Hi all, this is Jonathan Spring with my colleagues Leigh Metcalf and Rhiannon Weaver. We've been studying the dynamics of the Internet blacklist ecosystem for a few years now and the 2015 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report has corroborated our general results. We get a lot of questions about which list is which and if we can recommend a list. We won't reveal which is which generally, but in this blog post we'll make a small exception (with permission of course) in a case study to update the results.
Ever want to use a Snort-like rule with SiLK or Analysis Pipeline to find text within packets? Timur Snoke and I were recently discussing how we could do this and realized that while neither SiLK nor Analysis Pipeline themselves do packet inspection, YAF can be used to create an application label that can be used in analyses in both SiLK and Pipeline (field 29, application). This post outlines the steps required and provides an example.
Hi. This is Angela Horneman of the SEI's Situational Awareness team. I've generated service specific network flows to use as baseline examples for network analysis and am sharing them since others may find them helpful.
We have been looking at implementing Network Profiling in Analysis Pipeline to automatically generate lists of active servers and to alert when new IPs start acting as servers. As part of this initiative, we started looking at alternatives to using flags in the identification process, since not all collection methods capture TCP flag data. In this process, I looked for example network flows for verified services.
Recently, SuperFish and PrivDog have received some attention because of the risks that they both introduced to customers because of implementation flaws. Looking closer into these types of applications with my trusty CERT Tapioca VM at hand, I've come to realize a few things.
In this blog post, I will explain
The capabilities of SSL and TLS are not well understood by many.
SSL inspection is much more widespread than I suspected.
Many applications that perform SSL inspection have flaws that put users at increased risk.
Even if SSL inspection were performed at least as well as the browsers do, the risk introduced to users is not zero.
Hi folks, Allen Householder here. In my previous post, I introduced our recent work in surveying vulnerability discovery for emerging networked systems (ENS). In this post, I continue with our findings from this effort and look at the differences between ENS and traditional computing in the context of vulnerability discovery, analysis, and disclosure.
Hello, this is Kate Meeuf of the SEI's Situational Awareness team. I'm pleased to announce the publication of the new technical report, Regional Use of Social Networking Tools, which explores regional preferences for social networking tools.
Hi, it's Allen. In addition to building fuzzers to find vulnerabilities (and thinking about adding some concurrency features to BFF in the process), I've been doing some work in the area of cybersecurity information sharing and the ways it can succeed or fail. In both my vulnerability discovery and cybersecurity information sharing work, I've found that I often learn the most by examining the failures -- in part because the successes are often just cases that could have failed, but didn't.
In this blog post I focus on an area of cybersecurity information sharing that's considerably less well understood than incident reporting, malware analysis, or indicator sharing. I'm talking about coordinated vulnerability disclosure and why it's hard.
The third practice described in the newly released edition of the Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats is Practice 3: Clearly document and consistently enforce policies and controls. In this post, I discuss the importance of having consistent and articulated policies and controls in place within your organization.