	1	1	0		1	2	1	- 1	+	+	29
Functional Measures		<u> </u>				<u> </u>			1		2	2	1	1	_	-	1	1	<u> </u>	1	_	1	1	<u> </u>	2				2	- 1	-	+	+	17
Functional Solution Criteria (measure)									1		2	2	<u> </u>		-		- '	1		- '			1		2					1	-+	+	+	10
Interdependency	1	1			1	1	1	2	1		1	1	2	1	2	2		1		1	1	1	1	1	1				1		2	2	2	3 34
Interoperability	1	1			<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	2	1	1		1	2	1	_	2		1		1	-	- 1	<u> </u>	1	3		1		1	1	-	2	-	2 29
Size		<u>'</u>						-	- '	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	-	- 1	-	-				- '				<u>'</u>		<u> </u>	- 1		- 1			-	-	0
Project Challenge		<u> </u>		<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>				<u> </u>	<u> </u>											<u> </u>	—		<u> </u>		\vdash						1 8
Product Challenge		<u> </u>																													-+	-		0
Totals		10	0	6	4	7	7	12	8	10	15	18	14	47	17	15	12	19	9	10	2	8	13		20		11			11		_	5 1	








Applied ML: Incident report mapping

11



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
Applied ML: Incident report mapping





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Applied ML: Incident report mapping






Indicators across tickets

Indicators occur with diverse patterns across tickets, reporters and time.


Time on x axis, count on y axis, color coded by reporter.



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Similarity of indicators




Beginning with a reference indicator, we find indicators similar to it. Example: a malicious IP

- Colored circles are tickets
- Grey circles are indicators
- Large indicators near center of circle have similar occurrence patterns to the reference indicator.




Indicator communities



But what if we aren't starting with a reference indicator? We assume that indicators generated by a coherent real world process will be more likely to co-occur in tickets than arbitrary pairs of indicators. Find groups of highly similar indicators in complete indicatorticket graph.



Indicator-ticket graph



A subset of the ticket-indicator graph (for a small set of selected indicators)

- Tickets are grey triangles
- Indicators are black circles
- Edges connect tickets to the indicators they contain

Contact Information

Eliezer Kanal

Technical Manager Telephone: +1 412.268.5204 Email: <u>ekanal@sei.cmu.edu</u>

