

Focus on Resiliency: A Process Improvement Approach to Security

Introducing the Resiliency Engineering Framework

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Established in 1984

Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC)

College-level unit of Carnegie Mellon University

Includes five technical programs aimed at helping defense, government, industry, and academic organizations to continually improve software-intensive systems

Widely-known "brands"

- CERT Coordination Center
- Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI)





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Agenda

- An evolving view of security
- **Operational resiliency**
- Embracing a process view
- Introducing the Resiliency Engineering Framework
- Summary and questions



A new operational environment -1

- No operational boundaries
- Pervasiveness of technology
- Expanding and rapidly changing risk profile
- High dependency on upstream partners
- Successes are short-lived
- Skills have shorter longevity
- Less resources, more demands



A new operational environment -2

Increasing regulatory requirements

- Criticality of data and information
- **Distributed workforce**
- Heightened threat level and increasing uncertainty

Insurance costs

Poses a new environment in which security must be effective and efficient



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The problem with security management

- Poorly planned and executed function
- Business units not involved
- Usually bolted on as an afterthought
- Security seen as technical problem
- Searching for magic bullet: CobiT, ITIL, ISO17799
- Poorly defined and measured goals
- Funding model reactive, not strategic
- Not connected to continuity of operations planning



- False sense of accomplishment
- Misalignment of operational and security goals
- **Reinforcement of silos**
- Less-than-resilient assets, processes, services
- Misalignment with business objectives
- Wasted human and financial resources
- Compliance at the expense of effectiveness
- Failure to manage operational risk



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Security is an operational risk management activity


Security has two purposes:

- Prevent disruption to core business drivers
- Sustain the survivability of the organization's mission

Security is not an end, but a means to achieving higher organizational goals



An evolving view of security -2





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Operational risk is the risk that results from

- Failed internal processes
- Inadvertent or deliberate actions of people
- Problems with systems and technology
- External events

Operational resiliency is the organization's ability to sustain the mission in the face of these risks



Operational resiliency is an emergent property

Operational resiliency depends on effective management of core ORM activities



Security is one....

....but so are Business Continuity and IT Operations Management


Operational resiliency *emerges* from how well these activities are coordinated and executed toward a common goal



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Security and operational resiliency


- Focus on keeping critical assets safe from harm
- Limiting threats and managing impacts
- Manage confidentiality, integrity, and availability
- Manage "condition"





Business continuity and operational resiliency

- Limit unwanted effects of realized risk
- Ensure availability and recoverability
- Manage "consequence"





information



technology



facilities



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IT Operations Management and operational resiliency

Limit vulnerabilities and threats that originate in the technical infrastructure

Ensure availability and recoverability of technology






technology

information




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Collaborating toward a common goal





Operational resiliency in practice





Resiliency Engineering Framework © 2006 Carnegie Mellon University

An emerging holistic view


Organization is dependent on the productivity of four assets:

- People
- Information
- Technology
- Facilities


Each asset must be protected and sustainable

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A holistic risk perspective






Resiliency Engineering Framework

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
Collaborating toward a common goal



Resiliency means managing the conditions and consequences of risk balanced against business drivers and costs



A mission focus





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Organizations are not structured today to facilitate collaboration toward a common goal of resiliency


- Deficient funding models
- Management direction and oversight lacking
- Practice-driven
- Compliance-focused

Need to view resiliency as a definable, manageable, enterprise-wide process





Embracing a Process View of Security and Operational Resiliency



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Elevating the management and coordination of operational-resiliency focused activities to the enterprise level

- Shared goals and resources
- Elimination of redundancy and stovepipes
- Elimination of framework quagmire through practice integration
- Measuring process effectiveness
- Moving toward process improvement

How does process differ from practice?

Process

- · Describes the "what"
- Set and achieve process goals
- Manage process to requirements
- Select practices based on process goals
- Can be defined, communicated, measured, and controlled

Practice

- Prescribes the "how"
- No practice goals
- Tends toward "set and forget" mentality
- Reinforces domain-driven approach
- One size does not fit all
- Regulatory vehicle

Best practices are

effective ways to approach improvement in a critical organizational activity, like security

Best practices ARE NOT


a substitute for an actively planned and managed process



Best practices. . .

- Are often industry or discipline-specific
- Change/evolve frequently
- Don't have process improvement or management aspects built-in
- Don't provide long-term, sustainable success
- Can reinforce stove-piping and silos
- People still must implement and manage them
- Can create a management quagmire

The relationship between process and practice





Rostliancy Engineering Framework

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Improvement in meeting resiliency goals is dependent on the active management of the process


Process maturity increases capability for meeting goals and sustaining the process

"Are we resilient?" or *"Are we secure?"* is answered in the context of goal achievement rather than **what hasn't happened**

Facilitates meaningful, purposeful selection and implementation of practices



Most organizations have some process (implicit or explicit) for resiliency engineering, but it may not be effective for meeting goals.



Thanks to <u>www.betterproductdesign.net/maturity.htm</u> for the generic categories.

