Network flow analysis at SCinet

or

“Network flow analysis at ~~880Gb/s~~ 1.2Tb/s”

Eric Dull
Steven P. Reinhardt

Agenda

- What is SCinet
- What analytic questions were we answering
- How we applied graphs to answer these questions
- Places to start exploring graphs

What is SCinet

- /17 publicly routed network
- Network supporting the SC technical conference and exhibit hall
- 10,972 devices on the network
- 1.2 Tb/s onto the show floor
- 296 Gb/s under BRO observation
- Set-up to teardown – about 10 days
- Rebuilt/reused every year



SC14
New Orleans, LA
hpc matters.
SCinet
Network Architecture
V5.5
Linda Winkler
Argonne National Laboratory
Nov. 16-21, 2014
10/100/1000-TX
1 Gigabit Ethernet
10 Gigabit Ethernet
40 Gigabit Ethernet
100 Gigabit Ethernet
Dense Wave Division Multiplexing
Wi-Fi Access Point
Digital Signs
ESnet
ENERGY SCIENCES NETWORK
INTERNET2
CenturyLink
Commodity Internet Service
LONI
Commodity Internet Service
SC08-Baton Rouge
SC13-Baton Rouge
l3br-ciena1
ciena
6500-32
lsudc-alcatel
Alcatel·Lucent
PSS16
lsudc-fujitsu
FUJITSU
9500
CenturyLink
infinera
9826 Burbank Baton Rouge, LA
LSU Baton Rouge, LA
1340 Poydras New Orleans, LA
TimeWarner Telecomm Fiber
CenturyLink Fiber
300G
100G
800G
mccno-ciena
ciena
6500-32
mccno-alcatel
Alcatel·Lucent
PSS16
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FUJITSU
9500
mccno-infinera
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XTC-4
wan-mgmt-sw
100G Exhibitor Connections
spt-n4u
SPIRENT
core-sw
ciena
8700-10
core-rtr
Alcatel·Lucent
7750-SR12e
bwctl10g1
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OSA
JDSU
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Reservoir Labs
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dominate2
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reservoir-pace
Reservoir Labs
140.221.240.30
100G tap aggregation
SCinet NOC
Booth 1353
big-bro
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supermassive
sec-tool-sw
S4810-ON
its1
140.221.249.179
bigswitch-ctrl
big switch
140.221.240.14
metaflows-ids
140.221.240.46
ns1
140.221.251.252
KVM
GraphViz
CRAY
140.221.240.45
sw-net-sm
140.221.241.145
sw-net-dist
140.221.241.144
tap aggregation fabric
dist-rtr1
JUNIPER
PTX3000
dist-rtr2
ARISTA
7504e
bwctl10g3
perfSONAR
140.221.249.133
ixia
XM12
conf-rtr
JUNIPER
MX-960
tap aggregation fabric
bigswitch-ctrl
big switch
140.221.240.13
sec-baby-tap
big switch
140.221.240.2
sec-mama-tap
S4810-ON
monitor
140.221.249.131
owamp
perfSONAR
140.221.249.130
its0
140.221.249.178
prime
wlc1
wlc2
inMon
kiosk
meas-displays
ndt
ns0
oess
rancid
repo
scinet
syslog
KVM
General Conference Support
swnoc-5
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swnoc-7
swnoc-6
swnoc-9
swnoc-10
swnoc-1
swnoc-2
swnoc-3
swnoc-4
mgmt1221-sw
mgmt2322-sw
mgmt3516-sw
dnoc960-sw
BROCADE
VDX6740 (2)
mgmt960-sw
10G Exhibitor Connections
100G Exhibitor Connections
dnoc2245-sw
BROCADE
VDX6740 (2)
mgmt2245-sw
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BROCADE
VDX6740 (2)
mgmt3556-sw
1G Exhibitor Connections
1G Exhibitor Connections
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
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rancid
repo
scinet
syslog
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140.221.249.138
140.221.251.252
140.221.251.243.48
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NETWORKS
MX-960
General
Conference
Support
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swnoc-8
swnoc-7
swnoc-6
swnoc-9
swnoc-10
swnoc-1
swnoc-2
swnoc-3
swnoc-4
mgmt1221-sw
mgmt2322-sw
mgmt3516-sw
swroom-391
swroom-388
swroom-386
swroom-398
swroom-396
swroom-295
swroom-296
swroom-297
swroom-291
swroom-288
swroom-392
swroom-390
swroom-389
swroom-384
swroom-395
swroom-394
swroom-393
swroom-397
swroom-292
swroom-293
swroom-294
swroom-271
swroom-273
swroom-278

