From the braking system in your automobile to the software that controls the aircraft that you fly in, safety-critical systems are ubiquitous. Showing that such systems meet their safety requirements has become a critical area of work for software and systems engineers. "We live in a world in which our safety depends on software-intensive systems," editors of IEEE Software wrote in the magazine's May/June issue. "Organizations everywhere are struggling to find cost-effective methods to deal with the enormous increase in size and complexity of these systems, while simultaneously respecting the need to ensure their safety." The Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI) is addressing this issue with a significant research program into assurance cases. Our sponsors are regularly faced with assuring that complex software-based systems meet certain kinds of requirements such as safety, security, and reliability. In this post, the first in a series on assurance cases and confidence, I will introduce the concept of assurance cases and show how they can be used to argue that a safety requirement (or other requirement such as security) has been met.
Researchers on the CERT Division's insider threat team have presented several of the 26 patterns identified by analyzing our insider threat database, which is based on examinations of more than 700 insider threat cases and interviews with the United States Secret Service, victims' organizations, and convicted felons. Through our analysis, we identified more than 100 categories of weaknesses in systems, processes, people, or technologies that allowed insider threats to occur. One aspect of our research focuses on identifying enterprise architecture patterns that organizations can use to protect their systems from malicious insider threat. Now that we've developed 26 patterns, our next priority is to assemble these patterns into a pattern language that organizations can use to bolster their resources and make them more resilient against insider threats. This blog post is the third installment in a series that describes our research to create and validate an insider threat mitigation pattern language to help organizations balance the cost of security controls with the risk of insider compromise.
In 2012, Symantec blocked more than 5.5 billion malware attacks (an 81 percent increase over 2010) and reported a 41 percent increase in new variants of malware, according to January 2013 Computer World article. To prevent detection and delay analysis, malware authors often obfuscate their malicious programs with anti-analysis measures. Obfuscated binary code prevents analysts from developing timely, actionable insights by increasing code complexity and reducing the effectiveness of existing tools. This blog post describes research we are conducting at the SEI to improve manual and automated analysis of common code obfuscation techniques used in malware.
When life- and safety-critical systems fail, the results can be dire, including loss of property and life. These types of systems are increasingly prevalent, and can be found in the altitude and control systems of a satellite, the software-reliant systems of a car (such as its cruise control and GPS), or a medical device. When developing such systems, software and systems architects must balance the need for stability and safety with stakeholder demands and time-to-market constraints. The Architectural Analysis & Design Language (AADL) helps software and system architects address the challenges of designing life- and safety-critical systems by providing a modeling notation that employs textual and graphic representations. This blog posting, part of an ongoing series on AADL, describes how AADL is being used in medical devices and highlights the experiences of a practitioner whose research aims to address problems with medical infusion pumps.
Soldiers and emergency workers who carry smartphones in the battlefield, or into disaster recovery sites (such as Boston following the marathon bombing earlier this year) often encounter environments characterized by high mobility, rapidly-changing mission requirements, limited computing resources, high levels of stress, and limited network connectivity. At the SEI, we refer to these situations as "edge environments." Along with my colleagues at the SEI, my research aims to increase the computing power of mobile devices in edge environments where resources are scarce. One area of my work has focused on leveraging cloud computing so users can extend the capabilities of their mobile devices by offloading expensive computations to more powerful computing resources in a cloud. Some drawbacks to offloading computation to the cloud in resource-constrained environments remain, however, including latency (which can be exacerbated by the distance between mobile devices and clouds) and limited internet access (which makes traditional cloud computing unfeasible). This blog post is the latest in a series that describes research aimed at exploring the applicability of application virtualization as a strategy for cyber-foraging in resource-constrained environments.
Risk inherent in any military, government, or industry network system cannot be completely eliminated, but it can be reduced by implementing certain network controls. These controls include administrative, management, technical, or legal methods. Decisions about what controls to implement often rely on computed-risk models that mathematically calculate the amount of risk inherent in a given network configuration. These computed-risk models, however, may not calculate risk levels that human decision makers actually perceive.
The CERT Division of the SEI has a history of helping organizations develop, improve, and assess their incident management functions. Frequently we discover that an organization's primary focus is on security incident response, rather than the broader effort of security incident management. Incident response is just one step in the incident management lifecycle. In this blog post, we look at five recurring issues we regularly encounter in organizations' Incident Management programs, along with recommended solutions. By discovering and resolving these issues, organizations can attain a better cybersecurity posture.