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Lack of process

No process defined or performed

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Anarchy and heroics

No awareness of benefits of process-orientation

AD-HOC

- Focus on events •
- Ambiguous lines of • responsibility
- Funding sporadic •
- No alignment to strategic • drivers
- Highly dependent on people •
- No governance structure •

Partial process

Process recognized

Still functionally focused (not enterprise-wide)

Not repeatable or actively managed

- Focus on vulnerabilities
- Responsibility emanates from IT
- Considered an expense or burden
- Awareness of strategic drivers
- Still dependent on people and vul catalogs
- Informal governance

Formal process

Performed and managed

Repeatable

Spans enterprise

Not completely ingrained in culture RISK-DRIVEN

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- Focus on critical assets
- Responsibility of key organizational managers and IT
- Funded as an expense
- Implicit alignment to strategic drivers
- Dependent on localized risk management
- Informal governance, possibly CRM

Cultural

Performed and managed

Repeatable and proactive

Spans and involves enterprise


Process continually measured and improving

Fundamental to organizational success

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
- Focus on critical assets, processes, strategic drivers
- Responsibility of high-level executive
- Capitalized
- Explicit alignment to strategic drivers
- Reliant upon enterprise capabilities
- Formal governance and feedback

Increasing levels of competency





Maturity from a security perspective




- Technical problem
- •Owned by IT
- •Expense-driven
- Practice-centric
- •Security and survivability

Business problem
Owned by organization
Investment-driven
Process-centric
Enterprise resiliency



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Toward continuous improvement






Resiliency Engineering Framework

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Introducing the Resiliency Engineering Framework



The process by which an organization establishes, develops, implements, and manages the operational resiliency of services, related business processes, and associated assets

"Requirements-driven security and business continuity"

"Building resiliency into assets/processes/services and managing to an appropriate level of adequacy"



A framework of practice for integration of security and business continuity activities toward achievement of operational resiliency

Defines basic process areas and provides guidelines for security and BC/DR process improvement


Captures vital linkages between security, BC/DR, and I/T ops in the process definition

Addresses operational risk management through process management

Establishes a capability benchmark



Project history and evolution





Resiliency Engineering Framework

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OCTAVE development and fieldwork

- Affinity analysis of 750 practices
- Identification of capabilities
- Identification of processes
- Development of process goals and practices
- Exploration of maturity concepts
- Exploration of assessment methodologies



Represents processes that span four basic areas:

- Enterprise management
- Engineering
- Operations management
- Process management

Considers the resiliency of people, information, technology, and facilities in the context of services and business objectives



Enterprise management processes

Enterprise capabilities that are essential to supporting the resiliency engineering process



RSKM – Risk Management
EF – Enterprise Focus
COMP – Compliance Management
FRM – Financial Resource Management
HRM – Human Resource Management



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Operations management processes

Capabilities focused on sustaining an adequate level of operational resiliency

- **SAM** Supplier Agreement Management
- **SRM** Supplier Relationship Management
- **AMC** Access Management and Control
- **IMC** Incident Management and Control

- VM Vulnerability Management
- EC Environmental Control
- **KIM** Knowledge and Information Management
- **SOM** Security Operations Management
- **ITOPS** IT Operations Management



Engineering processes

Capabilities focused on establishing and implementing resiliency for organizational assets, business processes, and services

- **RD** Requirements Definition
- **RM** Requirements Management
- AM Asset Management
- **COOP** Continuity of Operations Planning
- **REST** Restoration of Operations Planning
- **CSI** Control Selection and Implementation

RAD – Resilient Architecture Development





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Process management processes

Enterprise capabilities related to defining, planning, deploying, implementing, monitoring, controlling, appraising, measuring, and improving processes



OT – Organizational Training

OPF – Organizational Process Focus

OPD – Organizational Process Definition

MA – Measurement and Analysis

MON - Monitoring



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Establish current level of capability

Set forward-looking resiliency goals and targets

Develop plans to close identified gaps

Build resiliency into important assets/processes/services and architectures

Reduce reactionary activities; shift to directing and controlling activities

Align common practices with processes to achieve process goals



Eighteen month collaboration with Financial Services Technology Consortium

Identify mature practices in mature industries: banking and financial services

Two phases of work—capability identification and process definition



Established in 1993

Member-owned consortium for collaboration between financial services-focused organization

Explore new technologies and methodologies to address today's business requirements

Projects:

- Technology Review
- Compliance
- Business Continuity Maturity Model





FSTC Project Members

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Bank of America	KPMG
Carnegie Mellon	MasterCard
Capital Group	Marshall and IIsley
Citicorp	NY Federal Reserve Bank
Discover	SunGard
DRII	Trizec Properties
DRJ	US Bank
IBM	Wachovia
JPMorgan Chase	



Release REF v0.9 in October 2006 for comments

Establish guidelines for improving the security and business continuity processes

Phase III expansion of model development and piloting

Exploration of integration with other existing models

Development of appraisal methodology to measure capability for managing resiliency



Operational resiliency must be actively managed

Security, BC/DR, and IT Ops must collaborate

Model-based process improvement brings defined, systematic, repeatable, consistent, and improvable processes

Approach must be flexible and adaptable

No one-size-fits-all solution



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