

TSP Symposium 2014

Going Beyond Methodology to Maximize Performance

November 3–6, 2014 Pittsburgh, PA

Graphical Recordings

TSP 2014 Keynote: Case Study of Toyota Unintended Acceleration and Software Safety

Philip Koopman

Carnegie Mellon University


Code Complexity It's a myth Keynote: CASE STUDY OF McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity Metric that quality costs Over 50 is cuisidered more. In creating TOYOTA UNINTENDED "untestable" Software, quality SYMPOSIUM ACCELERATION AND ETCS Code SOFTWARE SAFETY Throttle Angle COSTS LESS. function complexity Complexity - Philip Koopman 146 James Over, Redundacy Required for Critical Global Variables Opening Remarks November 9, Pittsburgh PA Systems are evil. 66 What would a Input Input Walts say? ETCS -> ABOUT Foult Fault 10,000 global antainment Containment region Region Variables Toyota ETCS ACTUATORS SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE Main Throttle Position Monitor ASIC undetected VTA1 Failure Throthe CPU ENGINE Throttle Pasition VTA Motora Monitor 11 Value Back pain. The VTA2 TSP helping to VTA2-Monitof Here Faul+ Acidorator_ UPAN Electric Pulal 1 VPOI lay the foundations chip VPA2) Fuel tie that binds " Comput WTA2-> Tujectim Accelerator SHARING OF Throttle of the next generation Course Pedel 2 VCA2 ni Ign INPUTS PERMITS Timins Remember the SEI) Transmissim UNDETECTED FAULTY of software Shift liday Party! DATA TO REACH MAIN CPU Selector MAIN CPU. Vehich Both copies of VPA go through the same input block on the Same CUDW FLAK Chip



TSP 2014: The Rest of the Story: From Product Process to Process Analysis

Jeff Schwalb

NAVAIR




TSP 2014 Keynote: Wild, Wild West—How to Corral All Your Developers into Creating Secure Code

Jonathan Beck

Vice President and Director of Security Controls, PNC Financial Services Group

Darwins & RISK ANALYSIS Wild, Wild West-· DRIVES SECURITY CONTROLS Developers How to corral all your . VERY PERSONAL TO Each team AN ORGANIZATION adapted to their developers into creating RISK FROMEWOCKS environment different circumstances - FAIR different models Secure code. - DREAD THREAT RISK MODELLUG - Jonathan Beck PNC Financial Services group Application Security · LOOKS AT RUK FROM THE Understand How Each Contribute to know code, build code LIEWPOINT OF THE BAD GUY Coscher . NOT JUST SOFTWARE, BUT know all imajor languages making secure software. OPERATIONAL & BUSINESS PROCTICES - focus on remedies - Sole focuoed on coaching Nudging Original state . TRUST BOUNDARIES . CHALLENGING FOR COMPLEX Not o Statiz & Dynamiz Teams find Unliverabilities o In setting up training -Nagging preferences varied greatlys. SYSTEMS · ExportISE NEED TO LEAD o Instructor-led was deemed o Penetratim Test inspect THE DISCUSSION most effective applizations ONLY FOR HIGHEST EISK APPLICATIONS · Pravided generic security requirements CAMPAIGN INCLUDED o Development team fixed buya - forum SECURITY APPLICATION - amareness articles - celebrated success REQUIREMENTS & VALIDATION DEFECTS DIRCOURED AT MOT YAY! - Presentations in - HOW TO PROVIDE MEANING FUL Senior management EXPENSIVE STAGE OF DEV LIFECKLE DIRECTION ? - Executive Support - MOVE TO CANGUAGE & FUNCTIONALMY. D TRAINING PROGRAM APPLICATION SECURITY COACHES - customized to each role DRIVEN REQUIREMENTS , understand our developest belier - wandaling & optional - CBT 2 Instructor-led - MAINTAINED AS THREATS - · Coding in many burganque, in many countries, ENVIRONMENT CHANGES - Supporting 1000s of appr 2 financial - VULNERABILITY SCAN REJULTS FOLDED BACK WTO REQUIREMENTS insimmento NO CENTRALIZATION NO HEAD



