



Security at Line Speed with NetFlows

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


Level of Observation


Data Source	Description	Advantage	Disadvantage
Packet	lowest level of granularity; all raw packets with all fields intact	most detailed data and statistics especially protocols; easiest to obtain	unscalable; protocol signaling needs to be decoded
NetFlows	IPs/ports/protocols/ Timestamps/data?	scalable for catching all traffic; multiple sources, uniform field formats	maybe no data field; context must be inferred
IDS	alerts of different formats	scalable; tunable	resource-intensive; misses; FPs
Load Levels	aggregate utilization levels that can be broken down to IP, protocol, port	high volume attacks (DOS, traffic); capacity planning; availability from routers & sniffers	details about SD pairs; no direction; low volume events obscured

NetFlows Instrumentation Issues


- Streaming Data



- Vantage Point




- High Line Rates



Flavors of NetFlows


- **Router-Based (Cisco, Juniper, etc.)**
 - Cache timeout
 - Configuration
 - Sampling
- **Argus <<http://www.qosient.com/argus/>>**
 - Open Source
 - Platform Independent
 - Configuration (data field)
- **Home Grown NetFlows**
 - Many, for instance, Tom Daniels, Iowa State University

The Data Management Problem




time dimension

NCSA's NetFlows Architecture



(1) Central Database Architecture



(2) Middleware Architecture