Total generated triples

BRO Log type	Lines	Triples per line	Triples
files	13,432,704	10	134,327,040
syslog	1,085,812	10	10,858,120
notice	380,842	10	3,808,420
http	12,133,443	25	303,336,075
ssh	2,093,004	10	20,930,040
dhcp	986,072	10	9,860,720
weird	49,789,135	5	248,945,675
conn	1,487,430,036	12	17,849,160,432

- RDF generated on Discover using Python scripts written at SC13
- Used the OCOG netflow RDF format for the first time in analysis!

Flow counts


1.E+09
1.E+08
1.E+07
1.E+06
1.E+05
1.E+04
1.E+03
1.E+02
1.E+01
1.E+00
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
15 Nov
16 Nov
17 Nov
18 Nov
19 Nov
20 Nov
Commodity Connections
100G connections
1.5B flows

Flow counts


1.E+09
1.E+08
1.E+07
1.E+06
1.E+05
1.E+04
1.E+03
1.E+02
1.E+01
1.E+00
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
15 Nov
16 Nov
17 Nov
18 Nov
19 Nov
20 Nov
SYN flood
1.3B flow
Commodity Connections
100G connections
1.5B flows

Analytic charge

- Find outbound scanning or attacking
- Help identify groups of infected systems from C2 and download activities
- “Perform the next hop” of analysis. Use graphs to ease automated analysis
- Find new DNS and DHCP servers as they appear on the network

Applicable graph operations

- **Search – “Find SSH connection networks”**
  - IP address based search
  - Port and volume based search
  - IDS alert based search
  - 1,2, or 3 hop
- **Jaccard Scoring – “which is the likely C2 channel for IPs downloading from this port?”**
- **Betweeness Centrality – “Which IP address in this network should be considered first when cleaning up an infection network?”**

Search example: SSH chain
alerting hosts– X > 10K response bytes



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Search example: SSH connection chain SPARQL query

```
CONSTRUCT{
  ?ap_addr <http://cs.org/p/hasNoticeNote>  <http://cs.org/notice_node#SSH::Password_Guessing>.
  ?ap_addr <urn:p/hasSSH> ?internal_addr.
  ?internal_addr <urn:p/hasSSH> ?a_addr.
}
{
 SELECT distinct ?internal_addr ?ap_addr ?a_addr
 WHERE
 {
  ?uid4 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationAddress> ?a_addr.
  ?uid4 <http://opencog.net/p/sourceAddress> ?internal_addr.
  ?uid4 <http://opencog.net/p/hasProtocol> <http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>.
  ?uid4 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationPort> <http://opencog.net/port#22> .
  ?uid4 <http://cs.org/p/hasRespBytes> ?rbytes1.
  FILTER(?rbytes1 > 10000)
  {
   SELECT distinct ?internal_addr ?ap_addr
   WHERE
   {
    ?uid <http://cs.org/p/hasNoticeNote>  <http://cs.org/notice_node#SSH::Password_Guessing>.
    ?uid <http://cs.org/p/hasNoticeMsg> ?msg.
    ?uid <http://cs.org/p/hasOrigAddr> ?ap_addr.
    ?uid4 <http://opencog.net/p/sourceAddress> ?ap_addr.
    ?uid4 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationAddress> ?internal_addr.
    ?uid4 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationPort> <http://opencog.net/port#22>.
    ?uid4 <http://cs.org/p/hasRespBytes> ?rbytes1.
    FILTER(?rbytes1 > 20900)
   }
   LIMIT 1000
  }
 }
}
```

