Mission-critical operations in the Department of Defense (DoD) increasingly depend on complex software-reliant systems-of-systems (abbreviated as "systems" below). These systems are characterized by a rapidly growing number of connected platforms, sensors, decision nodes, and people. While facing constrained budget, expanded threat, and engineering workforce challenges, the DoD is trying to obtain greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending needed to acquire and sustain these systems. This blog posting--the first in a three-part series--motivates the need for DoD common operating platform environmentsthat can help collapse today's stove-piped solutions to decrease costs, spur innovation, and increase acquisition and operational performance.
According to the 2011 CyberSecurity Watch Survey, approximately 21 percent of cyber crimes against organizations are committed by insiders. Of the 607 organizations participating in the survey, 46 percent stated that the damage caused by insiders was more significant than the damage caused by outsiders. Over the past 11 years, CERT Insider Threat researchers have collected incidents related to malicious activity by insiders obtained from a number of sources, including media reports, the courts, the United States Secret Service, victim organizations, and interviews with convicted felons.
Many modern software systems employ shared-memory multi- threading and are built using software components, such as libraries and frameworks. Software developers must carefully control the interactions between multiple threads as they execute within those components. To manage this complexity, developers use information hiding to treat components as "black boxes" with known interfaces that explicitly specify all necessary preconditions and postconditions of the design contract, while using an appropriate level of abstraction to hide unnecessary detail.
New acquisition guidelines from the Department of Defense (DoD) aimed at reducing system lifecycle time and effort are encouraging the adoption of Agile methods. There is a general lack, however, of practical guidance on how to employ Agile methods effectively for DoD acquisition programs. This blog posting describes our research on providing software and systems architects with a decision making framework for reducing integration risk with Agile methods, thereby reducing the time and resources needed for related work.
In his book Drive, Daniel Pink writes that knowledge workers want autonomy, purpose, and mastery in their work. A big problem with any change in processes is getting the people who do the work to change how they work. Too often, people are told what to do instead of being given the information, autonomy, and authority to analyze and adopt the new methods for themselves. This posting--the first in a two-part series--describes a case study that shows how Team Software Process (TSP) principles allowed developers at a large bank to address challenges, improve their productivity, and thrive in an agile environment.
In my preceding blog post, I promised to provide more examples highlighting the importance of software sustainmentin the US Department of Defense (DoD). My focus is on certain configurations of weapons systems that are no longer in production for the United States Air Force, but are expected to remain a key component of our defense capability for decades to come, and thus software upgrade cycles need to refresh capabilities every 18 to 24 months. Throughout this series on efficient and effective software sustainment, I will highlight examples from each branch of the military. This second blog post describes effective sustainment engineering efforts in the Air Force, using examples from across the service's Air Logistics Centers (ALCs).
Many DoD computing systems--particularly cyber-physical systems--are subject to stringent size, weight, and power requirements. The quantity of sensor readings and functionalities is also increasing, and their associated processing must fulfill real-time requirements. This situation motivates the need for computers with greater processing capacity. For example, to fulfill the requirements of nano-sized unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), developers must choose a computer platform that offers significant processing capacity and use its processing resources to meet its needs for autonomous surveillance missions. This blog post discusses these issues and highlights our research that addresses them.
In the first post in this two-part series, we covered five unique challenges that impact insider threat programs and hub analysts. The challenges included lack of adequate training, competing interests, acquiring data, analyzing data, and handling false positives.
As you read the new challenges introduced in this post, ask yourself the same questions: 1) How many of these challenges are ones you are facing today? 2) Are there challenges in this list that lead to an "aha" moment? 3) Are there challenges you are facing that did not make the list? 4) Do you need assistance with combating any of these challenges? Let us know your answers and thoughts via email at firstname.lastname@example.org.