

## Measurement for Cooperative Network Defense: DEMONS and BlockMon

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#### The problem

 The attack landscape has become more complex and cooperative.


— Botnets, XSS, APT, \*(scary\_buzzword\_ary++)

- Network defense remains largely isolated.
   Siloed within single administrative domains
- → Tools and processes for defense must become more cooperative than (implicit) processes for attack.




# Centralization of Traffic Data

- Passive measurement collects enormous amounts of data.
  - "Congratulations, you just pointed a ten gig firehose at yourself"
- (Almost) all of it is simultaneously
  - quite sensitive,
  - and completely uninteresting.



DEMONS



## Sharing Traffic Data

- Cooperative incident handling requires sharing of data across domains.
- Data sharing is fraught with peril.
  - Legal, regulatory, and business-sensitivity restrictions on data protection and disclosure
  - Anonymization not a solution to the problem
    - Pattern injection on Internet traffic practically undetectable [1]; partial offline reversal of anonymization possible.

[1] Burkhart et al., "The Role of Network Trace Anonymization Under Attack", ACM Computer Communications Review, vol. 40 no. 1, January 2010



Cooperative Network Defense


# DEMONS

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


#### The DEMONS Approach

#### Centralized



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#### **DEMONS:** The Project


- EC-funded, FP7 ICT IP, Sep 2010–Mar 2013
- Goal: Enable cooperative detection and mitigation of incidents effecting network stability and security.
- Consortium of 13 in 9 countries, includes three network operators (Telefónica, FT, TP)





# The DEMONS approach: decentralization


- Move processing to the edge
- Support iterative analysis on live traffic using programmable edge devices.
- Emphasize stream processing over retrospective analysis, use existing processes for forensics.
- Data reduction on the measurement device improves scalability and reduces sensitivity of collected data.
- Integration with existing mitigation processes.





# The DEMONS approach: sharing


- Share analysis, not data
- Analyses built by composition of well-defined processing modules
- Inspection of intermediate results before export
- Application of secure multiparty computation schemes, where appropriate
- Realism about technical limitations of data protection





## DEMONS Components and Interfaces

- Measurement layer nodes provide capture and analysis.
- Interdomain exchange point (IXP) provides "sharing" interfaces to external domains.
- Mitigation control point (MCP) provides interface to existing processes.
  - Additional research within the project WRT policy-driven pseudo-automatic mitigation, MPLS-based quarantining





**Composable Network Measurement** 

# BLOCKMON

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
## Introducing BlockMon: Goals

- Composable measurement using small blocks
  - Increases parallelizability, measurement performance on multicore hardware
  - Code reuse for measurement development
- Platform for understanding composable measurement application development
- Enable code and analysis interchange in the form of compositions of modules from a standard, trusted base



#### BlockMon

- Compositions of *blocks* exchange *messages* connected via *gates*.
- Blocks are implemented in C++, framework and scheduling in C++, focus on performance
- XML-based composition schema
- Python-based CLI and JSON-RPC daemon





# BlockMon: out-of-box experience


- Core messages, bridged to IPFIX
  - Packet, with lazy parsing & cache-aware allocation
  - Flow, allows use of BlockMon as a streaming flow analysis tool
  - Message base class allows *tagging* for adding features or annotations to a message in flight
- Source, exporter, simple counter blocks
- Current work on taxonomy of blocks

   filters, metrics, features, correlations, feedback



### BlockMon: How fast is fast?

#### **Trace replay (6Gbps peak)**




#### Synthetic traffic (10Gbps)

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### Case Study: VoIPSTREAM Abuse Detection



- Every Block is active, processes a CDRMsg (composition of PairMsg and Tags), and appends its own tag to it.

- BloomFilterCounters blocks are configured to work on a time-window base (i.e., 6hour long).



### Play Along at Home

- BlockMon to be released as open-source software, BSD licensed.
- Development of the core presently very active
- Find me this week or e-mail <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch> if you're interested.



#### Conclusions

- Current attacks require cooperative defense.
- Data sharing is fraught with peril.
- Move processing to the edge.
- Share analysis, not data.
- Composable measurement makes it possible.



#### Acknowledgments

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