Jaccard example: math and SPARQL implementation

```
SELECT ?proto ?port ?client_count ?big_client_count
WHERE
{
 {
 SELECT ?proto ?port (count(distinct ?ap_addr) as ?big_client_count)
 WHERE
 {
   ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/sourceAddress> ?ap_addr.
   ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationAddress> ?dest_addr2 .
   ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationPort> ?port .
   ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/hasProtocol> ?proto .
   ?uid3 <http://cs.org/p/hasRespBytes> ?rbytes2.
 }
 GROUP BY ?proto ?port
 }
 {
 SELECT ?proto ?port (count(distinct ?ap_addr) as ?client_count)
 WHERE
 {
   ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/sourceAddress> ?ap_addr.
   ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationAddress> ?dest_addr2 .
   ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationPort> ?port .
   ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/hasProtocol> ?proto .
   ?uid3 <http://cs.org/p/hasRespBytes> ?rbytes2.
   FILTER(?rbytes2 > 0)
   ?uid4 <http://opencog.net/p/sourceAddress> ?ap_addr.
   ?uid4 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationAddress> ?dest_addr .
   ?uid4 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationPort> <http://opencog.net/port#9162>.
   ?uid4 <http://cs.org/p/hasRespBytes> ?rbytes1.
   FILTER(?rbytes1 > 0)
 }
 GROUP BY ?proto ?port
 HAVING (?client_count > 1)
 }
}
ORDER BY DESC(?client_count)
```



Definition: $|V1 \cap V2| \; / \; |V1 \cup V2|$

Jaccard example: SSH password forced C2 channel candidates

?proto	?port	?client_coun	?big_client_count	
<http://opencog.net/proto#udp>	<http://opencog.net/port#26161>	2	6	0.33333333
<http://opencog.net/proto#udp>	<http://opencog.net/port#9162>	2	7	0.28571429
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#9162>	5	18	0.27777778
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#7668>	4	20	0.2
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#17471>	2	12	0.16666667
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#30261>	2	12	0.16666667
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#28761>	2	13	0.15384615
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#15770>	2	13	0.15384615
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#12081>	2	13	0.15384615
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#6218>	2	14	0.14285714
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#18675>	2	14	0.14285714
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#19244>	2	14	0.14285714
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#32712>	2	16	0.125
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#7168>	2	16	0.125
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#10090>	2	16	0.125
<http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>	<http://opencog.net/port#30556>	2	16	0.125

Jaccard example: ports 7668 and 9162 visualization



Betweenness example: pseudo-math and SPARQL implementation

```
SELECT ?vertices ?scores
WHERE
{
CONSTRUCT{ #<urn:SSH_forcer> <urn:/p/HasMember> ?src_addr.
?src_addr <urn:p/hasSSH> ?dest_addr.
?dest_addr <urn:p/hasSSH> ?dest_addr2
}
WHERE
{
SELECT distinct ?src_addr ?dest_addr ?dest_addr2
WHERE
{ ?booth2 a <http://sc14.org/class#SCinet_subnet> .
 ?booth2 <http://opencog.net/hasMember> ?dest_addr .
 ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/sourceAddress> ?dest_addr .
 ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationAddress> ?dest_addr2 .
 ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/hasProtocol> <http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>.
 ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationPort> <http://opencog.net/port#22> .
 ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/start> ?start_time2.
 ?uid3 <http://cs.org/p/hasRespBytes> ?rbytes2.
 FILTER (?rbytes2 > 12000)
 FILTER (?start_time < ?start_time2)
 OPTIONAL

{
SELECT ?src_addr ?dest_addr ?start_time
{ #?src_addr a <http://sc14.org/class#SSHattacker>.
 ?uid <http://cs.org/p/hasNoticeNote>  <http://cs.org/notice_node#SSH::Password_Guessing>.
 ?uid <http://cs.org/p/hasNoticeMsg> ?msg.
 ?uid <http://cs.org/p/hasOrigAddr> ?src_addr.

 ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/sourceAddress> ?src_addr .
 ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationAddress> ?dest_addr .
 ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/hasProtocol> <http://opencog.net/proto#tcp>.
 ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/destinationPort> <http://opencog.net/port#22> .
 ?uid3 <http://opencog.net/p/start> ?start_time.
 ?uid3 <http://cs.org/p/hasRespBytes> ?rbytes2.
 FILTER(?rbytes2 > 12000)
}
LIMIT 500
}
}
}INVOKE yd:graphAlgorithm.betweenness_centrality (.5,1)
 PRODUCING ?vertices ?scores
}
ORDER BY DESC(?scores)
```