TSP 2014: A Zero-Depth Entry to Using TSP: How TSP Turned Around the Smart Grid Maturity Model Project

Summer Fowler, Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute Julia Mullaney, Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute


cannon ball! LOAD BALANCING SGMM · Made sure tasks matched To committed. Nothing Produced A Zero-depth Entry \$ Spent Budget ANALYSIS Analyzed data from Not organized to Using the TSP: three opproaches to Dragging each other Julia Mullaney & Summer Fowler Finalize the plan. - Budget Quarter by Course Project Management Get People out of the Pool - Review Weekly TSP BEFORE A LOVE - Reconcile Monthly o thrown in TSP is not Just for STORY o Sink or Swim DESIGN-LESSONS LEARNED o every man for himself Software . How to design TSP process to the products produced. SGMM a -defined usage, audience management tool The team was for utilities dispessel, divided their Helped Design Navigetor pragrammatic approach time, lots of tumorer Course, Training Course Used launches & postmortems as team-building TSP set up team for 1> Model actinities easy implementation Compass Survey USED LAUNCHES where ac we? - REVLEW PROJECT STATUS Overall Lessons Learnel DNavigation Process (Post Morten) . Need better methods to - Major Differences in conduct requirements analysis knuch Process Distrit gather usable historical DTraining - Team Coles Functional - Used MS Project for Stickiners - Experience didn't DPartner Program transfer to other projects phaning - Used several cost planning tools - quality was a journey " Quality Planning - Dramatic Increase in Value improved as the LAUNCH LESSONS LEARNED - Planning made Project & Proyect Term product suite SACESAMI advanced - Work got done in spite of overcommitmat - Insight into cost -> better decisions



TSP 2014 Keynote: Information Flow: The Secret to Successful Teamwork

Jesse Schell

CEO, Schell Games



TSP 2014: Insider Threats in the Software Development Life Cycle

Daniel Costa, Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute Randall Trzeciak, Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute

INSIDER THREATS WHAT'S MOST IMPOPTANT TO YOU TO PROTECT ? IN THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE ACTOR / TARGET / IMPACT DANIEL COSTA & RANDAUL TRZECIAK HOW WAAT WHO "Not everyone is a threat "Insider used to mean to everything." PHASES of SOFTWARE LIFECYCLE 'trusted', Now connotation is negative " neglected to define authentication THERE IS NO MAGIC - neglected to define security requirements neglected to define sutomated data integrity checks BULLET FOR INSIDER REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION lack of security in automated workflow processes THREATS - HOW DO - Insufficient separation of dutics - Insufficient omer harchim of vulnerabilities by YOU DETERMINE SYSTEM "authorized system overrides " DESIGN MALICIOUS INTENT? - lock of Code Reviews - Insbility to attribute actions SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION - lack of enforcement of documentation & back-up HR, Legel, Physical, + Non-Tech Indicators - Used same passimonal file Ð SYSTEM DETECT RESPOND - Lack of configuration control & well-defined PREVENT Ŵ DEPLOYMENT business processes - Lack of code reviews DAMAGE ! STILL STILL SYSTEM -Ineffective configuration control -Insufficient back-up practices MAINTAINENCE TECHNICAL INDICATORS -End User access - Ignoring know minurabilities INSIDER THREATS INCLUDE NOT ALL MALICIOUS & UNINTENTIONAL INSIDERS AT A CERTAIN ARE DAMAGE: INSIDER THREAT LEVEL, MALICE MALICIOUS ... IN SPACE ... BECOMES INDISTINGUIS HABLE MANY EMPLOYEES FROM INCOMPETENCE TAKE SENSTTIVE INFORMATION WITH THEM WHEN THEY CHANGE JOBS.




TSP 2014: Under N: Acceptance to Delivery in N Hours

Umashankar Velusamy

Verizon Communications, Inc.


