In our research and acquisition work on commercial and Department of Defense (DoD) programs ranging from relatively simple two-tier data-processing applications to large-scale multi-tier weapons systems , one of the primary problems that we see repeatedly is that requirements engineers tend to focus almost exclusively on functional requirements and largely ignore the so-called nonfunctional requirements, such as data, interface, and quality requirements, as well as technical constraints. Unfortunately, this myopia means that requirements engineers overlook critically important, architecturally-significant, quality requirements that specify minimum acceptable amounts of qualities, such as availability, interoperability, performance, portability, reliability, safety, security, and usability. This blog post is the first in a series that explores the engineering of safety- and security-related requirements.
The Department of Defense (DoD) is increasingly interested in having soldiers carry handheld mobile computing devicesto support their mission needs. Soldiers can use handheld devices to help with various tasks, such as speech and image recognition, natural language processing, decision-making and mission planning. Three challenges, however, present obstacles to achieving these capabilities. The first challenge is that mobile devices offer less computational power than a conventional desktop or server computer. A second challenge is that computation-intensive tasks, such as image recognition or even global positioning system (GPS), take a heavy toll on battery power. The third challenge is dealing with unreliable networks and bandwidth. This post explores our research to overcome these challenges by using cloudlets, which are localized, lightweight servers running one or more virtual machines (VMs) on which soldiers can offload expensive computations from their handheld mobile devices, thereby providing greater processing capacity and helping conserve battery power.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has frequently cited poor cost estimation as one of the reasons for cost overrun problems in acquisition programs. Software is often a major culprit. One study on cost estimation by the Naval Postgraduate School found a 34 percent median value increase of software size over the estimate. Cost overruns lead to painful Congressional scrutiny, and an overrun in one program often cascades and leads to the depletion of funds from others. The challenges encountered in estimating software cost were described in the first postof this two-part series on improving the accuracy of early cost estimates. This post describes new tools and methods we are developing at the SEI to help cost estimation experts get the right information they need into a familiar and usable form for producing high quality cost estimates early in the life cycle.
Occasionally this blog will highlight different posts from the SEI blogosphere. Today's post is from the SATURN Network blog by Nanette Brown, a visiting scientist in the SEI's Research, Technology, and System Solutions program. This post, the second in a series on lean principles and architecture, takes an in-depth look at the waste of waiting and how it is an important aspect of the economics of architecture decision making.
Background: The U.S. Air Force has sponsored a number of SEI Independent Technical Assessments (ITAs) on acquisition programs that operated between 2006 and 2009. The programs focused on the development of IT systems, communications, command and control, avionics, and electronic warfare systems. This blog post is the second in a series that identifies four themes across acquisition programs that the SEI identified as a result of our ITA work. Other themes explored in the series include misaligned incentives, the evolution of science projects, and common infrastructure and joint programs. This post explores a related second theme, the need to sell the program, which describes a situation in which people involved with acquisition programs have strong incentives to "sell" those programs to their management, sponsors, and other stakeholders so that they can obtain funding, get them off the ground, and keep them sold.
Happy Memorial Day from all of us here at the SEI. I'd like to take advantage of this special occasion to keep you apprised of some recent technical reports and notes from the SEI. It's part of an ongoing effort to keep you informed about the latest work of SEI technologists. These reports highlight the latest work of SEI technologists in embedded systems, cyber security, appraisal requirements for CMMI Version 1.3, improving the quality and use of data, and software assurance. This post includes a listing of each report, author/s, and links where the published reports can be accessed on the SEI website.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has frequently citedpoor cost estimation as one of the reasons for cost overrun problems in acquisition programs. Software is often a major culprit. One study on cost estimation by the Naval Postgraduate School found a 34 percent median value increase of software size over the estimate. Cost overruns lead to painful Congressional scrutiny, and an overrun in one program often leads to the depletion of funds from another. This post, the first in a series on improving the accuracy of early cost estimates, describes challenges we have observed trying to accurately estimate software effort and cost in Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs, as well as other product development organizations.
Background:Over the past decade, the U.S. Air Force has asked the SEI's Acquisition Support Program (ASP) to conduct a number of Independent Technical Assessments (ITAs) on acquisition programs related to the development of IT systems; communications, command and control; avionics; and electronic warfare systems. This blog post is the first in a series that identifies common themes across acquisition programs that we identified as a result of our ITA work. This post explores the first theme: misaligned incentives, which occur when different individuals, groups, or divisions are rewarded for behaviors that conflict with a common organizational goal.