How to compute Betweeness centrality (All-pairs shortest-path)

- From every node, compute the shortest path(s) to every other node
- For every node, count the number of shortest paths that go through it
- For every edge, count the number of shortest paths that go through it
- Divide the shortest path counts by the total number of shortest paths to generate centrality scores

The nodes and edges with the highest centrality scores are most central



Betweenness example: SSH / Internal / ?

Urika YarcData SC14 SCinet NetSec | Run Queries | View Queries | Graph | Options | Connected: discover.

SSH Internal ?

Search in graph



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Betweenness example: Centrality results

?vertices	?scores
http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.248.140	1^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>
<http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.248.57>	0.5217391304347826^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>
<http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.161.209>	0.5217391304347826^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>
<http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.160.131>	0.2608695652173913^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>
<http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.243.2>	0.2608695652173913^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>
<http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.203.126>	0.2608695652173913^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>
<http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.248.40>	0.2608695652173913^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>
<http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.163.190>	0.2608695652173913^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>
<http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.240.45>	0.2608695652173913^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>
<http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.142.81>	0.2608695652173913^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>
<http://opencog.net/ip4#A.B.243.36>	0.04347826086956522^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#double>

Successes and next steps

- **Successes**
  - Identified outbound scanning behaviors (and SYN floods)
  - Identified candidate external C2 hosts
  - Identified candidate internal infected hosts based on port usage
  - Identified candidate C2 ports using Jaccard scoring
  - Identified the first place to start cleaning up the XX SSH client chain (if we chose to do that. We turned off the network instead)
  - Used Spark Streaming to identify DHCP servers during Wireless network ‘troubles’

- **Next steps**
  - More RDF/BRO parsers (particularly DNS)
  - Improved Python parser to more easily use the multiple cores on the XT5 blades
  - Easier link-chart generation
  - More and more mature Spark Streaming

Places to start your own graph analysis journey

- **Literature**
  - Chapter 13 of Network Security through Data Analysis by Michael Collins
  - Mark Newman's publications (http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/pubs.html)
  - Linked by Barabasi



- **Available FOSS tools**
  - Gephi
  - Cytoscape
  - Apache Jena
  - MTGL (https://software.sandia.gov/trac/mtgl)

BACKUP SLIDES

Data processing architecture



Available Algorithms

- **Search / neighborhood identification and extraction**
  - Pattern-matching / subgraph isomorphism: (**Core functionality**)
  - **Cybersecurity application: Context and search, data exfiltration, beaconing, attack identification**
- **Community detection**
  - Modularity: (**Fall2013 release**)
  - Relaxed clique
  - **Cybersecurity application: Botnet detection and server hierarchy mapping**
- **Similarity scoring**
  - Jaccard scoring: (**Example code available**)
  - **Cybersecurity: Infrastructure mapping, botnet detection, client / server mapping**
- **Path finding**
  - Shortest path: (**Summer2014 release**), S-T connectivity: : (**Fall2014 release**)
  - **Cybersecurity application: Identify likely paths for information flow between nodes**
- **Key node / edge identification**
  - Betweenness centrality: (**Summer2014 release**)
  - **Cybersecurity application: find the vulnerable points in network configurations**
- **Anomaly identification and clustering**
  - **Cybersecurity application: Unknown-unknown identification**
  - **Cybersecurity application: BadRank (Summer2014 release): finds likely worst actors by association with known bad actors, a la PageRank**