



Analyzing Flow Using Encounter Complexes

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DM-0000740

Clustering for Data Reduction

Instead of examining 5,000 flows over a time period...


Examine 12 clusters instead.
A 99.76% reduction

Previous Work


- Network Flow Clustering has been used for:
 - Trojan Detection
 - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6405737&tag=1
 - Detecting Spoofed Flows
 - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4239059
 - Finding Botnets
 - <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1496721>
- Encounter Complexes have been used for:
 - Recovering Spatial Information
 - <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1374668>

Encounter Trace

Defined as:




For Flow:



Encounter Complex

Two encounters have an edge between them if:

- They share an endpoint
- The endtime of one is within δ seconds of each other



Encounter Complex

Example of a complex:

2009/04/20T11:35:19.529 2009/04/20T11:35:28.935
10.1.60.203:60515 10.1.60.25:25

2009/04/20T11:36:28.822 2009/04/20T11:36:28.822
10.1.60.203:51727 10.1.60.25:25

Encounter Complex

Example of a complex:

2009/04/20T11:35:19.439 2009/04/20T11:35:19.445
10.1.60.203:50398 10.1.60.187:80

2009/04/20T11:35:19.440 2009/04/20T11:35:19.445
10.1.60.187:80 10.1.60.203:50398

Not Encounter Complexes

Example 1: The time is too far apart


2009/04/20T11:35:19.463 2009/04/20T11:35:19.519
10.1.60.203:49592 10.1.60.187:443

2009/04/20T13:00:13.738 2009/04/20T13:00:13.738
10.1.60.187:443 10.1.60.253:56074

Example 2: No matching trace found

2009/04/20T11:35:19.529 2009/04/20T11:35:28.935
10.1.60.203:60515 10.1.60.25:25

Visualizing This – Is Useless



Analysis

- Graph clusters
 - Each component within the complex is a set of related encounter traces
 - For example:
 - 12 components within one flow when $\delta=8$
 - Degree Analysis
 - What is the encounter with the most connections?
 - Local Clustering Coefficient
 - How dense is my graph


Analysis

Analyzing the largest component created from flow:

- 4,313 vertices, 636,761 edges, 635,631 cycles
- This means we have 4,313 encounter traces, or at worst case, 8,616 flows
- Vertex with highest degree (1,130) is found at:
 - 10.2.195.248:48776 10.1.60.25:25
- Local Clustering Coefficient:
 - Tightly clustered: 0.999994
- Examining the neighbors, it looks like 10.2.195.248:48776 is being very friendly

Analysis

This is what an HTTPS session can look like:



Analysis

This is some of the data from the previous graph:

10.1.60.187:443-10.1.30.5:3710 10.1.60.187:443-
10.1.30.5:3712

10.1.60.187:443-10.1.30.5:3710 10.1.30.5:3710-
10.1.60.187:443

10.1.60.187:443-10.1.30.5:3710 10.1.30.5:3712-
10.1.60.187:443

10.1.60.187:443-10.1.30.5:3712 10.1.60.187:443-
10.1.30.5:3710

Analysis

δ makes a difference

- When $\delta = 1$, the graph has 60 components
- When $\delta = 8$, the graph has 12 components
- $G_1 \subseteq G_8$

Increasing δ pulls in more edges

Analysis

Alternative Analysis:

What about those edges which didn't get an edge in the graph?

In general, these are one-sided conversations.

For example, this appears to be an unanswered ping:

```
2009/04/21T13:57:21.541 2009/04/21T13:58:02.968  
10.1.60.187:0 10.1.100.8:0
```


Future Work

- Graph fingerprinting
 - Create a graph that looks like a connection with <http://www.cnn.com>
 - Allow graph edit distance or Jaccard distance to determine similarity with the fingerprint
- Add size of flow as an edge weight to the graphs
- Multigraphs
- Time Series Analysis with Graphs
- A SiLK plugin



Questions/comments?

