

Insider Threat Mitigation Project

A Dynamic Network Approach

CMU-CS (and CASOS):

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- Neal Altman
- Geoff Morgan
- Matt Benigni

SEI:


- Matthew Collins
- Andrew Moore
- Dr. William Claycomb

Emergence of Threat – Ego centered analysis of specific cases



Approach:

- Semi-automated coding with fine-tuning to add dates
- Extract meta-networks one per year
- Comparison at “role” level
- Apply network analytics and visualization


Walker – Gang example Case records/searches (open-source)



Manning – Lone Wolf example open-source



Increasing betweenness during spy activities







Findings on Insiders:

- Special characteristics
- Access
- Increasing betweenness
- Disrupted family network

Emergence of Threat – Email centered analysis of possible anomalies

Approach:


- Networks formed from meta-data
- One network per year
- Segment internal from internal-to-external communication
- Remove suspected distribution lists
- Identify “normal behavior” using Enron
- Develop pattern for “insiders” in contrast to “normal” using Enron
- Apply to anonymized SEI email




Findings on SEI -v- Enron:

- SEI—more email, proportions similar
- Both—dominant dense core with numerous stars

Enron core for 2001— Newman group coloring



SEI core for 2013— Newman group coloring



Findings on “Insiders” — those accused:

- Are not “top” network actors
- Form a densely connected sub-group
- High level of in-group communication
- Low out-group communication