The report draws on related work such as OWASP but comes from a different point of view. While OWASP is focused on developing web applications securely, this report focuses more on situations where you don't have that control, but you need to protect servers and clients from web-based threats. The report may help you answer the following questions:
What kinds of network monitoring do you need to do?
How do you identify the attacks?
How do you prevent them at the network level?
At more than 100 pages, the report is as comprehensive as we could make it and still get it out in a (relatively) timely manner.
Hi, folks. As you can see, we've changed the name of the Vulnerability Analysis Blog to the CERT/CC Blog. With this name change, we're expanding the focus of the blog to include content from other technical teams.
The current RSS and Atom feeds will continue to work, but you may want to update to the corresponding new feed location now (RSS, Atom) in order to avoid any problems in the future.
Past blog entries will continue to be available at the existing URLs.
Recently the Network Situational Awareness team at CERT has been researching the characteristics of malicious network touchpoints. The findings of this initial research are very telling as to the true state of security on the internet.
Hi folks. I've been involved in a fuzzing effort at CERT. One of the ways that I've been able to discover vulnerabilities is through "dumb" or mutational fuzzing. We have developed a framework for performing automated dumb fuzzing. Today we are releasing a simplified version of automated dumb fuzzing, called the Basic Fuzzing Framework (BFF).
Recently there have been some statistics published on botnet Command & Control (C2) channels. These statistics claim that 94.58% of botnet C2 channels are under the .com top level domain (TLD). While it's impossible to accurately comment on those statistics without knowing the methodology used to arrive at them, we at CERT have been doing research concerning malicious domain names that arrives at a different result.
Reading email messages in plain text seems like a reasonable thing to do to improve the security of your email client. Plain text takes less processing than HTML, which should help minimize your attack surface, right? As it turns out, Outlook Express (and its derivatives) is doing more than you think when it is configured with the "Read all messages in plain text" option enabled.
My prior blog post on product lines in DoD sustainment described the complexity of contractual relationships in a DoD software product line. Recall that a software product line is a collection of related products with shared software artifacts and engineering...