A 2016 study on cybersecurity and digital trust found that 69 percent of organizations surveyed experienced an attempted or successful theft or corruption of data by insiders in the last 12 months. Despite the impact of insider threat--and continued mandates that government agencies and their contractors put insider threat programs in place--a number of organizations still have not implemented them. Moreover, the programs that have been implemented often have serious deficiencies. One impediment to organizations establishing an insider threat program is the lack of a clear business case for implementing available countermeasures.
Software engineers face a universal problem when developing software: weighing the benefit of an approach that is expedient in the short-term, but which can lead to complexity and cost over the long term. In software-intensive systems, these tradeoffs can create technical debt, which is a design or implementation construct that is expedient in the short term, but which sets up a technical context that can make future changes more costly or even impossible.
This post is co-authored by Will Hayes and Eileen Wrubel.
On July 14, 2016, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security convened a hearing on the Social Security Administration's (SSA) information technology modernization plan. The hearing focused on the current state of the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Information Technology (IT) modernization plan and best practices for IT modernization, including oversight of agile software development. Agile development approaches, relatively new in government settings, create opportunities for rapid deployment of new capabilities but also pose challenges to traditional government oversight and management practices. A team of researchers from the SEI's Agile in Government (AIG) team were part of an expert panel brought in to testify before the members of the subcommittee. The team, comprised of me, AIG principal engineer Will Hayes, and AIG program manager Eileen Wrubel, developed written testimony that was submitted to the committee in conjunction with verbal testimony delivered by Hayes. This blog post, the first in a series, presents the written testimony as submitted to Congress, drawing upon seven years of research the SEI has conducted on the use of Agile in government settings. Specifically, this post provides a summary of challenges observed by the SEI in overseeing Agile programs in governmentsuch as progress measurements, IT transformations beyond Agile, and workforce development of government staff working in Agile settings.
There are several risks specific to big data system development. Software architects developing any system--big data or otherwise--must address risks associated with cost, schedule, and quality. All of these risks are amplified in the context of big data. Architecting big data systems is challenging because the technology landscape is new and rapidly changing, and the quality attribute challenges, particularly for performance, are substantial. Some software architects manage these risks with architecture analysis, while others use prototyping. This blog post, which was largely derived from a paper I co-authored with Hong-Mei Chen and Serge Haziyev, Strategic Prototyping for Developing Big Data Systems, presents the Risk-Based Architecture-Centric Strategic Prototyping (RASP) model, which was developed to provide cost-effective systematic risk management in agile big data system development.
Safety-critical software must be analyzed and checked carefully. Each potential error, failure, or defect must be considered and evaluated before you release a new product. For example, if you are producing a quadcopter drone, you would like to know the probability of engine failure to evaluate the system's reliability. Safety analysis is hard. Standards such as ARP4761 mandate several analyses, such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). One popular type of safety analysis is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), which provides a graphical representation of all contributors to a failure (e.g., error events and propagations). In this blog post, I present the concepts of the FTA and introduce a new tool to design and analyze fault trees.
As cyber-physical systems continue to proliferate, the ability of cyber operators to support armed engagements (kinetic missions) will be critical for the Department of Defense (DoD) to maintain a technological advantage over adversaries. However, current training for cyber operators focuses...