

Intelligence Driven Malware Analysis (IDMA) Malicious Profiling

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**Homeland
Security**

National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center

whoami

- Cyber Threat Analyst at Northrop Grumman
 - Performed wide range of duties from malware analysis to cyber threat reporting
 - Supporting US-CERT/NCCIC
- B.S. in Digital Forensic Science from Defiance College (Ohio)
- M.S. in Digital Forensic Science from Champlain College (Vermont)
- Certifications
 - GIAC Certified Reverse Engineer of Malware (GREM)
 - GIAC Certified Incident Handler (GCIH)
 - GIAC Certified Forensic Analyst (GCFA)



Outline

- Introduction & Purpose
- Foundation & Origin
- IDMA Overview
- Critical Components
- Operational Use Case
- Conclusions



Introduction & Purpose


- Malware Analysis Integration
 - Reduce operational isolation
 - Increase effectiveness of threat intelligence and incident response operations
- Augment Existing Methodologies
 - Not attempting to reinvent the wheel
 - Utilize threat intelligence to drive analysis



Foundation & Origin

- Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis
(*Caltagirone et al. 2013*)
- Robust and Scalable
 - Designed for incident response
 - Adapted for malware analysis

- Facilitate a Bridge
 - Incident response
 - Malware analysis
 - Threat intelligence




Critical Components of IDMA

- Indicator Classification
 - Novel concept
 - Provides context for analysis
- Indicator Correlation
 - Novel concept
 - Facilitates actionable and relevant indicators
- Threat Intelligence Order of Volatility (TI-OV)
 - Novel concept
 - Methodical order of precedence



Indicator Classification & Correlation



Ephemeral

- Hash values
- Single IP address
- Single domain

Network Based

- Source and destination IP (net flow)
- Targeted ports and services
- Beacon addressed and locations
- Delivery methods

Host Based


- File names
- File paths
- IDS signatures or other detection methods
- Intrusion objectives (if known)
- Vulnerability identifiers

Behavioral

- File system interaction (create, change, delete)
- Registry interactions
- Toolchain analysis (packer, compiler)
- Impact and outcome



Threat Intelligence Order of Volatility (TI-OV)




Profiles of Analysis

- **Four Core Profiles (Analysis Methods)**
 - Static, Dynamic, Reversing, Adversary
- **Segmented Analysis**
 - Reinforce existing methodologies
 - Multiple components = one profile
 - Modular system of analysis
- **Critical Questions of Malicious Profiling**
 - Provides focus to core profiles
 - Drives analysis towards intelligence criteria



IDMA Profiles

The basic concept of malicious profiling leverages existing malware analysis techniques applied with critical thinking and intelligence analysis skills.




Modular analysis


Profiles can be individually or collectively applied to the diamond model to increase efficiency and focus analysis.



IDMA Concept




IDMA Process Flow



Use Case

- **SATR Discovery**
 - Malware hashes beaconing to government hosts
 - Intelligence -> malware analysis -> incident response
- **IDMA Analysis**
 - Integration of efforts
 - IDMA project was a derivative of this effort





5 MALWARE samples found

Government Agency #1

Government Agency #2

Using intel-driven data, Malware samples were observed attempting to make connections to government machines

Additionally, two external facing websites from two different Government agencies were identified



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Use Case: Malicious Profile

| TI-OV | | Adversary | Infrastructure | Capabilities | Victim |
|-------|---------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---|---|
| | Behavioral | Anti-forensic techniques | | Sample signed with two digital certificates | |
| | Host Based | | | | Public facing server URL Designed to run on Windows XP |
| | Network Based | Digital certificate domains | Malicious domain hardcoded | | Hosting IP address |
| | Ephemeral | Compile time | | Sample hash | Detection Time |

(Zeltser, 2015)



Use Case: Correlating Evidence

- Original Work Flow
 - Samples discovered
 - Net flow examined (limited scope)
 - Samples were sent to malware shop (little context provided)
 - Callback domain
 - Net flow conclusions
 - Total time invested ~10 days (prior to additional response)
- IDMA Work Flow
 - Samples discovered
 - IDMA applied (context discovery)
 - Samples can be sent to malware shop
 - Indicators from all 8 categories of the profile supplied
 - Additional context can drive further analysis (malware, IRT)



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Use Case Conclusions

- Full Scale Reverse Engineering
 - Time consuming, resource intensive process
 - Few individuals are fully qualified
- IDMA Analysis
 - Two profiles used (Static, Reversing)
 - Tools utilized
 - OllyDbg
 - PEStudio
 - BinText
 - Context driven analysis
 - Total time invested ~3 hours (additional)



Conclusions



Context

- Shift field away from single indicators
- Additional context increases effectiveness of incident response and threat intelligence operations



Volatility

- Facilitates indicator precedence
- Focus analysis on less volatile indicators
- Adds additional context for reporting



Malware Analysis & Diamond Model

- Sample analysis can feed all four components
- Malware analysis does not have to be compartmentalized & segregated



Value of Time

- Context and behavior can be derived without full scale reversing
- Can lead to increased effectiveness in incident response operations



Questions?