UNDER N: SUPPORT STRUCTURE. FRAME WORK: - Strong Executive Support - Create Under-N Fabric Acceptance to Delivery Create & Template with - Celebrati Success Key info associated with - Broadcast, Identify & Apply Capabilities in n hours the Under- NI capability, both the info needed & - Challonge Teams to Self-Sorvice Umashankar Velusamy the info to be used. - Ask the right questions Under-N to the IT teams 9 Months Smart Delivera When does it fail? to Delivery of pre-defined GOVERNANCE : ochestrated software = 2 Months 1. Capability Request changes from 52. Define Capability to Velivery acceptance to delivery G3. Term Assess & Approve in under "h" hours, Not All Deliveries 64. Define Templete Are Alike 55. Confirm Tark Dwhership -Driven by busines values 66. Ensure Process & standards - Doesh't compromise quality O When used to bypass G.7. Launch -Co-exists with other processes Think of it as CAPABILITY INVOCATION: business delivery cycles o When cutting corners 1. Client invokes a defined - Many teanny already do it! building an ER o Wrong choice of tools Under-N copability for software delivery Validate Pre-requisites or Architecture - Create a framework ER Accept / Deny Use templates " When trying to - Create Qovernance POC'S follow Templath Steps SOFTWARE Process squeeze large Projects 5, Confirm Delivery in N-hours CAPABILITY - Encable 2 Medium to D: STAT handle Requests 46. Measure Business Value Institute a suppost structure MEDIUM : Invoke the Framework - Central Information for each Under-N Radiator Portal Copubility



TSP 2014 Keynote: When You Build It, They Will Come

Richard Pethia

Director of the CERT Program, Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute



of trained people. There's more to it than cryptography

There is a critical shortage of cyber security professionals,

Government Systems moving away from check. the - box - checks and towards ongoing processes that increase/ enhance security/resilience

Static testing 8 Source Code analysis improving-leading to better code

Design weakn ces drive Vulnerabi. tics 76% of Most Dangerous Errors stem from Design Weaknesses

Malware Samples are eccumulating at more than a million 2 month

TSP 2014: Scrum: Creating Great Products and Critical Systems – What to Worry About, What's Missing, and How to Fix it

Neil Potter

The Process Group

SCRUM: Creating Great Products and Critical Systems-Get Good Requirements Ellicitation an art. Scrum Missing Architecture / Design DELIVER? Missing Final System Test/Validation Release Analysis Sprint what to Worry About, What's Missing & How Why Design? - Identify Possible Problems sooner ·Design - Find Errors earlier - Charify Concepts & definitions to fix it. SPRINT be able to communicate them - Neil Potter SCRUM HAS BENEFITS Better work before the SCRUM gives better feedback during the SORUM - Work chunked Agile -- Scope changes managed 2 collection of development Plan Ahend: Incorporate Design, - good momentum & Testing, System Testing, etc into early feedback methodologies - easy to learn The scrum plan_" SALWT N+1: 60% Design Scrum is the most - fact feedback 40% Codig/Test - Opportunities for popular SCRUMBUT!* YOU CAN ADD QA WHA reduced risk Agile Manifesto Teams picking & doodsing SERUM DOESN'T DO parts of scrum process. EVERYTHING YOU NEED Does this Individuals & interactions _ processes & tools explain why * as in, " We do scrum, ATTO MATICALLY all the weetings but we don't do comprehensive Dre standing? Working software - Plant documentation - standards Don't be afraid to add practices -Customer Collaboration - contract negotistion - Requirements A Responding to Change . Following a plan (Just don't break the polit of Scrum) SCRUM SUSCEPTABLE TO AMBIGUITY AND Agile values CAN WE FIND A BALANCE? OVERSIGHTS INTRODUCED WHEN SCRUM IS DONE WELL The left list IN THE REQUIREMENTS & BASED ON GOALS more than WHAT DO YOU CALL IT? AND CHALLENGES ARCHITECTURE DESIGN the right. - SCRUMMY ? - SCRUMPTOUS? DON'T MISTAKE SPEED FOR PROGRESS

Not all Agile/ Scrum teams actually do Agile Scrum (Ask what they do)

GATES & GOVERNANCE