During the Watergate hearings, Senator Howard Baker asked John Dean a now-famous question: "My primary thesis is still: What did the president know, and when did he know it?" If you understand why that question was important, you have some sense as to why I am very concerned that "zero-day exploit capability" appears as an operative phrase in the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) proposed rules to implement the Wassenaar Arrangement 2013 Plenary Agreements regarding Intrusion and Surveillance Items.
In my last post, I presented how to create a YAF application label signature rule that corresponds to a text-based Snort-type rule. In this post, I discuss methods for using Analysis Pipeline to provide context to those signatures.
The context for signatures can take many forms. Some context can be derived from the individual flows that match the signatures. This information is easy to obtain from either SiLK or another traffic analysis tool--just look at the traffic that matched the signature. Analysis Pipeline lets you easily do more. I will discuss three simple options, but Analysis Pipeline can be used for more complex analyses.
Hi all, this is Jonathan Spring with my colleagues Leigh Metcalf and Rhiannon Weaver. We've been studying the dynamics of the Internet blacklist ecosystem for a few years now and the 2015 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report has corroborated our general results. We get a lot of questions about which list is which and if we can recommend a list. We won't reveal which is which generally, but in this blog post we'll make a small exception (with permission of course) in a case study to update the results.
Ever want to use a Snort-like rule with SiLK or Analysis Pipeline to find text within packets? Timur Snoke and I were recently discussing how we could do this and realized that while neither SiLK nor Analysis Pipeline themselves do packet inspection, YAF can be used to create an application label that can be used in analyses in both SiLK and Pipeline (field 29, application). This post outlines the steps required and provides an example.
Hi. This is Angela Horneman of the SEI's Situational Awareness team. I've generated service specific network flows to use as baseline examples for network analysis and am sharing them since others may find them helpful.
We have been looking at implementing Network Profiling in Analysis Pipeline to automatically generate lists of active servers and to alert when new IPs start acting as servers. As part of this initiative, we started looking at alternatives to using flags in the identification process, since not all collection methods capture TCP flag data. In this process, I looked for example network flows for verified services.
Recently, SuperFish and PrivDog have received some attention because of the risks that they both introduced to customers because of implementation flaws. Looking closer into these types of applications with my trusty CERT Tapioca VM at hand, I've come to realize a few things.
In this blog post, I will explain
The capabilities of SSL and TLS are not well understood by many.
SSL inspection is much more widespread than I suspected.
Many applications that perform SSL inspection have flaws that put users at increased risk.
Even if SSL inspection were performed at least as well as the browsers do, the risk introduced to users is not zero.
The 19th practice described in the newly released edition of the Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats is Practice 19: Close the doors to unauthorized data exfiltration. In this post, I discuss how organizations are vulnerable to data exfiltration and offer potential mitigation strategies.