As cyber-physical systems continue to proliferate, the ability of cyber operators to support armed engagements (kinetic missions) will be critical for the Department of Defense (DoD) to maintain a technological advantage over adversaries. However, current training for cyber operators focuses entirely on the cyber aspect of operations and ignores the realities and constraints of supporting a larger mission. Similarly, kinetic operators largely think of cyber capabilities as a strategic, rather than a tactical resource, and are untrained in how to leverage the capabilities cyber operators can provide. In this blog post, I present Cyber Kinetic Effects Integration, also known as CKEI, which is a program developed at the SEI's CERT Division that allows the training of combined arms and cyber engagements in a virtual battlefield.
Since its debut on Jeopardy in 2011, IBM's Watson has generated a lot of interest in potential applications across many industries. I recently led a research team investigating whether the Department of Defense (DoD) could use Watson to improve software assurance and help acquisition professionals assemble and review relevant evidence from documents. As this blog post describes, our work examined whether typical developers could build an IBM Watson application to support an assurance review.
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks have been dominating the IT security headlines. A flurry of reporting followed the September 2016 attack on the computer security reporter Brian Krebs's web site KrebsonSecurity when he reported attack traffic that was at the unprecedented scale of gigabytes per second. In November, my colleague Rachel Kartch wrote "DDOS Attacks: Four Best Practices for Prevention and Response," outlining what we can do to defend against these attacks. In this blog post, I tell the story of the Mirai powered botnet that's been harnessed in some of these recent attacks and which has also received its own share of press. My purpose is to explore the vulnerabilities that Mirai exploits and describe some simple practices that could help transform our Internet devices to mitigate the risk posed by botnets.
First responders, search-and-rescue teams, and military personnel often work in "tactical edge" environments defined by limited computing resources, rapidly changing mission requirements, high levels of stress, and limited connectivity. In these tactical edge environments, software applications that enable tasks such as face recognition, language translation, decision support, and mission planning and execution are critical due to computing and battery limitations on mobile devices. Our work on tactical cloudlets addresses some of these challenges by providing a forward-deployed platform for computation offload and data staging (see previous posts).
When establishing communication between two nodes--such as a mobile device and a tactical cloudlet in the field--identification, authentication, and authorization provide the information and assurances necessary for the nodes to trust each other (i.e., mutual trust). A common solution for establishing trust is to create and share credentials in advance and then use an online trusted authority to validate the credentials of the nodes. The tactical environments in which first responders, search-and-rescue, and military personnel operate, however, do not consistently provide access to that online authority or certificate repository because they are disconnected, intermittent, limited (DIL). This blog post, excerpted from the recently published IEEE paper "Establishing Trusted Identities in Disconnected Edge Environments"--I coauthored this paper with Sebastián Echeverría, Dan Klinedinst, Keegan Williams--presents a solution for establishing trusted identities in disconnected environments based on secure key generation and exchange in the field, as well as an evaluation and implementation of the solution.
The prevalence of Agile methods in the software industry today is obvious. All major defense contractors in the market can tell you about their approaches to implementing the values and principles found in the Agile Manifesto. Published frameworks and methodologies are rapidly maturing, and a wave of associated terminology is part of the modern lexicon. We are seeing consultants feuding on Internet forums as well, with each one claiming to have the "true" answer for what Agile is and how to make it work in your organization. The challenge now is to scale Agile to work in complex settings with larger teams, larger systems, longer timelines, diverse operating environments, and multiple engineering disciplines. I recently explored the issues surrounding scaling Agile within the Department of Defense (DoD) with Mary Ann Lapham, Suzanne Miller, Eileen Wrubel, and Peter Capell. This blog post, an excerpt of our recently published technical note Scaling Agile Methods for Department of Defense Programs, presents five perspectives on scaling Agile from leading thinkers in the field including Scott Ambler, Steve Messenger, Craig Larman, Jeff Sutherland, and Dean Leffingwell.
Interest in Agile and lightweight development methods in the software development community has become widespread. Our experiences with the application of Agile principles have therefore become richer. In my blog post, Toward Agile Strategic Planning, I wrote about how we can apply Agile principles to strategic planning. In this blog post, I apply another Agile concept, technical debt, to another organizational excellence issue. Specifically I explore whether organizational debt is accrued when we implement quick organizational change, short-cutting what we know to be effective change management methods. Since I started considering this concept, Steve Blank wrote a well-received article about organizational debt in the context of start-up organizations. In this post, I describe organizational debt in the context of change management and describe some effects of organizational debt we are seeing with our government clients.
The Domain Name System (DNS) is an essential component of the Internet, a virtual phone book of names and numbers, but we rarely think about it until something goes wrong. As evidenced by the recent distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against Internet performance management company Dyn, which temporarily wiped out access to websites including Amazon, Paypal, Reddit, and the New York Times for millions of users down the Eastern Seaboard and Europe, DNS serves as the foundation for the security and operation of internal and external network applications. DNS also serves as the backbone for other services critical to organizations including email, external web access, file sharing and voice over IP (VoIP). There are steps, however, that network administrators can take to ensure the security and resilience of their DNS infrastructure and avoid security pitfalls. In this blog post, I outline six best practices to design a secure, reliable infrastructure and present an example of a resilient organizational DNS.
As part of an ongoing effort to keep you informed about our latest work, this blog post summarizes some recently published books, SEI technical reports, podcasts and webinars on insider threat, using malware analysis to identify overlooked security requirements, software architecture, scaling Agile methods, best practices for preventing and responding to DDoS attacks, and a special report documenting the technical history of the SEI.
These publications highlight the latest work of SEI technologists in these areas. This post includes a listing of each publication, author(s), and links where they can be accessed on the SEI website.