




Detecting Traffic to Recently Unparked Domains with Analysis Pipeline

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Agenda

Define parked/unparked domains

Why are they interesting?

Use Pipeline to detect recently unparked domains

Detect traffic to IP addresses with recently unparked domains

Limit false positives

Results of testing on SEI network

Other DNS fun with Pipeline

Domain Parking / Unparking

For this presentation, a domain is considered **parked** when its associated IP is:

- 127.0.0.0/8
- 10.0.0.0/8
- 192.168.0.0/16
- 172.16.0.0/12
- 255.255.255.254/31
- 0.0.0.0
- 1.1.1.1

It becomes **unparked** when associated with a routable address.

Why can it be bad?

Changes in the control plane can be notable, even if not malicious

Some malicious uses of domain parking:

- Regulation of malware phoning home
 - Use parked IP address to keep malware quiet
 - Unpark IP address to receive data from malware
- Change ownership or location of existing malware
 - Redirect to the new owner of the implant
 - Redirect to newly hacked server after original one cleaned

What are we trying to find?

Domains that become unparked

Look for traffic of any sort being sent to IP addresses associated with those domains.

How do we do this?

Examine DNS A record response records

Look for responses with IP addresses in

127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16,
172.16.0.0/12, 255.255.255.254, 255.255.255.255, 0.0.0.0, 1.1.1.1

Build an IPSet with these addresses called: ***parked.set***


Record the domain name

Look for records with those domain names with IP addresses that aren't in the list above.

Record the unparked IP

Look for traffic sent from our network to that IP

Test Network setup



Multiple YAF sensors feed a super_mediator

Pipeline gets a copy of the full stream

Pipeline accept additional data sources

Pipeline handles DNS?

Pipeline version 4.x only handled SiLK flow records.

Pipeline version 5.x has expanded its input possibilities

- SiLK – just like v4

- YAF with full DPI (that's how we get DNS)

- IPFIX – any raw ipfix can be ingested

Schemas are generated dynamically giving pipeline access to the fields without a priori knowledge of the record format

(Yes, YAF is IPFIX, but YAF data sources get special processing)

Pipeline 5.3 publicly released September 30th, 2015.

Find Parked Domains



```
FILTER parkedDomains  
  rrIPv4 IN LIST "parked.set"  
END FILTER
```

*parked.set consists of 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8,
192.168.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12,
255.255.255.254, 255.255.255.255, 0.0.0.0,
1.1.1.1

Record Parked Domains



If a flow passes emptyDomainNames filter, record the dnsQName value in a list named domainsWithNoIP. Keep those values for 1 day.

```
INTERNAL FILTER park
```

```
    FILTER parkedDomains
```

```
    dnsQName domainsWithNoIP 1
```

```
DAY
```

```
END INTERNAL FILTER
```

Find parked domains now unparked



```
FILTER unparked
```

```
  dnsQName IN LIST
```

```
    domainsWithNoIP
```

```
  rrIPv4 NOT IN LIST "parked.set"
```

```
END FILTER
```

*parked.set consists of 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8,
192.168.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12,
255.255.255.254, 255.255.255.255, 0.0.0.0,
1.1.1.1

Record unparked IP Addresses for unparked domains



INTERNAL FILTER unpark

FILTER unparked

rrIPv4 unparkedDomainIPs 1 DAY

END INTERNAL FILTER

Our configuration so far

```
FILTER parkedDomains
  rrIPv4 IN LIST "parked.set"
END FILTER
```

```
INTERNAL FILTER park
  FILTER parkedDomains
  dnsQName domainsWithNoIP
  1 DAY
END INTERNAL FILTER
```

```
FILTER unparked
  dnsQName IN LIST
  domainsWithNoIP
  rrIPv4 NOT IN LIST
  "parked.set"
END FILTER
```

```
INTERNAL FILTER unpark
  FILTER unparked
  rrIPv4 unparkedDomainIPs
  1 DAY
END INTERNAL FILTER
```

Find traffic to unparked domain IP addresses



```
FILTER trafficToUnparked
```

```
    destinationIPv4Address IN LIST
```

```
        unparkedDomainIPs
```

```
END FILTER
```

Alert on traffic to unparked IP addresses



```
EVALUATION reportTrafficToUnparked
  FILTER trafficToUnparked
  ALERT ALWAYS
  ALERT EVERYTHING
  CHECK EVERYTHING PASSES
  END CHECK
END EVALUATION
```


Results from live SEI* data



False positives at each step in analysis

Domain parking is not always malicious or even interesting

Let's get rid of them

*Thanks Mike Pochan

False positive #1

Valid security sites use DNS to receive requests and return results

DNS query with request prepended to site's domain:

- 1.2.3.4.securitysite.com
- potential.malicious.domain.securitysite.com

Replies are returned using responses in the 127.0.0.0/8 network

For example:

- 127.0.0.1 means OK
- 127.0.1.1 means malicious

These look like parked domains! Let's not record these.

