

CAMNEP: Multistage Collective Network Behavior Analysis System with Hardware Accelerated NetFlow Probes

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Overview




- Network Intrusion Detection Systems
 - Anomaly Detection Models
 - Trust-Based Anomaly Integration
 - Experimental Results



- Identification of attacks against hosts or networks from the network traffic observation
 - **Signature based** - detects patterns in packet content
 - **Stateful protocol analysis** - anomalies in TCP protocol state sequences
 - **Network Behavior Analysis (NBA)** - identifies attacks from traffic statistics
- Current Challenges
 - **False positives** - legitimate traffic labeled as malicious
 - **False negatives** - malicious traffic classified as legitimate
 - **Performance** - high network speed, near-real-time results
- **Our Contribution:** Efficient algorithm for integration of NBA methods
 - Linear with traffic
 - Improves the classification rate by multi-layer combination
 - Based on extended trust modeling


System Architecture



High-Speed Network Traffic Acquisition



- **Probes** observe the traffic at the wire speed
 - Each probe generates **NetFlow** traffic statistics
 - Results are stored and preprocessed in **collector** servers
 - **Hardware acceleration** necessary for high-speed networks



Hardware Accelerated FlowMon Probe



■ Requirements:


- traffic characteristics change heavily in time - network probes must **behave reliably** in all possible cases
 - capable of generating **NetFlow traffic statistics**
 - work at **wire speed** (1Gbits/sec - 10Gbits/sec)

■ FlowMon Probe:

- developed in Liberouter project
 - hardware accelerated network card based on COMBO hardware
 - high performance and accuracy
 - handles 1Gbits/sec and 10Gbits/sec traffic at line rate
 - exports acquired NetFlow data to different collectors




Traffic Acquisition Server Architecture



Detection Process Overview



- Each agent based on one **anomaly detection** method
 - **Input:** NetFlow statistics, same for all agents
 - **Anomaly:** aggregated from individual agent's anomalies
 - **Update:** heterogenous trust model are updated, each has a **different structure**
 - **Query:** all agents evaluate all flows, and aggregate the output




Anomaly Detection Input (simplified)



Duration	Proto	Src IP Addr:Port	Dst IP Addr:Port	Flags	Pack.	Bytes
0.000	TCP	192.168.195.164:1086	192.168.10.12:445	.A....	2	84
0.000	TCP	62.97.162.208:3417	192.168.192.83:1172	.AP...	1	42
0.577	TCP	192.168.195.132:2544	194.228.32.3:80	.A.R..	3	126
0.576	TCP	192.168.195.132:2545	194.228.32.3:80	.A.R..	3	126
0.000	UDP	192.168.60.31:4021	192.168.19.247:53	1	55
0.000	UDP	192.168.19.247:53	192.168.60.31:4021	1	149
0.000	UDP	192.168.60.31:4021	192.168.60.1:53	1	55
0.000	UDP	192.168.60.31:4020	192.43.244.18:123	1	72
30.276	TCP	192.168.192.170:61158	71.33.170.53:1358	.AP...	307	368627
0.000	UDP	24.28.89.160:63319	192.168.192.83:58359	1	42
0.000	TCP	63.208.197.21:443	192.168.192.106:1031	.AP...	1	73
0.093	TCP	192.168.193.58:1302	192.168.192.5:110	.AP.SF	8	356
0.093	TCP	192.168.192.5:110	192.168.193.58:1302	.AP.SF	8	440
0.000	UDP	85.160.81.10:6766	192.168.192.217:11084	1	45
0.000	UDP	192.168.192.217:11084	85.160.81.10:6766	1	45
0.000	TCP	192.168.19.247:1723	192.168.60.19:1042	.AP...	1	56



Anomaly Detection Methods: MINDS




- **Features:** Flow counts from/to important IP/port combinations.
 - **Classification:** Comparison with windowed average of past values, different from original MINDS.

Anomaly Detection Methods: Xu et al.




- **Features:** Determines the entropies of dstIP, dstPrt and srcPrt on the set of all flows from each source IP.
 - **Classification:** Classifies the traffic with a set of static rules.
 - All flows from the same source share the classification features and result.






- Uses Principal Component Analysis to predict the volume of traffic from individual sources.
- **Features:** Ratio of predicted/observed numbers of bytes, packets and flows.
- **Classification:** Anomaly is derived from the ratio of prediction and observation, for all flows from the same source.



