



Measurement for Cooperative Network Defense: DEMONS and BlockMon

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
Flocon 2012, January 11, Austin, Texas USA

The problem


- The attack landscape has become more *complex* and *cooperative*.
 - Botnets, XSS, APT, *(scary_buzzword_ary++)
- Network defense remains largely isolated.
 - Siloed within single administrative domains
- → Tools and processes for defense must become more cooperative than (implicit) processes for attack.

Centralization of Traffic Data

- Passive measurement collects enormous amounts of data.
 - "Congratulations, you just pointed a ten gig firehose at yourself"
- (Almost) all of it is simultaneously
 - quite sensitive,
 - and completely uninteresting.



Sharing Traffic Data



- Cooperative incident handling requires sharing of data across domains.
- *Data sharing is fraught with peril.*
 - Legal, regulatory, and business-sensitivity restrictions on data protection and disclosure
 - Anonymization not a solution to the problem
 - Pattern injection on Internet traffic practically undetectable [1]; partial offline reversal of anonymization possible.

[1] Burkhart et al., "The Role of Network Trace Anonymization Under Attack", ACM Computer Communications Review, vol. 40 no. 1, January 2010




Cooperative Network Defense


DEMONS

The DEMONS Approach

Centralized




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
DEMONS: The Project

- EC-funded, FP7 ICT IP, Sep 2010–Mar 2013
- Goal: ***Enable cooperative detection and mitigation of incidents effecting network stability and security.***
- Consortium of 13 in 9 countries, includes three network operators (Telefónica, FT, TP)




The DEMONS approach: decentralization

- *Move processing to the edge*
- Support iterative analysis on live traffic using programmable edge devices.
- Emphasize stream processing over retrospective analysis, use existing processes for forensics.
- Data reduction on the measurement device improves scalability and reduces sensitivity of collected data.
- Integration with existing mitigation processes.




The DEMONS approach: sharing

- *Share analysis, not data*
- Analyses built by composition of well-defined processing modules
- Inspection of intermediate results before export
- Application of secure multiparty computation schemes, where appropriate
- Realism about technical limitations of data protection



DEMONS Components and Interfaces

- Measurement layer nodes provide capture and analysis.
- Interdomain exchange point (IXP) provides "sharing" interfaces to external domains.
- Mitigation control point (MCP) provides interface to existing processes.
 - Additional research within the project WRT policy-driven pseudo-automatic mitigation, MPLS-based quarantining





Composable Network Measurement


BLOCKMON

Introducing BlockMon: Goals

- Composable measurement using small blocks
 - Increases parallelizability, measurement performance on multicore hardware
 - Code reuse for measurement development
- Platform for understanding composable measurement application development
- Enable code and analysis interchange in the form of compositions of modules from a standard, trusted base

BlockMon

- Compositions of *blocks* exchange *messages* connected via *gates*.
- Blocks are implemented in C++, framework and scheduling in C++, focus on performance
- XML-based composition schema
- Python-based CLI and JSON-RPC daemon




BlockMon: out-of-box experience


- Core messages, bridged to IPFIX
 - Packet, with lazy parsing & cache-aware allocation
 - Flow, allows use of BlockMon as a streaming flow analysis tool
 - Message base class allows *tagging* for adding features or annotations to a message in flight
- Source, exporter, simple counter blocks
- Current work on taxonomy of blocks
 - filters, metrics, features, correlations, feedback

BlockMon: How fast is fast?


Synthetic traffic (10Gbps)



Trace replay (6Gbps peak)



Case Study: VoIPSTREAM Abuse Detection



- Every Block is active, processes a CDRMsg (composition of PairMsg and Tags), and appends its own tag to it.
- BloomFilterCounters blocks are configured to work on a time-window base (i.e., 6hour long).

Play Along at Home

- BlockMon to be released as open-source software, BSD licensed.
- Development of the core presently *very active*
- Find me this week or e-mail `<trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch>` if you're interested.

Conclusions

- Current attacks require cooperative defense.
- Data sharing is fraught with peril.
- Move processing to the edge.
- Share analysis, not data.
- Composable measurement makes it possible.

Acknowledgments

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