Filtering out security sites

Change filter that identifies parked domains

FILTER parkedDomains

```
rrIPv4 IN LIST "parked.set"
```

```
DNS_SLD(dnsQName) NOT IN LIST ["cmu", "cert",  
    "barracudacentral", "surriel", "spamhaus", "uribl", "isipp",  
    "root-servers", "dnswl", "sorbs", "senderscore", "support-  
intelligence", "mcafee", "surbl", "nessus", "dynect",  
    "akadns", "quadranet"]
```

END FILTER

DNS Derived Fields

dnsQName is: a.B.domain.com.

DNS_PUBLIC_SUFFIX(dnsQName) = com

DNS_SLD(dnsQName) = domain

DNS_HOST(dnsQName) = a.B

DNS_PRIVATE_NAME(dnsQName) = a.B.domain

DNS_SLD+TLD(dnsQName) = domain.com

DNS_INVERT(dnsQName) = com.domain.B.a

DNS_NORMALIZE(dnsQName) = a.b.domain.com

(All lower case. Remove any starting or ending dots)

False positives #2: Ignore internal addresses

When looking for unparked domains, ignore those whose IP address is on the internal network.

```
FILTER unparked
```

```
  dnsQName IN LIST domainsWithNoIP
```

```
  rrIPv4 NOT IN LIST ["parked.set", "internalSubnet.set"]
```

```
END FILTER
```

False positive #3: Safe* sites

Addresses within the IP spaces of Apple, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft.

External facing networks of CMU, SEI, and CERT.

FILTER unparked

```
dnsQName IN LIST domainsWithNoIP
```

```
rrIPv4 NOT IN LIST ["parked.set", "internalSubnet.set",  
                    "safeIPSpace.set"]
```

END FILTER

*I know safe is a dangerous word and cannot be assumed, but let's pretend

False positive #4: Follow on DNS Traffic

When identifying traffic to unparked domain IP address, ignore traffic coming from our internal DNS servers

```
FILTER trafficToUnparked
```

```
  destinationIPv4Address IN LIST unparkedDomainIPs
```

```
  sourceIPv4Address NOT IN LIST "internalDNSServers.set"
```

```
END FILTER
```

```
FILTER parkedDomains
  rrIPv4 IN LIST "parked.set"
END FILTER
```

```
INTERNAL FILTER park
  FILTER parkedDomains
  dnsQName domainsWithNoIP
  1 DAY
```

```
END INTERNAL FILTER
```

```
FILTER unparked
  dnsQName IN LIST
  domainsWithNoIP
  rrIPv4 NOT IN LIST
  "parked.set"
END FILTER
```

```
INTERNAL FILTER unpark
  FILTER unparked
  rrIPv4 unparkedDomainIPs
  1 DAY
END INTERNAL FILTER
FILTER trafficToUnparked
  destinationIPv4Address
  IN LIST unparkedDomainIPs
END FILTER
EVALUATION reportTrafficToUnparked
  FILTER trafficToUnparked
  ALERT ALWAYS
  ALERT EVERYTHING
  CHECK EVERYTHING PASSES
  END CHECK
END EVALUATION
```


See unparked domains in alerts

Add evaluation to alert when an unparked domain is discovered

Then we get the {domain, IP} tuple

Replace the “unpark” internal filter an evaluation alerting on unparked IP addresses.

Alerts will contain that:

- the IP
- the DNS flow record,
- the dnsQName as an extra field.

We now have a record of unparked domains and associated IPs

Replacement Evaluation

```
EVALUATION unparkedDNS_IP
  FILTER unparked
  FOREACH rrIPv4
    EXTRA ALERT FIELD dnsQName
    CHECK THRESHOLD
      RECORD COUNT > 0
    END CHECK
    OUTPUT TIMEOUT 1 DAY
    OUTPUT LIST rrIPv4 unparkedDomainIPs
  END EVALUATION
```

Results

Three interesting domains found:

- x.bidswitch.net
 - On a list of phishing domains
- p.rfihub
 - Associated with a sinkhole IP
- ads.mp.mydas.mobi
 - Associated with a sinkhole IP
 - String found in 14 malware sample on Virus Total.

DNS Watchlisting

FILTER blacklist

dnsQName IN LIST "dnsBlacklist.txt"

END FILTER

EVALUATION badDNS

FILTER blacklist

ALERT ALWAYS

ALERT EVERYTHING

CHECK EVERYTHING PASSES

END CHECK

EXTRA ALERT FIELD dnsQName

END EVALUATION

dnsBlacklist.txt

##format:dns

inbox.google.com

maps.google.com

cmu.edu

sei.cert.org

pittsburgh.pirates.mlb.com

Pipeline Can Detect Fast Flux Networks

PMAP asn "pmaps/20151027.bgp.pmap"

EVALUATION FFv4

ALERT ALWAYS

ALERT EVERYTHING

CHECK FAST FLUX

IP_FIELD sourceIPv4Address 5

ASN asn 5

DNS dnsQName 5

NODE MAXIMUM 150000

END CHECK

END EVALUATION

SIE Data Processing

Security Information Exchange DNS data processing

- CERT converts from nmessage to daily rollup CSV
- Emily Sarneso used pyfixbuf to convert the record to IPFIX
- Pipeline can process any IPFIX record

Searching for unparked domains from a 1 day rollup

- 343,828,409 records
- Found 25 unparked domains
- 3 minutes 35 seconds

Thank you for listening

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 Pipeline