Anomaly Detection Methods: Entropy Prediction, Lakhina et al.




- Uses Principal Component Analysis to predict the entropies of features on the flows from each source IP.
 - **Features:** Difference between the predicted and observed entropies of dstIP, dstPrt and srcPrt on the set of all flows from each source IP.
 - **Classification:** Anomaly is derived from the difference between the prediction and observation, defined by the source only.



Extended Trust Modeling



- Agents describe each flow using its **identity** and **context**.
 - **Identity** - defined by the features measured on the flow
 - **Context** - uses the features from the AD model, measured on other flows
 - Metric **feature space**, metrics determines similarity
 - Trustfulness is determined for cluster **centroids** in the feature space





Extended Trust Modeling: Identity/Context Example

Duration	Proto	Src IP Addr:Port	Dst IP Addr:Port	Flags	Pack.	Bytes
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Identity

- srclP: 192.168.195.164
- dstIP: 192.168.10.12
- srcPrt:1086
- dstPrt: 445
- protocol: TCP
- bytes: 84
- packets: 2

Context (MINDS)

- count-srclP: 3
- count-dstIP: 1
- count-srclP-dstPrt:2
- count-dstIP-srcPrt:1

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 - dstIP: 192.168.10.12
 - srcPrt: 1086
 - dstPrt: 445
 - protocol: TCP
 - bytes: 84
 - packets: 2

Context (MINDS)


- count-srcIP: 3
 - count-dstIP: 1
 - count-srcIP-dstPrt:2
 - count-dstIP-srcPrt:1




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


Trust Update and Query



- Trustfulness **update**:
 1. Find **relevant** centroids
 2. Determine the update **weight** for each centroid
 3. **Update** the trustfulness of centroid using a given weight
 - Trustfulness **query**:
 1. Find **relevant** centroids
 2. Determine the **weight** for each centroid
 3. **Aggregate** the trustfulness from centroid, with respective weights

Multi-Source Trustfulness Integration




- Effectiveness improved by:
 - **Aggregated anomaly value** reduces the effect of singular anomaly peaks
 - Similarity between flows varies between the agents e.g. trustfulness is based on anomaly aggregated over the **agent-specific clusters**
 - Normalized individual **trustfulness** is **re-aggregated** into the common value


Agent Specific Clusters




Attack data (as identified by other agent) are concentrated in a single centroid.




False positive data are spread across the whole feature space of other agent.



System Output



Known Attacks, Regardless of Type




Third Party Attacks Results







Anomalous		A_M	A_X	A_E	A_V	$A_{\mathbb{M}}$
# flows	detected	6653	3246	13541	12375	9911
	TP	35	168	5841	5868	4709
	FP	6618	3078	7700	6507	5202
	FP[%] all traffic	15.9 %	7.4 %	18.5 %	15.6 %	12.5 %
# srcIP	detected	72.5	322.3	17.2	16.7	12.5
	TP	1.7	0.2	2.5	2.7	2.3
	FP	70.8	322.1	14.7	14.0	10.2
	FP[%] all traffic	1.52 %	6.94 %	0.31 %	0.30 %	0.22 %
Untrusted		Θ_M	Θ_X	Θ_E	Θ_V	Θ
# flows	detected	9149	9975	10704	9518	9741
	TP	5242	5712	5833	5864	5769
	FP	3907	4263	4872	3654	3972
	FP[%] all traffic	9.4 %	10.2 %	11.7 %	8.8 %	9.5 %
# srcIP	detected	7.8	11.3	13.5	10.8	6.7
	TP	2.7	2.7	2.3	2.7	2.7
	FP	5.1	8.6	11.2	8.1	4.0
	FP[%] all traffic	0.11 %	0.19 %	0.24 %	0.18 %	0.09 %


Impact of Collaboration 1



Impact of Collaboration 2



Reporting



Conclusions



- Collaborative trust mechanism **reduces the error rate** of existing anomaly detection approaches.
 - The error rate reduction is achieved by:
 - **Aggregation** of **anomaly** values
 - **Specific trust models** of individual agents, each providing different insight into the flow data
 - Trustfulness aggregation **re-integrates** the opinions from the various trust models, each using **different perspective**
 - Agent-based trust techniques can be used under **high-performance** constraints.
 - A-Globe multi-agent platform has negligible computational overhead, architecture naturally **scales** to multiprocessor environments.



Thank You For Your Attention

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