




# To Resiliency and Beyond!

How to engineer survivable systems

# Today's Map








# About Me




Matt Wiseman  
Managing Principal  
Cyber Resilient Engineering  
at Fathom5


# About the Maritime Domain





# About Fathom5







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**Why has the status quo failed to protect critical systems?**

# NIST Interagency Report 8011 (2017)

- *Automation Support for Security Control Assessments*

“predefined control sets have been applied to provide detailed technical requirements **without documenting traceability** of control items to more general requirements”

“many security programs have focused on the individual controls as a **compliance checklist**, with **little consideration given to how the controls work together**”



# Rugged Software (2010)

- *Manifesto, Handbook, and Implementation Guide*

“The best projects today perform activities like threat modeling, security architecture, secure coding training, and security testing. However, **it’s generally unclear how these activities connect back to the business goals**”

“Frequently these activities simply report vulnerabilities or risks that **do not become part of any sort of coherent security strategy**. In fact, most of these efforts **create no lasting value**, and are simply repeated from scratch after some period of time.”

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Why has the status quo failed to protect critical systems?



**Requirements need to be linked to business/mission value**





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
**Is security a “functional” or  
“non-functional” requirement?**



# First, Some Definitions

## Functional

- Unit of work
- What a thing does



## Non-functional

- Measure of performance
- How well a thing works



# Quality is Non-Functional

- Reliability
- Maintainability
- Usability
- Availability
- Portability
- “other –ilities...”

What about Security?





# Security is Non-Functional

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Authenticity
- Non-Repudiation





[This Photo](#) by Unknown Author is licensed under [CC BY-SA-NC](#)

# Security is Functional

- Cryptography
- Secrets Management
- Mutual Authentication
- Logging
- Auditing
- Intrusion Prevention
- ...





# SECURITY ENGINEERING

CAPABILITY /  
FEATURE  
DEVELOPMENT

TEST / QA /  
RISK MGMT


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Is security a “functional” or “non-functional” requirement?



**Both! There are capabilities to build (for unique users) and metrics to assess**





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**Is the industry balancing  
investments in the right  
tech?**



# Today's Most Popular Tools

- SAST
- DAST
- SCA
- SBOM Generators
- Image Scanners
- Network Pen Test Tools

These tools reinforce a non-functional security stereotype when applied in isolation!

(i.e. nothing to engineer, just findings to track and patch)

# Tomorrow's Most Popular Tools (a bet)

- Hardened Libs/Archs
- Extensible Fuzzing Frameworks
- Debloaters
- Declarative Security Engines/Runbooks
- Resiliency Models
- AI-Driven Pen Test Agents

Today's tools are still necessary, but Security Engineering would benefit from more that lend themselves to functional development!




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Is the industry balancing investments  
in the right tech?



**Need to shift focus to  
system resiliency by  
design over managing  
CVEs/CWEs**






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**What can we do to start  
engineering for resilience?**

# Engineering for Resilience

- “What functions do I need to engineer into my system to protect, detect, respond, and recover from cyber events?”
  - Threat Modeling starts providing answers...




[https://owasp.org/www-community/Threat\\_Modeling\\_Process](https://owasp.org/www-community/Threat_Modeling_Process)



# NISTIR 8011

“The four abstraction layers support integrated systems engineering by making the desired results of a security program **clear and measurable** at a concrete level. This, in turn, makes the results more understandable to non-security experts and thereby easier to **link to desired business/mission results.**”

- 1) Attack Step Layer
- 2) Functional Capability Layer
- 3) Sub-Capability Layer
- 4) Control Item Layer




<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2017/NIST.IR.8011-1.pdf>



# Rugged Software

“rugged describes staying ahead of the threat over time. Rugged organizations create secure code as a byproduct of their culture. You are rugged because you run the gauntlet, instrument your organization and your code, constantly experiment to see if anything breaks, and survive the process of **hardening yourself through real-world experience**. Rugged organizations produce rugged code designed to **withstand not just today’s threat, but future challenges as well.**”



<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rugged-software/rugged-software.github.io/master/documents/Rugged-Handbook-v7.pdf>



## Nat'l Cyber Strat

“We will complement our efforts to out-innovate other countries with focused, coordinated action to optimize critical and emerging technologies for cybersecurity **as they are developed and deployed.** We will ensure that **resilience is not a discretionary element of new technical capabilities but a commercially viable element** of the innovation and deployment process.”



<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf>


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What can we do to start engineering for resilience?



**Assume compromise.  
Put yourself in the  
hacker's shoes. Keep  
it outcome focused.**





# How do we operationalize this?




# Our Cyber Resiliency Playbook

☐ Phase 1: Release the CVEs!



☐ Phase 2: Speed-Run MVS!



☐ Phase 3+: Malicious BDD 'til Infinity!



# (1) Release the CVEs!




<https://www.amazon.com/Clash-Titans-Sam-Worthington/dp/B002ZG977Y>

We start by surfacing the known vulnerabilities and weaknesses, giving us the opportunity to kill risk at the source

- ✓ SAST
- ✓ Image Scanning
- ✓ SBOM Generation + Scanning
- ✓ CVSS x EPSS x SSVC for a Risk-Based Approach to Vulnerability Triage



## (2) Speed-Run Min Viable Security!



<https://www.polygon.com/2014/6/5/5784190/mario-maker-nintendo-e3-2014-rumor>

We prioritize the top 20% of functional specifications that buy down 80% of the attack surface, and deploy to prod

- ✓ Secure-by-Design/Default (per CISA)
- ✓ Pass Compliance Muster (can't deploy an MVP otherwise)

[https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/principles\\_approaches\\_for\\_security-by-design-default\\_508\\_0.pdf](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/principles_approaches_for_security-by-design-default_508_0.pdf)

# (3) Malicious BDD 'til Infinity!



<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/e/e1/93tilinfinity.jpg>

We put on our white hats to stress test system performance under malicious activity, and continuously engineer improvements

- ✓ System Modeling and Criticality Analysis
- ✓ Threat Modeling with Malicious Behavior Statements
- ✓ White Box Software Penetration Testing
- ✓ Engineer Protection, Detection, Response, and Recovery Capabilities
- ✓ Re-Test & Repeat



# Summary

- Security needs to connect back to key mission outcomes to yield lasting value
- Security Engineering is both functional and non-functional
- DevSecOps culture is key to implementing it
- More investments are needed in functional security technology
- The more we break and fix, the higher our system resiliency can become with each new release
- We can demonstrate clear measurable improvement in mission performance from cybersecurity investments

# Questions? Interested? Contact Me



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cyber@fathom5.co