### Building a Trustworthy Computing Platform

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
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#### **Trust Anchors for Fielded Systems**




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### **Trust Anchors for Fielded Systems**



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# **Trusting Trust: Problem and Solution**

- Self-propagating compiler hack (Ken Thompson)
  - Malicious C compiler inserts Trojan during victim program build
    - Clean source  $\rightarrow$  malicious binary
      - Including compiler's own sources!
    - Compiler source hack no longer needed after 1st iteration!
- David A. Wheeler's defense: Diverse Double Compilation
  - Suspect compiler A: source  $S_A$ , binary  $B_A$
  - Trusted compiler T: binary  $\mathsf{B}_{\mathsf{T}}$

$$S_A \rightarrow B_A \rightarrow X$$
  $S_A \rightarrow B_T \rightarrow Y$ 

• X and Y are functionally identical, but different binaries

$$S_A \rightarrow X \rightarrow X_1 \qquad \qquad S_A \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Y_1$$

•  $X_1$  and  $Y_1$  must be identical binaries (since X, Y functionally identical)

### Recommendations

- Retain ability to *field strip* our cyber-weapons!
  - Require capability to rebuild system from *sources* 
    - *Including* tool chain sources: HDL & software compilers!
  - Show of good faith from upstream supplier(s)
  - Built-in sustainment capability from day one
    - Solve "Trusting Trust" concerns
      - Available source code (to everything) acting as trust anchor


## Bootstrapping a Trustworthy Platform

- Use DDC to obtain a clean C [cross-]compiler
- [Cross-]compile HDL compiler toolchain
- Cross-compile target OS (kernel, glibc, utilities)
- Build FPGA bitstream with HDL toolchain
- Boot target OS on FPGA
  - Self-hosting from this point forward
    - Any system component can be (re)built on the system itself!
  - Trust anchor: the cumulative set of source code
    - HDL, OS (kernel, glibc, utilities), and Compilers (C & HDL)

## List of Ingredients

- FPGA development board
  - Lattice ECP5 Versa: LFE5UM5G-45F-VERSA
- Free/Open HDL (Hardware Description Language) toolchain
  - Verilog front-end: https://github.com/YosysHQ/yosys
  - ECP5 device db. & bitstream tools: https://github.com/SymbiFlow/prjtrellis
  - Place & Route back-end: https://github.com/YosysHQ/nextpnr
- Free/Open 64-bit CPU (RISC-V ISA)
  - RocketChip: https://github.com/freechipsproject/rocket-chip
- Free/Open System-on-Chip (SoC) environment (sys. bus & peripherals)
  - LiteX: https://github.com/enjoy-digital/litex
- Software stack (Linux, GCC, glibc)
  - Fedora: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Architectures/RISC-V

## Simplified Computer Architecture





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