As a vulnerability analyst at the CERT Coordination Center, I am interested not only in software vulnerabilities themselves, but also exploits and exploit mitigations. Working in this field, it doesn't take too long to realize that there will never be an end to software vulnerabilities. That is to say, software defects are not going away. For this reason, software exploit mitigations are usually much more valuable than individual software fixes. Being able to mitigate entire classes of software vulnerabilities is a powerful capability. One of the reasons why we strongly promote mitigation tools like EMET or Windows Defender Exploit Guard, which is the replacement for EMET on the Windows 10 platform, is because exploit mitigation protections are not limited to the specific vulnerability du jour.
While looking at a recent exploit for VLC on Windows, I noticed some unexpected behaviors. In this blog post, I will describe how my journey led me to the discovery of several flaws that put users of many applications at unnecessary risk. VLC isn't the only victim here.
Back in 2016, a coworker of mine was using CERT BFF, and he asked how he could turn a seemingly exploitable crash in Microsoft Office into a proof-of-concept exploit that runs calc.exe. Given Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) on modern Windows platforms, this isn't as easy as it used to be. One strategy to bypass ASLR that is possible in some cases is to leverage a memory leak to disclose memory addresses. Another strategy that is sometimes possible is to brute-force attack the vulnerability to make ASLR irrelevant. In this case, however, the path of least resistance was to simply use Rich Text Format (RTF) content to leverage Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) to load a library that doesn't opt in to using ASLR.
As I started pulling the thread of RTF and OLE, I uncovered a weakness that is much more severe than an ASLR bypass. Continue reading to follow my path of investigation, which leads to crashed Windows systems and stolen passwords.
We are happy to announce the release of the CERT® Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD). The guide provides an introduction to the key concepts, principles, and roles necessary to establish a successful CVD process. It also provides insights into how CVD can go awry and how to respond when it does so.
In this blog post, I discuss the impact of insecure software updates as well as several related topics, including mistakes made by software vendors in their update mechanisms, how to verify the security of a software update, and how vendors can implement secure software updating mechanisms.
While investigating the fixes for the recent Microsoft Office OLE vulnerability, I encountered a situation that led me to believe that Office 2016 was not properly patched. However, after further investigation, I realized that the update process of Microsoft Update has changed. If you are not aware of these changes, you may end up with a Microsoft Office installation that is missing security updates. With the goal of preventing others from making similar mistakes as I have, I outline in this blog post how the way Microsoft Office receives updates has changed.
The Google Identity Platform is a system that allows you to sign in to applications and other services by using your Google account. Google Sign-In is one such method for providing your identity to the Google Identity Platform. Google Sign-In is available for Android applications and iOS applications, as well as for websites and other devices.
Users of Google Sign-In find that it integrates well with the Android platform, but iOS users (iPhone, iPad, etc.) do not have the same experience. The user experience when logging in to a Google account on an iOS application is not only more tedious than the Android experience, but it also conditions users to engage in behaviors that put their Google accounts at risk!
Application whitelisting is a useful defense against users running unapproved applications. Whether you're dealing with a malicious executable file that slips through email defenses, or you have a user that is attempting to run an application that your organization has not approved for use, application whitelisting can help prevent those activities from succeeding.
Some enterprises may deploy application whitelisting with the idea that it prevents malicious code from executing. But not all malicious code arrives in the form of a single executable application file. Many configurations of application whitelisting do not prevent malicious code from executing, though. In this blog post I explain how this is possible.
Recently, there has been a resurgence of malware that is spread via Microsoft Word macro capabilities. In 1999, CERT actually published an advisory about the Melissa virus, which leveraged macros to spread. We even published an FAQ about the Melissa virus that suggests to disable macros in Microsoft Office products.
Why is everything old new again? Reliability of the exploit is one reason, but the user interface of Microsoft Office is also to blame.
A few months ago, a widely-publicized set of vulnerabilities called StageFright hit the Android ecosystem. While Google fixed the vulnerabilities in what appears to be a reasonable amount of time, the deployment of those fixes to end-user devices is another story. Many Android devices have a lengthy supply chain, which can make the process of deploying OS updates a slow and uncertain process. In this blog post, I investigate the supply chain of the Android platform and show how it can affect the security of the OS.