

Classifying Encrypted Traffic with TLS aware Telemetry

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
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Problem Statement

- "I need to understand traffic even when it is encrypted"
 - Malware detection
 - Application identification
- "I need to understand how crypto is being used on my network"
 - Weak crypto algorithms and/or key sizes
 - Vulnerable cryptographic library detection
 - The ports where TLS shows up

Non-443 Malicious TLS






Solution

- Our solution is to gather additional, TLS-aware telemetry.
- This solution:
 - Could be baked into a flow telemetry exporting device
 - Can be run in a VM off a SPAN port (with our open source package)
- Passive monitoring is used to gather all data.
 - Not costly or difficult to deploy (as opposed to MITM solution)



TLS-aware Telemetry Data Types



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809
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
Malware Detection

Malware Detection

- Malware is making use of TLS to communicate.
 - We observed that 7-13% of malware communication is over TLS
- Traditional IPS/IDS signatures fail.
 - Malicious communication is encrypted
- We leverage TLS-aware telemetry for malware classification.
 - Increases classification accuracy
 - Reduces false positives





TLS Versions






Ciphersuites








TLS Extensions





Client Key Lengths





Test Setup

Malware

- September 2015 pcaps from ThreatGRID
- TLS (443) traffic, > 100 in and out bytes
- 26,404 flows, Telemetry enhanced with TLS extensions, ciphersuites, and client key lengths


Benign

- traffic taken from a large enterprise DMZ
- TLS (443) traffic, > 100 in and out bytes
- 50,848 flows, Telemetry enhanced with TLS extensions, ciphersuites, and client key lengths
- 10-fold CV




Telemetry Data Types

 SPLT – Sequence of Packet Lengths and Arrival Times



- Byte Distribution
 - Relative frequency for each byte in a flow



traditional: sp, dp, prot, ib, ip, ob, op, dur



Results

- L1-logistic regression
- SPLT + 7-tuple + BD

- L1-logistic regression
- SPLT + 7-tuple + BD + TLS



Results

- L1-logistic regression
- SPLT + 7-tuple + BD
 - 172.2 non-zero parameters
 - 0.01 FDR: 0.1%
 - Total Accuracy: 96.1%

- L1-logistic regression
- SPLT + 7-tuple + BD + TLS
 - 138.1 non-zero parameters
 - 0.01 FDR: 90.4%
 - Total Accuracy: 99.7%



.1448916609,021792, ..64% 809 421 499


Crypto Audit

Crypto Audit

- We observe what cryptography is being used in TLS (same principles can be applied to SSH, IPsec, etc.).
 - Who is using weak crypto on my network?
- We infer the version of the cryptographic library in use.
 - Initial results with OpenSSL
 - Vulnerable implementations, not active attacks
- We passively monitor traffic, no active probing.




Client Key Lengths (DMZ)






Selected Ciphersuites (DMZ)






OpenSSL Similarity Matrix






TLS Extensions






Heartbleed





logjam





Benefits of TLS-awareness

- TLS-aware telemetry provides a passive monitoring approach for:
 - Improved malware classification
 - The ability to audit an enterprise network's crypto usage
- TLS-aware telemetry is a relatively light weight system compared to MITM solutions or full packet capture.
- joy (our open source package) currently implements the described functionality (https://github.com/davidmcgrew/joy).



CISCO

Thank You

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1448916579.567474.
.1448916609,021792,
                                   809
                                   421
                                   499
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